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ABSTRACT 
The measurement of preferences concerning health outcomes has the potential 
to provide important information on the benefits associated with alternative 
allocations of the health care budget. However, there are a number of 
important and controversial issues which must be addressed when measuring 
such preferences and this thesis addresses some of these. 
It begins by briefly outlining some of the problems associated with measuring 
benefits in monetary units and then concentrates on issues relating to the 
measurement of health-related quality-of-life (HRQoL). It then focuses upon 
the following issues: the relationships between, and the appropriateness of, 
different valuation methods; the methodologies that can be adopted to estimate 
a full set of health state valuations from a subset of direct valuations; the 
factors that may influence or bias stated responses; and the appropriateness of 
using individual valuations of HRQoL as measures of social value. 
In addressing each of these issues, valuation data gathered principally from 
members of the general public but also from convenience samples of students 
are used to test different hypotheses. The data analysed here form one of the 
most comprehensive datasets ever gathered on respondent preferences 
concerning HRQoL and thus enable much additional light to be shed on the 
issues outlined above. Of course, such data itself generates additional 
questions and the thesis also looks at the ways in which future research might 
be directed towards addressing them. 
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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUES 
CHAPTER 1.1: VALUING THE BENEFITS OF HEALTH CARE 
Introduction 
Under conditions of perfect competition, price exactly equals marginal cost. In 
other words, the value consumers place on the last unit of production is exactly 
equal to its opportunity cost of production; a situation of allocative efficiency. In 
addition, in can be shown that in the long-run a firm in a perfectly competitive 
market is forced to the point of maximum technical efficiency. Neither is true of 
any other market structure. It is these propositions which underlie the 
"predilection of the market" on the part of many economists from Adam Smith 
onwards. 
The reliance on market forces to allocate goods implies that the prevailing income 
distribution (or, more strictly, the income distribution after any transfers of wealth 
and income) is considered acceptable. It also rests on the acceptance of additional 
value judgements: for example, that individuals are the best judges of their own 
well-being, and that social welfare depends only on the welfare of persons in 
society. Although these latter value judgements are of very general appeal, there 
are conditions (for example, concerning the consumption of hard drugs) under 
which many people might think it justifiable to override individual preferences. 
Whilst it is generally accepted that no market works perfectly, it may still be that 
leaving the resource allocation process to be determined by market forces remains 
the best way of getting as close as possible to the ideal outcomes (given the value 
judgements cited above) of the perfect market. However, the basic rationale 
underlying government intervention in health care is that none of the assumptions 
of perfect markets (fully informed consumers, a large number of suppliers etc. ) 
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work in the case of health care. In other words, there are important characteristics 
of the commodity health care which render it more susceptible than other 
commodities to government intervention (see McGuire et al [ 1988] pp 182-93). 
If market forces are no longer relied upon to promote an efficient allocation of 
resources, it is necessary to find alternative ways in which to value the costs and 
benefits of health care, so that governments will be better able to deploy the 
limited resources at their disposal where they will be of greatest benefit. By 
leaving resource allocation to the market, this benefit is defined in terms of 
consumer preferences which are expressed by their willingness to pay, matched by 
their ability to pay. But when there is government intervention in the market, 
there are questions relating to how benefit is defined and how it is to be allocated 
amongst the population. 
This thesis will concentrate on how the measurement of preferences concerning 
health-related quality-of-life (HRQoL) can be used to provide information on the 
benefits associated with alternative allocations of the health care budget. It begins, 
though, by considering an alternative methodology; namely, cost-benefit analysis, 
which is well-grounded in economic theory and which attempts to capture all the 
benefits associated with health care, but which suffers from a number of 
methodological problems. After briefly outlining the limitations of cost- 
effectiveness analysis, the thesis will then consider cost-utility analysis which has 
been widely used by health economists in the evaluation of health care 
programmes. This section will look at the problems associated with using more 
narrow measures of benefit like HRQoL before discussing the process of 
developing a measure of HRQoL that will be of use to economists wishing to 
compare a wide range of diverse health care interventions and policies. 
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Cost-benefit analysis 
In general terms, a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of a programme requires the 
identification of all the costs and benefits derived by all members of the community 
affected by the programme. It then requires these costs and benefits to be 
measured in some common unit so that aggregate benefits can be compared with 
aggregate costs. In this way, CBA provides an estimate of the value of resources 
used up by each programme compared to the value of resources the programme 
might save or benefits it might produce. Since costs are typically measured in 
monetary units, it is usual to express benefits likewise. 
There are essentially three methods that can be adopted in order to attach 
monetary values to commodities that are not traded on the market. First, the 
human capital approach measures the value of preventing someone's death, injury 
or illness as the gain in the value of their present earnings. Second, the revealed 
preference approach attempts to observe decisions individuals make concerning 
risks to their health and then to infer their willingness to trade money for changes 
in these risks. Third, the contingent valuation method (CVM) which uses answers 
to survey questions to estimate an individual's willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a 
particular good, risk reduction or health improvement. For a more detailed 
discussion of these approaches see Jones-Lee [1976] and Sugden and Williams 
[1978]). 
Because of problems associated with the first two approaches (for example, the 
human capital method does not take individual preferences into account and the 
revealed preferences method relies on (imperfect) market data), it is now generally 
accepted that in principle the CVM offers the most direct and effective means of 
establishing preference-based monetary values. The method was originally 
developed to estimate the value of environmental changes, such as the 
preservation of a recreational area (for a review, see Cummings et al [ 1986]). The 
CVM was probably first used in health care by Acton [ 1973] but most of the 
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studies is this area have taken place in the last 10 years (see the review by 
Donaldson [1993]). 
It is essential in any CVM study that the scenario being valued is both plausible 
and meaningful to respondents. Needless to say, these requirements are not 
unproblematic. In their typology of potential response effect biases in CV studies, 
Mitchell and Carson [1989] identify three main types of bias relating to the design 
of the CV instrument: 1) incentives to misrepresent responses: this includes 
strategic bias, whereby a respondent (perhaps through acting out of self-interest) 
has an incentive to under- or over-state their true WTP; 2) implied value cues: for 
example, starting point bias in bidding games, whereby a respondent's stated WTP 
may be influenced by the first bid they receive; and 3) scenario misspecification: 
this occurs when the respondent does not respond to the correct scenario, usually 
because the question is formulated incorrectly. 
Another potentially important bias arises from the fact that the CVM provides 
hypothetical answers to hypothetical questions. Thus, we cannot be certain that 
the respondent would behave in the same way in a real situation as they do in an 
experimental one. Mitchell and Carson [1989] argue that there is no evidence that 
the results from CV studies are biased in any systematic way but some studies 
have shown that the WTP based on the CVM is higher than the WTP based on 
actual decisions (see Cummings et al [ 1995]). 
Against this background, the CVM has become the subject of heated controversy 
in the literature. For example, in the environmental context, possibly the most 
wide-ranging and fundamental debate, involving some fierce exchanges of views, 
followed the Exxon Valdez oil spillage (see Carson et al [ 1992], Arrow et al 
[ 1993] and Hausman [ 1993]). Much of this debate centred around the 
measurement of non-use values, due to the public good properties of 
environmental change. Since health is primarily (though not exclusively) a private 
good, the problems in using CVM in health care might be smaller. However, in 
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the context of safety, a recent study suggested that responses to CV questions 
designed to estimate the value of a statistical life are insufficiently sensitive to the 
size of the reduction in the risk of death faced by the respondent. As a result, 
there are now serious doubts as to the validity of monetary values of non-market 
goods established on the basis of responses to CV questions. 
In addition, the appropriateness of eliciting (WTP) valuations for commodities like 
health care, for which government intervention indicates that willingness-to-pay 
should not be the main criterion for allocating resources, is questionable. Of 
course, this criticism stems from the fact that WTP is constrained by ability to pay 
and it is possible to construct hypothetical experiments which mitigate against the 
respondents' actual ability to pay influencing their responses. However, this raises 
additional questions about the validity of WTP responses that are not subject to an 
effective budget constraint. In any event, respondents, particularly those in 
societies with public provision of health care, may be hostile to questions that are 
couched in monetary terms and some policy-makers may be hesitant to base 
decisions on health benefits denominated in monetary units. 
Alternative approaches 
In view of all this, it is not surprising that many researchers have sought alternative 
methods of measuring the benefits of health care programmes. Since CBA is the 
only methodology that, at least in theory, provides information on the absolute 
benefit of programmes, the alternatives have concentrated only on the assessment 
of their relative performance. In this way, they can be seen as addressing a 
second-best optimisation problem i. e. assessing how best to allocate health care 
resources once the level of these resources have been determined. Although this is 
certainly a departure from the first-best world where we can say something about 
the appropriate level of resources devoted to health care relative to other demands 
on the public purse, Weinstein and Zeckhauser [1973] have shown that resource 
allocation problems involving a fixed budget may be solved by looking at the ratio 
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of benefits to costs for each project, and all projects with a ratio greater than an 
(endogenously determined) critical ratio are undertaken. 
One of the alternative methods that can be used to evaluate health care 
programmes is cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). This includes both the costs and 
consequences of the alternatives, using a single outcome measure expressed in 
natural units, for example, life years gained. It allows comparisons between 
treatments where the effectiveness is not equal. However, the results are 
meaningful only when the alternatives compared results in a change in the same 
outcome measure. It is not possible to rank therapies with different outcomes, for 
example, hip replacements where the primary outcome is mobility with surgery for 
cataracts, where the primary outcome is sight. In other words, CEA informs 
choices about the economic merits of interventions within but not between 
therapeutic categories. In addition, it permits inclusion of only one outcome 
measure, whereas many interventions have several potential benefits. 
Cost-utility analysis 
Unlike CEA, cost-utility analysis (CUA) combines multiple outcomes into a single 
measure and thus allows comparisons of the efficiency of interventions between 
different conditions. Here benefits are measured in terms of the utility associated 
with different levels of, or improvements in, health status. These utilities, or more 
accurately measures of HRQoL since preferences are elicited within the domain of 
health, are typically expressed on a scale where 'full health' is assigned an index 
value of 1 and 'death' an index value of 0 (see Torrance [ 1986]). To allow for the 
possibility that some states may be regarded as being worse than death, negative 
indices are often also allowed for. The indices attached to different states of 
health then provide the basis of a common denominator which allows the costs and 
benefits of different health care programmes to be compared. This common 
denominator is often expressed in terms of quality-adjusted life-years (or QALYs), 
which attempt to combine the value of quality of life with the value of length of 
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life into a single index number, which may then be used as a currency in which the 
benefits of health care interventions can be expressed. 
It is worth noting that this thesis is not exclusively about QALYs - after the brief 
discussion here, the term does not reappear again until Chapter 5- but about 
issues relating to the measurement of preferences concerning HRQoL more 
generally. However, since the QALY is one of the best known tools for aiding 
decision-making in the domain of health care, and are derived principally from the 
elicitation of preferences concerning HRQoL, it is worth considering their scope 
and limitations. Because one of the main advantages of CBA is that in principle it 
can account for all the benefits associated with a particular health care programme, 
attention will be focused on the extent to which QALYs can in principle do the 
same. Issues relating to the measurement of HRQoL (whether for use in QALY 
calculations or not) are discussed in more detail in the main body of text in this 
thesis. 
As alluded to above, QALYs essentially measure health. The question that arises, 
then, is to what extent does improved health encompass the benefits of health 
care? Whilst it is reasonable to assume that the objectives of health care (whether 
decided upon by politicians, doctors, patients or the general public) will be 
dominated by considerations about health, is it also reasonable to assume that 
these considerations will strictly dominate all others all of the time? Mooney 
[ 1994] has suggested that these other benefits may relate to the extent to which 
the provision of health care is equitable, the value of information that doctors and 
others can provide, and the autonomy that patient's have in the decision-making 
process (pp 16-20). Let us take each of these in turn. 
There has been considerable debate in the health economics literature about what 
type of equity we want our health care system to promote; for example, do we 
want a system that promotes equal access for equal need (however need is 
defined), as argued by Mooney [ 1994] or one that promotes equal health, as 
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suggested by Culyer [1995]. In so far as we are concerned with inequalities in 
health, QALYs can in principle take such concerns into account and how this 
might be done in practice is discussed in Chapters 5.1 and 5.2. This author 
suspects that this is what we (be it the general public, patients, special interest 
groups or health care professionals) would be most concerned about but this is, of 
course, an empirical question; and one that he intends to address in future work. 
In a number of screening programmes, it has been shown that patients value 
information per se (see Lange et al [1991] and Mooney and Lange [1993]), 
although the weight attached to information is likely to be considerably less in 
treatment programmes. Another argument likely to be in the patient's utility 
function is autonomy, which Mooney [1994] defines as the right to make a 
consumption decision, as well as the right not to make it. The question here is 
whether or not information and autonomy can be taken account of within the 
QALY framework. 
It is the view of this author that in principle information (at least about one's 
current or future health status) can be taken account of within an appropriately 
defined 'mental health' dimension of a HRQoL instrument but that to incorporate 
autonomy is more problematic since QALYs are concerned with outcomes rather 
than the processes by which the outcomes come about. However, until empirical 
evidence shows that such factors as autonomy are sufficiently important for 
respondents to trade health off for them, it seems entirely justifiable that CUA 
proceeds in a piecemeal fashion assuming that things other than health are held 
constant. 
The discussion in this chapter has highlighted the main issues associated with the 
use of CBA and CUA in the evaluation of health care programmes. In assessing 
the appropriateness of the two approaches, this author agrees with Johansson 
[ 1995] when he suggests that "there seems to be no strong reason for arguing 
emphatically in favour of one or the other approach to benefits measures or in 
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favour of cost-benefit analysis over cost-effectiveness analysis [which he takes to 
include CUA]; there is no measure which works in all possible circumstances; and 
cost-effectiveness analysis and cost-benefit analysis are complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive approaches" (p162-3). Against this background, issues related 
to the measurement of HRQoL are now discussed. 
CHAPTER 1.2: THE MEASUREMENT OF HRQOL FOR USE IN CUA 
Introduction 
There are two main stages in the development of any measure of HRQoL. The 
first is to describe health status, preferably in such a way that different states of 
health can be identified. The second stage involves determining the numerical 
index value to be attached to the health states so described. Whilst the approach 
taken by the MVH Group will be discussed in this way, it must be remembered 
that the distinction between the two stages is not quite so clear-cut, since any 
decision made during the first stage to leave a particular aspect of health out of the 
descriptive system implies a value of zero in the second stage. 
Description 
There exist a number of different types of health state descriptive systems, each 
designed for a specific purpose. For example, condition-specific instruments are 
designed to measure HRQoL within a particular condition or disease group. They 
typically contain very detailed descriptions of a limited number (often only one) of 
the dimensions of health, since they are designed to be sensitive to small changes 
within the dimension(s) relevant to the particular condition. Attempts have been 
made to establish an 'exchange rate' between the different condition-specific 
measures so as to facilitate comparisons across disease groups but this has proved 
problematic (see Cairns et al [ 1991 ]). 
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Generic measures have been developed which measure health status across a range 
of different dimensions and as a result are typically less sensitive than condition- 
specific measures. Most generic measures consist of a health profile which allow a 
comparison of health within each dimension independently but do not combine the 
different dimensions to form an overall single index. For many health profiles, it 
would be impractical to try to do so since the combination of the various levels of 
the different dimensions would typically generate a universe of health states that is 
too large to elicit indices for; for example, the SF-36 (see Ware and Sherbourne 
[1992]) generates over ten million possible health states. 
Those profile measures for which it is conceivably possible to generate an overall 
score often avoid the question of preferences by assuming that the levels within 
each dimension are equi-distant and even those that do have preference-based 
indices within each dimension often assume that each dimension contributes 
equally to the overall score (for example, see Spitzer et al [ 1981 ]). Therefore, 
neither condition-specific nor profile measures are suitable for use in informing 
resource allocation decisions across a range of diverse interventions. 
In fact, at the time the MVH Group began work, there were remarkably few 
instruments that were suitable. The exceptions were the McMaster Health State 
Classification System (see Torrance [ 1982]), the Sickness Impact Profile (see 
Bergner et al [ 1981 ]) and the Quality of Well-Being Scale (see Patrick et al 
[1973]). Because these instruments are all of North American origin, the 
problems associated with cross-cultural comparisons of health (see Hunt et al 
[ 1991 ]) meant that a new generic instrument which is capable of being reduced to 
single index was required. 
There are essentially two ways in which such an instrument can be developed (see 
Kind [ 1990]). One is a 'top-down' approach in which the researcher makes a 
judgement about the relevant aspects of health, based either on their personal 
views or upon an existing definition; for example, that of the World Health 
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Organisation (WHO) which expresses health in terms of overall physical, 
emotional and social well-being. The problem with this approach is that without 
reference to a wider set of judgements, there can be no guarantee that all relevant 
aspects of health have been included. 
The other is the 'bottom-up' approach which, by asking a wider population to 
provide the relevant aspects, partially overcomes the problem of judging what 
should be included in the descriptive system. For example, the general public 
and/or patients can be surveyed (typically using a very 'open-ended' questionnaire 
format) in order to generate the descriptive material necessary to generate the 
health states. As with the 'top-down' approach, though, the researcher must make 
some judgement; this time about how this descriptive material should be organised 
so as to provide a viable set of descriptions. 
The MVH Group in collaboration with researchers from Northern Europe 
(together calling themselves the EuroQol Group) decided to draw on both 
approaches. From published literature and their own experiences, the Group drew 
up a number of dimensions which they called the 'common core' since they were 
the items which most instruments contained, and then surveyed a number of 
different population groups in the UK to assess the extent which these were 
considered the most salient dimensions of health (see van Dalen et al [ 1994] for 
details). 
After some revisions, and heated debate within the Group as to how best to 
balance considerations of coverage, importance of items and complexity against 
one another, the current EuroQol descriptive system evolved consisting of five 
dimensions, each of which comprises three levels of severity (see Figure 1.2.1), 
thus generating 35=243 possible health states. Of course, some of these states, for 
example, 33331, might be considered to be highly implausible but circumstances 
where they exist cannot be ruled out ex ante. For completeness, two further states 
were added, unconscious and dead, making 245 in all. 
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Valuation 
For the EuroQol to be used in evaluating the health benefits associated with 
different health care interventions, it is important to derive a single index number 
for each of the 245 states. In determining these indices, there are three broad 
strategies: 1) use expert judgement, 2) use indices obtained from relevant 
literature, or c) use direct measurement of the preferences of an appropriate 
population (see Torrance [1986]). Because of the potential sources of bias 
associated with the first two (for example, judgements may be wrong, or published 
literature may be inappropriate) the third strategy is generally seen as the most 
appropriate and was the one adopted by the MVH Group. 
In eliciting valuations for health states, two important issues must be considered: 
whose valuations should be sought, and how should these be derived? In 
answering the first question, we could elicit the preferences of doctors and other 
health care professionals, patients, or the general public. Since doctors might be 
thought of as having a broader and more objective view of the relative severity of 
different states of health, it might be appropriate to give greatest weight to their 
preferences. But, in a sense, greatest weight is already given to their views in that 
they hold a powerful position in the provision of health care. 
It is sometimes argued that it is most appropriate to elicit valuations from those 
people who are currently experiencing the health states for which index values are 
sought. The argument seems to be that these are the only people who know what 
it is really like to be in these states but there are a number of points that need to be 
made here. First, the proposition itself may be flawed since, apart from the more 
severe health states, the distinction between those with current experience of 
illness and those without is really very blurred. Even in supposedly 'healthy' 
populations (for example, the general public), there is a substantial degree of 'ill' 
health and many currently 'healthy' people have experienced 'ill' health at some 
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time in their lives (even if they may sometimes have difficulty recalling it; see 
Christensen-Szalanski [1984]). 
Second, it is possible that patient preferences may be susceptible to strategic bias, 
similar to that outlined in the discussion of the CVM. Of course, this may be true 
of any group of respondents but is potentially more likely amongst patients who 
may feel that their treatment will be directly affected by their responses. This 
suggests that when making comparisons of interventions that affect many different 
population sub-groups, it is likely that the views of the whole population will be 
most relevant. Third, even if we could 'trust' patient responses, there is the 
question of whether or not we would want to. Since it is well-established that 
there is a direct positive link between the time spent in ill health and adaptation to 
that ill health (see Meyerowitz [ 1983] and Cassileth et al [ 1984]), the question 
that arises is whether or not such adaptation should be taken into account when 
allocating resources which will deal with the treatment of prospective patients. 
In general terms, the answer to this question will turn largely on whether social 
welfare is looked at ex ante or ex post. The ex ante approach means that social 
welfare is viewed as a function of the expected levels of utility attained by different 
individuals. The ex post approach means that utility is calculated conditional on 
everybody experiencing the same state of the world, and then to arrive at the 
overall level of social welfare, the utility of all the possible states of the world is 
weighted by the probability that these states occur. 
The two approaches will only yield the same result when the social welfare 
function is of the utilitarian form (see Milne and Shefrin [1987]). Whilst the ex 
post approach has its proponents, most notably Broome [1991], it is fair to say 
that most economists, particularly those involved in empirical research, have 
adopted the ex ante approach. This may in part be due to the fact that the ex ante 
approach lends itself much more readily to empirical investigation. This author 
feels that the ex post approach has much to commend it but, since resource 
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allocation decisions do principally affect future (rather than current) patients, not 
least because they may be the one denied treatment in the future, it seems 
legitimate to give weight to the ex ante preferences of potential patients when 
making ex ante resource allocation decisions. 
Finally, it could be argued that, since the general public pay for health care, their 
preferences should be the chosen basis for the weights used in the resource 
allocation process. This is consistent with conventional welfare economic theory 
which suggests that public sector decisions should, so far as possible, reflect the 
preferences of all those who will be affected by these decisions. 
For these reasons, the MVH Group decided that its main fieldwork would 
concentrate on eliciting the preferences of the UK population and in a large-scale 
general population study (henceforth referred to as the Main Study) we went to 
considerable lengths to ensure that the sample was as representative of the wider 
population as possible. In this thesis, the empirical results presented in Chapters 2, 
3 and 4 are based on the valuations of the general public whilst the exploratory 
studies on measuring attitudes towards equity in Chapter 5 are based on valuations 
from convenience samples. It is important, however, that valuations are elicited 
from as many different population sub-groups as possible since empirical evidence 
on inter-rater differences will illuminate the issues surrounding whose values 
should count. Ultimately, though, this decision will be a political not a scientific or 
empirical one. 
How valuations should be derived raises two important questions: one concerns 
the choice of valuation method(s) and the other concerns the approach adopted to 
valuing all 245 EuroQol health states. An important consideration in the choice of 
method is the level of measurement that is required. Valuation methods can 
produce scales that are ordinal, interval or ratio (see Froberg and Kane [1989]). 
An ordinal scale is one in which health states are ranked in order of severity but 
there is no indication of how much more severe one state is compared to another. 
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An interval scale provides information on how far apart those states are in terms of 
severity but it does not indicate the absolute magnitude of severity. A ratio scale 
is achieved when the distance from zero is known for at least one state, and thus 
the absolute severity can be determined for all states. CUA requires that cardinal 
indices be assigned to each health state on an interval scale (see Lipscomb [1982] 
and Chapter 1.1 above). 
Three methods that in principle generate valuations that lie on an interval scale 
have been widely used in a number of studies; the visual analogue scale (VAS), the 
standard gamble (SG) and the time trade-off (TTO). For this reason, these 
methods have been used in the studies conducted by the MVH Group. Chapter 
2.1 outlines the relative merits of the three methods and discusses how valuations 
might differ between them. Without wishing to pre-empt this discussion too 
much, suffice it to say here that because no systematic relationship between the 
methods could be established and in the face of limited resources, the MVH Group 
was committed to choosing between the SG and TTO for use in the Main Study. 
Reasons for removing the VAS from this choice can also be found in Chapters 2.1 
and Chapter 2.2 considers the criteria that can be used to make a choice between 
the SG and the TTO. In the light of the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 
2, a variant of the TTO was the chosen for use in the Main Study and the results 
are presented in Chapter 3.1. 
Since it is not feasible to elicit direct valuations for all 245 EuroQol health states, a 
choice has to be made about how best to interpolate some of the indices. There 
are essentially two different approaches that can be adopted here: one I will refer 
to as the decomposed approach, the other as the composite approach. The former 
involves asking the respondent to value each level within a particular dimension 
assuming that the levels of all other dimensions are held constant. Thus, the 
decomposed approach requires few (and in some cases no) valuations for 
composite health states, although most studies that have adopted this approach 
have elicited valuations for a small subset of composite states (see Torrance et al 
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[ 1982]). Valuations for composite health states can then be generated by 
specifying a multi-attribute function (MAUF). The problem with this approach is 
that the conditions that the MAUF must satisfy are stringent; the least-restrictive 
model (in which the MAUF is multilinear) requires utility independence which 
means that preferences for various level of each dimension do not depend upon the 
particular levels at which the other dimensions are fixed. 
Because of the restrictions imposed on preferences by the decomposed approach, 
the MVH Group decided to adopt the composite approach whereby each 
respondents is asked to value a subset of composite EuroQol health states. An 
important consideration when choosing these states - and when choosing a larger 
subset from which to sample if the number that each respondent can value is 
deemed to be too small - is that they should be widely spread over the valuation 
space so as to include as many combinations of levels across the five dimensions as 
possible. This is subject to the constraint that the states are likely to be considered 
plausible by respondents; for example, respondents would probably have difficulty 
imagining a state in which they were confined to bed or were unable to wash or 
dress themselves yet had no problems with their usual activities. The next step, 
using appropriate regression or statistical techniques, is to estimate a model which 
allows valuations for all 245 EuroQol states to be interpolated from direct 
valuations on a subset of these. The advantage of this approach is that fewer 
restrictions need to be placed on the resultant model. The particular model which 
best describes the data from the Main Study is presented in Chapter 3.2. 
From the results presented in Chapter 3.1, it appears that TTO valuations are 
affected by the age and the sex of the respondent; those aged 18-59 have higher 
valuations than those aged 60 or over and men have higher valuations than 
women. Given that a large proportion of health care expenditure is directed 
towards elderly populations, and to a lesser extent towards women, it is possible 
that policy-makers may wish to give more weight to the valuations of the 
appropriate sub-group when making resource allocation decisions within that sub- 
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group than they do to valuations from the general population. Against this 
background, Chapter 3.3 presents different valuation 'tariffs' according to the age 
and sex of the respondent using the model described in Chapter 3.2. 
Whilst the issue of whose values should count has received a great deal of 
attention in the literature, the question of how these individual responses should be 
aggregated has received much less attention. Economists have generally 
advocated that the theoretically correct way to aggregate individual preferences is 
to calculate the mean value from any given distribution but, in the realm of public 
policy, an alternative view is that group preferences should be expressed in terms 
of the median. Because of the lower and, particularly, upper bound on health state 
valuations, TTO valuations for less severe health states are negatively-skewed 
whilst those for more severe states are positively-skewed. Thus, the transition 
from a more severe state to a less severe one is valued less according to the mean 
than the median and hence the choice of the measure of central tendency may have 
important implications for resource allocation decisions. Because of the 
methodology employed, the 'tariff presented in Chapter 3.2 provides a good 
approximation of mean values. The purpose of Chapter 3.4 is to present a tariff 
based on median values. 
Further methodological questions 
Since valuations in the Main Study and the sets of `tariff' values reported in 
Chapter 3 were based upon responses to TTO questions, it is important to 
consider the extent to which such responses can be interpreted in the way that 
many researchers interpret them; namely, as HRQoL indices which lie on an 
interval scale. Chapter 4 looks at the effects of three potentially important sources 
of bias in interpreting TTO responses in this way: i) lifetime reallocation of 
consumption; ii) time preference; and iii) duration. Chapter 4.1 is directed 
towards explicitly setting out the likely magnitude of the first two of these biases 
and shows that for responses to TTO questions to provide unbiased estimates of 
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the HRQoL associated with different health states, it is necessary that there is a 
zero rate of time preference. Chapter 4.2 reports on a pilot study designed to test 
the plausibility of this assumption using the TTO method, and also looks at the 
impact that the time spent in a particular state can have on its subsequent value. 
The results show that using the TTO to assess the effect of duration on health 
state valuations (whether time preference can be accounted for or not) is 
problematic and, therefore, Chapter 4.3 reports on a much larger general 
population study in which valuations for three different durations were elicited 
using the VAS method. 
Since the primary purpose for eliciting individual valuations is to inform decisions 
at the social level, it is important to consider the extent to which individual 
valuations can be used to express social preferences. This is the purpose of 
Chapter 5. Chapter 5.1 looks at how distributional issues that are known to be 
important in the context of health care can be incorporated within the QALY 
framework. An approach is suggested which uses a particular class of social 
welfare functions (SWF) that allows efficiency and equity to be considered 
independently and which is sufficiently flexible to represent a wide range of social 
preferences. Particular attention is given to the log-linear form which implies 
inequality aversion and which the results from a preliminary experiment suggest 
might indeed represent the average preferences of groups of respondents. 
Although the approach presented in Chapter 5.1 appears to be a feasible one, it is 
necessary to explore different approaches, not least because very few empirical 
studies have addressed the efficiency-equity trade-off in health care. In Chapter 
5.2, the method first described by Atkinson [1970] in order to measure the shape 
of the SWF with respect to income distribution is used to allow the shape of the 
SWF with respect to the distribution of health gain to be measured. In Chapter 
5.3, another approach is considered. Rather than, as in Chapters 5.1 and 5.2, look 
at how equity might be taken account of after an efficient allocation has been 
determined, this chapter looks at the use of the person-trade-off (PTO) method, 
which, its proponents argue, captures (efficiency and equity) concerns that are 
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relevant to social decision-making in one question. Specifically, the chapter 
reports on a pilot study which was designed to assess whether two treatments that 
yield the same benefit to the individual are also considered, by that individual, to 
yield the same benefit to society (as measured by responses to PTO questions). 
The thesis concludes with Chapter 6 which considers three important themes to 
have emerged from the thesis in the context of how they may provide a general 
strategy for future research into the measurement and valuation of health. The 
themes are: 1) the nature of individual preferences; 2) the measurement of social 
welfare; and 3) the use of different tariffs. Under each of these of headings, suffice 
it to say here that: 1) attempts must be made to establish the cognitive processes 
that respondents use to arrive at their responses in order to get a better 
understanding of why valuations differ in addition to how they differ; 2) given that 
the aggregated health state utilities are, for the purposes of public policy, 
interpreted as measures of social value, research efforts should be directed 
towards assessing the shape of and, perhaps more fundamentally, the arguments in 
the health-related SWF; and 3) it should now be possible in future cost-utility 
analyses that use EuroQol `tariff' values to consider the extent to which the cost- 
utility ratios are affected by the choice of tariff and, crucially, to consider the 
implications for resource allocation decisions. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS FOR VALUING HEALTH STATES 
CHAPTER 2.1: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VAS, SG AND TTO 
Introduction 
Most empirical studies to date have shown that the VAS, SG and TTO yield different 
valuations from the same respondents for identical descriptions of health. Torrance 
[ 1976] and Read et al [ 1984] found correlations of 0.65 between the scores elicited by 
the SG and the TTO methods. Torrance concluded that these two methods are 
equivalent, but Read et al emphasised that high correlations can coexist with 
systematic differences between sets of scale values. Both studies found that VAS 
valuations were lower than SG and TTO ones and. in a comparison of mean VAS and 
TTO values, Torrance concluded that "the two techniques exhibit a systematic 
relationship [that] can be approximated by a number of different functions. Two that 
fit well ... are a 
logarithmic function and a power function" (p. 134), although these 
relationships did not hold at the individual level. 
Wolfson et al [ 1982] obtained somewhat different results. Having estimated linear 
relationships, they concluded that standard gamble values were much higher than VAS 
ones, with TTO values generally lying somewhere in between. In a more recent study, 
Hornberger et al [ 1992] found poor correlation between any of the methods at the 
individual level and, in a comparison of mean values, found the TTO produced the 
highest values, the VAS the next highest, and the SG yielded the lowest values. This 
contradicts much of the earlier work and may be in part a function of the fact that, 
whilst other studies invoked hypothetical scenarios, this study elicited patients' 
valuations of their own health. In a review of the literature to 1988, Froberg and Kane 
[1989] concluded that "while correlations between methods are usually moderately 
high, the different methods do not necessarily produce equivalent scale values". 
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Because valuations from the VAS are elicited in a choiceless context, and thus do not 
require people to make trade-offs between different arguments in their utility function, 
the method is commonly regarded by economists as theoretically inferior to the choice- 
based SG and TTO methods. A notable exception is Broome [1993] who regards a 
method he describes as identical to the VAS (although he does not use the term 
himself) as "uncontaminated" by factors which he considers to be irrelevant to the 
measurement of "goodness"; like risk attitude in the SG or time preference in the TTO. 
However, the VAS has the practical advantages of being simpler to complete and 
cheaper to administer than either the SG or the TTO. Consequently, it is widely used 
in clinical and evaluative studies. If an algorithm can be found which maps VAS values 
onto SG and/or TTO ones and if, crucially, the relationship is stable, then it might be 
possible to elicit valuations via (cheap and simple) VAS methods and "convert" them 
into (theoretically superior) SG and/or TTO values. Furthermore, the nature of these 
algorithms may provide useful insights into why different methods yield different 
valuations. 
Whilst the studies highlighted above have shown beyond doubt that different methods 
can be expected to yield different sets of valuations, it is questionable to what extent 
their results and conclusions are generalisable. This is because: 1) all were based on 
small samples of convenient populations (none consisted of more than 67 people); 2) 
the analysis was performed on aggregate- rather than individual-level data, thus making 
the choice between competing models more difficult as well as making inefficient use 
of the data; and 3) all the results were generated using ordinary-least squares (OLS) 
regression analysis which is inappropriate given the (censored) nature of the data 
being analysed. This chapter considers whether there exists an empirical relationship 
between the valuations from the VAS and those from two variants of the SG and 
TTO: one using specially designed boards and cards (Props); and one using a self- 
completion booklet (No Props). In contrast to previous studies, the results are from a 
large scale study of the general population, and are based on individual-level analysis 
using a Tobit model which takes account of the type of data typically dealt with in the 
health state measurement field. 
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Hypotheses 
Despite their limitations, the results of earlier studies, together with some theoretical 
work, suggest two hypotheses. Firstly, for identical descriptions of health status, 
valuations from the VAS will be lower than those from the SG or TTO. This may 
result from respondents' use of different reference points in the valuation of health 
states on the VAS than on the SG and TTO. For example, in the VAS, a respondent 
may take full health as their reference and value dysfunctional health states as losses 
from this state. In a qualitative study, Morris and Durand [ 1989] suggest that VAS 
responses are indeed constructed in this way. In the SG and TTO, on the other hand, 
the respondent is asked to imagine already being in a dysfunctional health state and, 
consequently, this state becomes the reference point. 
It seems entirely plausible that the value given to a particular health state will be a 
function both of its severity and of the state that it is viewed from, just as our 
perception of how fast a car is travelling is a function both of its actual speed and the 
speed it had previously been travelling at, and that people may give some special status 
to their current position, and react asymmetrically to movements away from that 
position, placing greater weight on what they perceive as losses vis-a-vis the reference 
point than on what they perceive as gains. These ideas are developed by Kahneman 
and Tversky [ 1979] who propose that an individual's value function is concave with 
respect to gains, convex with respect to losses, and steeper at each level of loss than at 
the corresponding level of gain, as depicted in Figure 2.1.1. The frequently observed 
substantial disparities between what people say they would be willing to pay (WTP) 
for some marginal benefit, and what they would be willing to accept as monetary 
compensation for a comparable marginal disbenefit, is often taken as evidence of such 
an effect (see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [ 1990]). A (non-stochastic) value 
function with these properties will result in lower valuations from the VAS than from 
either the SG or the TTO. 
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Secondly, based on two assumptions about individual preferences, mapping functions 
for SG variants are expected to be different from those for TTO variants. The first 
assumption is that people are risk averse: if utility on the ordinate is plotted against 
length of life on the abscissa, the resulting utility function is concave to the origin. This 
implies that people will be less willing to accept the gamble outcomes in the SG and 
more willing to accept the certain outcome. The second assumption is that people 
have positive time preference: they value years of life in the near future more highly 
than they value years of life in the more distant future. This implies that people will be 
more willing to give up years of life at the end of a profile, as in the TTO. Thus, both 
assumptions imply that, for the same health states, SG values will be higher than TTO 
ones. Significant differences across variants of the same method are not anticipated. 
Study design 
The Questionnaires 
Previous piloting indicated that when asked to value the same EuroQol health states 
using three methods, respondents could not effectively assess more than six states on 
each method (plus two anchor states on the VAS: full health and death). The states 
were chosen to be widely spread over the valuation space and, in the SG and TTO 
tasks, were presented to respondents in a standard order. 
Each respondent was first asked to describe their own health using the EuroQol 
descriptive system. They were then asked to rank all 8 health states. It was explained 
that each state was to be regarded as lasting for 10 years without change, followed by 
death. The respondent was asked to indicate where they would rate their own health 
on a vertical VAS, with endpoints of 100 (best imaginable health state) and 0 (worst 
imaginable health state). They were then asked to rate the 8 health states on an 
identical VAS. Once full health and dead had been removed, the remaining six states 
(which were always presented in the same order), were valued using one variant of the 
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SG and one variant of the TTO. At the end of the interview, personal background 
data were collected from each respondent. 
The SG asks the respondent to choose between the certainty of an intermediate health 
state and the uncertainty of a treatment with two possible outcomes, one of which is 
better than the certain outcome and one of which is worse. For a state, hb, rated as 
better than dead, the intermediate state is hb and the treatment outcomes are full health 
and death, respectively. For a state, h, rated as worse than death, the intermediate 
state is death and the treatment outcomes are full health and h, In both cases, the 
object is to find the probability, p, at which the respondent is indifferent between the 
two alternatives. 
For SGP, a sliding scale on a specially designed board showed the varying chances of 
success and failure of treatment. For each health state, the respondent was initially 
asked to choose between living for 10 years in that state and a treatment which would 
return them to full health for 10 years (i. e. a 100% chance of success). Then, to 
determine whether the state was considered to be better or worse than death, the 
respondent was asked to choose between 10 years in that state and a treatment which 
would result in immediate death (i. e. a 0% chance of success). If they preferred the 
former, the protocol for states rated as better than dead was used and if they preferred 
the latter, the protocol for states rated as worse than dead was used. In both cases, the 
chances of success were presented in intervals of 10% in a "ping-pong" fashion i. e. 
90% success, 10% success, 80% success, etc. The question was complete when either 
a) preferences changed over a 10% interval (e. g. the treatment was preferred when it 
had a 70% chance of success but the certain health state was preferred when the 
treatment had a 60% of success), in which case the state would be valued at half-way 
between the two probabilities (i. e. 0.65 in this example), or b) indifference was 
reached. 
34 
The SGNP variant consisted of a self-completion booklet which showed the (certain 
and uncertain) alternatives on the left-hand page and the chances of success and failure 
relating to the uncertain treatment on the right-hand page, which were listed in 10% 
intervals ranging from a 100% chance of success at the top to a 0% chance of success 
at the bottom. The respondent was initially shown the protocol for states rated as 
better than dead and was asked to place a tick alongside all those probabilities where 
they would prefer the treatment, a cross alongside all those probabilities where they 
would prefer the certain health state, and an equals sign alongside the probability at 
which they would find it hardest to choose between the certain state and the treatment. 
If the treatment was preferred when it was certain to result in immediate death (i. e. 
when a tick was placed alongside a 0% chance of success), the respondent turned over 
the page and was presented with the protocol for states rated as worse than dead, 
which was competed in a similar fashion. Details of both SG protocols can be found in 
Gudex [ 1994] and examples of the protocols used are shown in the appendix. 
The TTO asks the respondent to choose between two alternatives. For a state, hb, 
rated as better than dead, the first alternative is to live for a defined period of time, t, in 
hb and then die. The second alternative is to live for a shorter period of time in full 
health and then die. For a state, h, rated as worse than dead, the first alternative is to 
die immediately and the second alternative is a number of years in h, followed by a 
number of years in full health (which combined sum to t). In both cases, the time in full 
health, x, is varied until the respondent is indifferent between the two alternatives. 
For TTOP a sliding-scale on a double-sided board showed the number of years spent 
in each alternative: one side was used for states rated as better than dead and the other 
for states rated as worse than dead. Using the former side of the board, for each health 
state, the respondent was first asked to choose between living for 10 years in that state 
and living for 10 years in full health. Then, to determine whether the state was 
considered to be better or worse than death, the respondent was asked to choose 
between 10 years in that state and immediate death. If they preferred the former, they 
continued to use the side of the board for states rated as better than dead and if they 
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preferred the latter, the side of the board for states rated as worse than dead was used. 
In both cases, the number of years spent in full health were presented in units of one 
year in a "ping-pong" fashion i. e. nine years, one year, eight years, etc. The question 
was complete a) when preferences changed over a one year period (e. g. full health was 
preferred when it was for 7 years but 10 years in the particular state was preferred 
when full health lasted for 6 years), in which case the state would be valued at half-way 
between the two lengths of time (i. e. 0.65 in this example), or b) when indifference was 
reached. 
The TTONP variant consisted of a self-completion booklet which showed the two 
health profiles on the left-hand page and the number of years spent in the profiles on 
the right-hand page, which were listed in units of one year, ranging from ten years in 
full health at the top to zero years in full health at the bottom. The respondent was 
initially shown the protocol for states rated as better than dead and was asked to place 
a tick alongside the cases where they preferred a certain number of years in full health 
to 10 years in the particular state, a cross alongside the cases where they preferred 10 
years in the particular state to the number of years in full health, and an equals sign 
alongside the case where they consider a certain number of years in full health to be 
equivalent to 10 years in the particular state. If immediate death was preferred (i. e. 
when a tick was placed alongside zero years in full health), the respondent turned over 
the page and was presented with the protocol for states rated as worse than dead, 
which was competed in a similar fashion. Details of both TTO protocols can be found 
in Gudex [ 1994] and examples of the protocols used are shown in the appendix. 
Ten years was chosen as the time horizon because it was considered long enough for 
respondents to be able to make meaningful sacrifices and to be able to distinguish 
between states but not too long so as to be unrealistic for older respondents. It is 
recognised that this time horizon would have been unrealistically short for many 
younger respondents but it was felt that other alternatives (such as variable time 
horizons based on a person's own expected life expectancy) would have created even 
greater problems of measurement and interpretation. 
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The sample 
The sample was drawn from adults aged 18 and over in the general population. A 
random sample of 700 addresses was drawn from 13 regional areas in the U. K. by 
Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR) using the postcode address file. 
The main fieldwork was carried out by 25 specially trained interviewers between 
March and May 1992. In order to study the two variants of the SG and TTO (from 
now on referred to as P and NP, to denote Props and No Props, respectively) and to 
test whether the order of presentation of these tasks influences valuations, each 
interviewer was randomly allocated to one of eight experimental groups (2 methods x 
2 variants x2 orders of presentation). 
Of the 700 addresses selected for sampling, 88 (13%) were found to be `out of scope', 
being non-residential, empty/derelict, untraceable, or not yet built. Of the remaining 
612 addresses, 335 interviews were achieved, giving a 55% response rate on in-scope 
addresses. The main reason for unsuccessful interviews was a refusal by the selected 
person. Table 2.1.1 shows that the sample was similar to the general population in 
terms of age and sex, although there was some response bias in favour of the more 
educated. Table 2.1.2 shows that, by chance, more respondents were in the four 
groups containing the TTONP variant than in the four groups containing TTOP. No 
statistically significant differences were found between the groups on the basis of their 
socio-demographic characteristics. 
Table 2.1.2 also shows that 14 interviews were incomplete (defined as one or both of 
the main valuation methods being missed out entirely) and these respondents have been 
excluded from subsequent analysis. These respondents were scattered amongst the 
eight experimental groups and did not differ in terms of background characteristics 
from the remainder of the sample. Finally, Table 2.1.2 shows that the number of 
missing observations from the remaining respondents is very small, particularly for 
TTOP. 
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Methods 
Re-calibration of scores 
In CUA, aggregation across respondents is achieved by measuring all individual 
valuations on a common 0 to 1 (dead to healthy) scale, as noted in Chapter 1.1. 
Because respondents could locate full health and death anywhere on the VAS, it is 
necessary to re-calibrate raw VAS scores so that full health and death are of 
equal value to everybody, and hence "the unit of health" is the same across all 
respondents. If full health and dead are assigned scores of 1 and 0 respectively, then, 
using notation introduced above, hb=p on the SG and x/t on the TTO, whilst h,,, =-p/(1- 
p) on the SG and -x/(10-x) on the TTO. Thus, negative scores lie on a ratio (not an 
interval) scale and, unlike the case for states rated better than dead, are theoretically 
unbounded (though, given the response categories available to respondents, in this 
study they are bounded by -19 and in the Main Study reported on in Chapter 3 they are 
bounded by -39). 
The asymmetry between positive and negative values poses problems since those 
respondents rating a state as worse than death will have a much greater impact on the 
measures of central tendency than those respondents rating it as better than death. As 
Torrance [ 1984] noted, "this issue of large negative values and what to do about them 
needs much more study". Patrick et al [ 1994] transformed their negative values so 
that scores for states rated as worse than dead were bounded by -1 i. e. symmetrical to 
the upper bound of +1 for states which are rated as better than dead. This 
transformation was justified on statistical grounds but there is possibly a psychometric 
justification as well; namely that respondents may treat the scale for states worse than 
dead in the same way as they are assumed to treat the scale for states better than dead 
i. e. as an interval (not a ratio) scale. For these reasons, then, valuations for states 
worse than dead have been transformed such that h,,,, =-p on the SG and (x/10)-1 on the 
TTO. 
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For the purposes of the analysis in this chapter, all SG and TTO scores have then been 
re-calibrated so that death equals 0.5 for each respondent. This is so that mathematical 
manipulations of the VAS scores are well-behaved functions, and so that the SG and 
TTO scores can be transformed onto a logarithmic scale for the analysis of power 
functions. Denoting the raw VAS scores for full health, death and some dysfunctional 
health state h by vf, Vd and Vh respectively, a health state index, h, can be derived 
according to the following decision rule: 
if Vf < Vh 
ifVd< Vh<Vf 
if[vd-(Vf-Vd)]<Vh<Vd 
ifVh< [Vd-(Vf-Vd)] 
h=1 
h=0.5 +[O. S*(Vh- Vd)/(Vf- Vd) I 
h=0.5 
-[0.5*(Vh - Vd)/(Vf- Vd) 
h=0 
Diagnostic tests for heteroskedasticity and functional form are included in the analysis, 
which should indicate any problems with this approach. 
Independent variables 
Previous studies of the relationship between scores elicited by different techniques have 
concentrated on the relationships between aggregate (mean) scores. However, an 
alternative approach, for which a larger amount of data are available, is the estimation 
of mapping functions based on the individual-level data. Initially, a model using all the 
data was estimated which contained binary variables for variant (P or NP) and method 
(SG or TTO). This model failed the specification tests outlined in the next section and 
thus the relationship is estimated separately for both variants. This produces four 
mapping functions to be estimated. The aim of these functions is to show the 
relationship between the VAS and the variants of the SG and TTO, irrespective of the 
health state being valued. 
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With SG and TTO scores as regressands, the regressors of interest are different 
transformations of VAS scores. However, in the analysis of the individual-level data, 
information is available for a number of respondent background characteristics which 
have been found to significantly affect health state valuations (for a review of the 
literature to date see Froberg and Kane [ 1989]). If these independent variables affect 
scores derived from the methods differently, then these factors should be taken into 
account in estimating any mapping function. The characteristics considered in this 
analysis are sex, age (considered by the introduction of two dummy variables 
representing three age-groups: 18 - 29 years; 30 -59 years; and 60 years or more), and 
the individual's rating of their own health status on the VAS. Each of these variables is 
entered as an independent factor and as a cross-product term with the visual analogue 
score. Details of the abbreviations used for the independent variables are given in 
Table 2.1.3. 
Models 
Five functional forms were estimated to represent the relationship between VAS and 
SG/TTO scores: a linear, a quadratic and a cubic model plus two log-linear models. 
The linear model included only the VAS score, (V;,, ), and the other independent 
variables. In the quadratic model (V; X)2 was added, and in the cubic model (V1 )3 was 
included: 
Model 1: Y;,, =a+ßV1 +OkZixk+e;, 
Model 2: Y;,, =a+ ßV;,, + cV;,, 2 + OkZ;, k + e;, 
Model 3: Y1, =a+ ßV1 + cV, X2 + I)V; X3 + OkZ; Xk + e; x 
in which Y1 is the re-calibrated score on the SG/TTO for state x from individual i, V; x 
is the score for health state x elicited from individual i by the visual analogue method, 
Z ix is a vector of k independent variables for individual i, and e1 is an error term. 
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Two log-linear models were estimated: 
Model 4: Y1 =A V1 Z;,, kok e1 
Model 5: (1-Y)1 =A (1-V; X)ß Z;, kok e;, 
The difference between the models relate to the testing of two assumptions: 1) a health 
state rated as good as full health on the VAS will also be rated as good as full health on 
the SG/TTO; and 2) a health state rated as far below dead as full health is above dead 
on the VAS will also be rated as far below dead as full health is above dead on the 
SG/TTO. Model (4) makes the first assumption whilst the size of the constant in the 
regression can be used to test for the second assumption. Model 5 makes the second 
assumption whilst the first can be tested from the regression results. In the estimation 
of his power function, Torrance [ 1976] assumed equality between valuations from 
different methods at both end-points of the scale. 
Estimation and Testing 
To take account of the fact that valuations on both the SG and the TTO were within 
the range 0.025 to 0.975, Tobit estimation was undertaken with censoring at both the 
top and bottom ends. The models were estimated using maximum likelihood within 
LIMDEP (see Greene [1992]). Two specification tests have been included in this 
analysis: a modified RESET test, and a test for heteroskedasticity in the error terms. 
The modified RESET test is undertaken in a two-step process. In the first stage, the 
model is estimated and the linear function is calculated: 
¶ix = ß; x1X; 
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in which: ßj are the j coefficients estimated in the Tobit model, where j refers to all 
independent variables in the model; and X;,, j is the vector of all independent variables 
which includes value(s) on the VAS. In the second stage, the square of the linear 
function is added to the equation, and the t-statistic on this variable can be used as a 
test of the functional form of the original model. 
All models were initially estimated on the assumption that the variance term is constant 
across all observations i. e. 6; =c The models were then estimated by allowing the 
variance term to be an exponential function of either the VAS (V;,, ), the square of the 
VAS (V1 )2, or the square of the linear function from the unadjusted Tobit estimation 
(q[ix)2 i. e. 6; = 6e1 
Zl. These homoscedastic and heteroscedastic models, respectively, 
were compared using the likelihood ratio (LR) test. 
Calculation of mapping functions 
Because the data was analysed using a Tobit model, the predicted values from the 
regressions have to be transformed according to the following equations: 
E [yi] =L OL +U (I - OU) +A- 0L) ß/ Xi + µi (OL - OU) 
in which: L and U are the lower and upper bounds of the range within which y; are 
restricted; ß is the corresponding vector of coefficients for the set of independent 
variables x;; pi are the standard errors of the (possibly heteroskedastic) error terms; 0 
is the standard normal cumulative distribution; 0 is the standard normal distribution; 
and: 
Ö; =Ö [(j-ß'x; )/N11 
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and oj=0[0-ß'x1)/Nj] 
in which: j=L, U. In contrast to OLS methods, the predicted values calculated from 
these equations are constrained within the desired range [L , 
U]. 
Results 
The results of the various linear, quadratic and cubic models for each of the four 
variants are shown in Table 2.1.4. Where possible, results are shown for models which 
do not show evidence of functional form misspecifications or heteroskedastic 
disturbances at the 99% level. As it turned out, the LR test for all models suggested 
that there was no significant heteroscedasticity present. Whilst it would then be 
justified to use the homoscedastic models, some models adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
offered improvements in the RESET statistics. Therefore, results of Tobit models with 
adjustment for heteroskedasticity are shown for all valuation methods except SGNP, 
for which no adjustment made any significant improvement in this regard. 
Few of the independent variables associated with respondent background 
characteristics are significantly different from zero at even the 5% level. For example, 
there is little evidence of any systematic effect of gender or self-rated health on the 
difference between scores from the VAS and the other methods. However, for both 
SG variants, the negative coefficient on YOUNG and the positive coefficient on 
YOUNG*VAS are both significant at the 5% level and, although not statistically 
significant, the sign on these coefficients is the same for the TTO variants. These 
results imply that, given the same VAS score, younger respondents tend to give lower 
valuations to more severe health states on the choice-based methods, particularly the 
SG. This divergence between age-groups, however, decreases as the VAS rating 
increases. 
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The results for the two log-linear models are not very encouraging and hence the 
results are not presented here. For the logarithmic model (Model 4), the likelihood 
ratio indices are below 0.05 for all methods, there is evidence of heteroskedastic 
disturbances in all four equations and the estimated models for all but TTONP fail 
functional form tests. Similarly, with regard to the estimation of a power function 
(model 5), the likelihood ratio indices are less than 0.01 for all methods, there is 
evidence of heteroskedasticity in all simple and adjusted equations and no models pass 
functional form tests at the 5% level. The estimated likelihood ratio indices illustrate 
that the ability of power functions to explain variations in this date-set is negligible. 
Moreover, although unlikely to be valid, the estimated coefficients on the constant 
terms are not close to one as assumed by Torrance [ 1976]. 
Mapping functions can be derived based on the predicted value formulae described 
above, a simulated index of possible VAS scores, and the average values of other 
independent variables. The average values of the other independent variables for 
which the predicted value functions have been estimated are given in Table 2.1.5. 
Average values of even the discrete variables are used, since this may reflect the 
characteristics of a general sample of respondents (e. g. the TTO Props case in which 
29% are aged under 30 years and 20% are aged over 60 years). In contrast to the log- 
linear models, the linear functional forms pass misspecification and heteroskedasticity 
tests at the 99% level of significance for the majority of methods and, as indicated by 
the likelihood ratio index, explain a significant proportion of the variation in the data. 
As a result, mapping functions have been generated based on the coefficient estimates 
from the linear models only. These functions are shown in Figures 2.1.2 to 2.1.5. 
As well as highlighting systematic differences across methods and variants, the 
mapping functions suggest that the relationship with VAS scores is a function of the 
severity of the state. Figures 2.1.3 and 2.1.5 both show that values from the no props 
variants are higher than those for the VAS and that this difference increases as the 
severity of the state increases. Figure 2.1.2 shows that TTOP valuations are higher 
than VAS ones for mild states and lower for more severe states, although SGP 
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valuations are broadly similar to VAS ones for a wide range of scores (see Figure 
2.1.4). Note that the functions estimated for the props variants imply that for states 
worse than dead, a marginal increase in the VAS score is associated with a marginal 
decrease in the corresponding TTO or SG score. This finding is counter-intuitive, and 
thought to be related to both the lack of observations in this quadrant and the 
dominating effect of the function in other parts of the valuation space. 
Discussion 
This chapter has used health state valuation data from a large-scale general population 
study to estimate an empirical relationship between VAS scores and scores elicited 
from two variants of the SG and the TTO. The analysis was based on individual level 
data using the Tobit model which takes account of the (censored) nature of the data. 
A number of different functional forms were tested and a range of diagnostic tests 
were applied to the competing models. Logarithmic and power function formulations 
were outperformed by more flexible (linear, quadratic or cubic) functional forms, both 
in terms of specification and ability to explain variations in the data. In particular, the 
results do not lend support to the hypothesis that VAS and SG/TTO values can be 
related by a concave power function, since this functional form failed all diagnostic 
tests. 
In contrast to expectations, differences between the mapping functions are more 
pronounced across variant than across method. That valuations differ by method 
variant is an important finding which has been noted elsewhere (for example, see Nord 
[ 1992]). This result offers an explanation for the lack of consensus regarding the 
comparability of the different methods, since although the studies referred to in this 
chapter used the same methods, the way in which they were administered differed 
enormously. This suggests that comparisons can only be made between valuations 
from different studies if both the same method and the same variant were used. 
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One of the underlying hypotheses was that, for identical descriptions of health status, 
VAS valuations would be lower than SG/TTO ones. Thus, for high valuations, the 
intercept of any mapping function between VAS and SG/TTO scores is expected to be 
greater than one, whilst the gradient will be less than one. The gradients of all mapping 
functions for the linear models are indeed shallower than the 45° line. However, the 
mapping functions imply that a VAS score greater than about 0.8 is associated with a 
lower SG and TTO score. This suggests that the disutility associated with the very 
mild health states is greater for methods in which the reference point is the 
dysfunctional health state itself than for a method in which the reference point is likely 
to be full health. This result appears to cast doubt on the value function hypothesised 
by Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory [1979]. 
However, inspection of the distribution of health state values suggests that the majority 
of respondents do behave in accordance with Prospect Theory i. e. have SG and TTO 
values that are higher than VAS ones for very mild states. Therefore, the fact that 
mapping functions cross the 45° line at about 0.8 appears to be explained by a small 
number of `outliers', who give high VAS scores yet give very low SG/TTO scores. 
Although there were no grounds for excluding such responses from the data set, this 
finding suggests that the functions presented here should be treated with caution, and 
their interpretation made clear. Because of the estimation technique used, the results 
represent mapping functions that approximate how mean VAS scores can be 
converted into mean SG and TTO ones. 
Another unexpected result (at least in the presence of a reference point effect) is the 
suggestion from Figure 2.1.2 that for the more severe health states, TTOP values are 
lower than VAS ones (notwithstanding the non-monotonicity at very low values 
discussed above). Given that this is not the case for any of the other methods, it is 
likely to be explained in terms of the differential effect that TTOP has on valuations. 
One possible explanation is that TTOP (which has a ten-year scale on a board) is the 
method which focuses the respondent's attention explicitly on the length of time spent 
in a health state. If the disutility associated with a severe health state increases as the 
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time spent in that state increases (see the discussion in Chapter 4), then lower 
valuations will be elicited for such states from methods which focus more explicitly on 
the time dimension. 
Of course, if this is the reason why TTOP valuations are lower than VAS ones, then 
one would expect to observe a similar (although perhaps less powerful) effect with 
respect to TTONP which (unlike both SG variants) also asks respondents to think in 
terms of time. That this is not the case raises the more general issue of why valuations 
from the no props variants are higher than those from the props variants, particularly 
for lower VAS values. A possible explanation relates to the different ways in which 
response categories were presented to respondents. 
In the props variants, respondents were presented with choices in a "ping-pong" 
fashion, moving back and forth between higher and lower probabilities of success in 
the SG and longer and shorter life expectancy in the TTO. In the no props variants, on 
the other hand, respondents were presented with all possible responses at once. These 
were listed from high to low probability of success in the SG, and from long to short 
life expectancy in the TTO. It is likely that respondents would have started from the 
top of the page and worked their way down. This may have resulted in an analogue of 
the reference point effect, in which respondents gave special status to favourable 
outcomes and hence to higher (inferred) health state valuations (as evidenced by the no 
props mapping functions which are above the 45° line and `fan-in' from above). This 
suggests that no props variants may introduce systematic bias into valuations. 
It was also hypothesised that mapping functions for the SG would be different from 
those for the TTO; specifically, that, for the same VAS values, SG values would be 
higher than TTO ones. In terms of the relationship between the different choice-based 
methods, two patterns emerge from the mapping functions: 1) for VAS scores above 
about 0.4, SGP values are lower than TTOP ones, whilst SGNP and TTONP values 
are very similar; and 2) for VAS scores below 0.4, SGP values are higher than TTOP 
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values and SGNP values are higher than TTONP ones. That TTOP valuations are 
higher than SGP valuations for high VAS values goes against a priori expectations, 
but might be explained in terms of the relative weight respondents' attach to the 
numeraire they are asked to sacrifice in order to gain an improvement in health. In the 
SG, health improvements are valued in terms of the level of risk (usually of immediate 
death) a respondent is prepared to accept, whilst in the TTO they are valued in terms 
of the amount of life expectancy a respondent is prepared to sacrifice. Thus, the 
results may indicate that sacrificing an extra six months of life expectancy is more 
valuable to respondents in this study than taking an extra 5% risk of death. That the 
expected relationship between SG and TTO holds for lower VAS values might be 
explained in terms of the explicit reference to the time spent in the health state in the 
TTO exercise. 
With respect to the impact of respondent background characteristics, it is found that 
only age appears to have a significant impact on the resultant mapping functions. For 
both SG variants, it was found that those aged 18-29 years had significantly lower 
intercepts and steeper slopes than older respondents, suggesting that, for the same 
(low) VAS score, younger respondents tend to give lower valuations on the SG, but 
that this difference decreases as the VAS score increases. Although the same pattern is 
observed for the TTO variants, the coefficients on the relevant variables (YOUNG and 
YOUNG*VAS) fail to reach conventional levels of significance. It is unclear why 
younger respondents should have different mapping functions from other respondents, 
or why this difference should be more pronounced at the lower end, or why it should 
be more pronounced on the SG than on the TTO. The literature to date does not help 
to shed much light on this subject since, although age is generally regarded as having 
negligible a impact on health state valuations (see Carter et al [ 1976], Rosser and Kind 
[ 1978] and Kaplan et al [ 1978]), much of the analysis has concentrated on differences 
within valuation methods and not across them. 
Nonetheless, the results suggest that, at least when considering severe states of health, 
younger respondents (for the same VAS score) are more willing to sacrifice life 
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expectancy and, relatively speaking, even more willing to risk death than are older 
respondents. It might be that younger respondents differ from older respondents more 
in their attitude to risk (as measured by different SG values) than in their attitudes 
towards time (as measured by different TTO values). However, that both these 
differences decrease as the VAS value increases suggest that either risk attitude and 
time preference are not independent of the health state being valued or that something 
else is being picked up here. These would appear to be important issues that future 
research efforts should be directed towards addressing. 
This chapter has attempted to assess whether VAS valuations can be mapped into SG 
and/or TTO ones. If robust mapping functions could be estimated, then this would 
have the practical advantage of allowing valuations elicited from the cheap and simple 
VAS to be converted into theoretically superior SG and/or TTO ones. In addition, 
models could be developed that might explain the mapping functions, in the same way 
that Loomes [ 1993] has shown that Regret Theory in its non-stochastic form can 
explain the relationship between aggregate values in the Torrance [ 1976] and Wolfson 
et al [ 1982] data. 
However, the results presented in this chapter suggest that the way the methods are 
administered is as important a determinant of the resultant mapping functions as the 
methods are themselves. This suggests that the way in which a question is framed can 
have a significant effect on responses: a fact which is increasingly recognised by many 
economists who now accept that changes in questionnaire design can bias a 
respondent's stated preferences. A fuller discussion of the possible reasons why this 
should be so is beyond the scope of the present chapter. However, the results in this 
chapter do suggest that an important consequence is that no single set of mapping 
functions is likely to explain the observed disparities between health state valuation 
methods. 
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CHAPTER 2.2: CHOOSING BETWEEN SG AND TTO 
Introduction 
Given that estimating a robust relationship between the valuations from different 
methods does not appear to be possible, it is necessary from the study described in 
Chapter 2.1 to choose one method to use in the Main Study. The VAS was not one of 
the contenders in the choice of "best" method because, as noted in Chapter 2.1, 
valuations from this technique are elicited in a choiceless context. Thus, they do not 
reflect the importance of health relative to other arguments in an individuals utility 
function and are not regarded as measures of utility, defined in its broadest sense. 
The SG and TTO methods, on the other hand, both start from the premise that, given 
that health is an important argument in an individual's utility function, we can estimate 
the welfare change associated with a change in health if we can determine the 
compensating change in one of the remaining arguments in an individual's utility 
function that leaves utility unchanged. In the SG, health improvements are valued in 
terms of the level of risk (usually of immediate death) an individual is prepared to 
accept, which means assuming utility to be a negative function of such a risk. In the 
TTO, health improvements are valued in terms of the amount of life expectancy an 
individual is prepared to sacrifice by assuming utility to be a positive function of 
longevity. In this way, both the SG and the TTO can be viewed as sharing a common 
theoretical background. 
In developing Expected Utility Theory (EUT), Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1953] 
showed that if a cardinal utility could be expressed as equivalent to a gamble, under 
certain assumptions, it would be a linear function of the risk involved in the gamble. In 
other words, the level of risk involved in standard gamble questions is linear in utility. 
This led many to regard the SG as the "gold standard" for health status measurement 
(see Torrance [ 1976] and Gafni [ 1994]). However, doubt has been cast on EUT both 
as a positive and as a normative theory. First, there is evidence that people 
systematically violate the axioms of EUT (see Llewellyn-Thomas et al [ 1982] and 
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Schoemaker [ 1982]). Thus, much of the appeal of the SG is lost since it will only be 
an accurate measure of utility if the axioms of EUT apply. Second, EUT focuses only 
on the expected utility of different outcomes, and there is increasing evidence that 
many people consider this to be an irrational basis on which to make decisions, 
preferring instead to take account of the process by which the outcomes were arrived 
at. This has led to a number of new theories which relax the independence axiom (for 
example, Regret Theory as developed by Loomes and Sugden [ 1982]). 
The literature often distinguishes between utility, which results from decisions under 
uncertainty (as measured by the SG, for example), and value, which results from 
decisions based on certainty (see Gafni, Birch and Mehrez [ 1993]). Because in the 
TTO both of the alternatives presented to the respondents have outcomes that are 
known with certainty, it is said to produce a value, not a utility, function (see Pliskin et 
al [ 1979], Dyer and Sarin [ 1982] and Bennett et al [ 1991 ]). However, this is based on 
a very narrow definition of utility, one that has arisen as a direct result of Von Neuman 
Morgenstern EUT. In its broader sense, and one which is perhaps more relevant to the 
measurement of quality-of-life, utility is defined as a (cardinal) index of strength of 
preference. It is possible to measure this under conditions of uncertainty or certainty. 
The SG is also advocated on the grounds that almost all decisions about health care are 
made under conditions of uncertainty (see Mehrez and Gafni [ 1991 ]). Whilst this is 
indeed the case, the appropriateness or otherwise of a valuation method is determined 
by its ability to act as a proxy for utility and not by its capacity to model the situation 
being valued (see Buckingham and Drummond [ 1993]). In this respect, the TTO may 
be considered more appropriate since, by definition, it gives the number of years in full 
health which are valued equally to a (longer) period in the health state being measured. 
In this respect, it collapses the relationship between the health state, its duration and its 
value into one single measure. Nevertheless, there is doubt about the validity of the 
underlying assumption of the TTO method that individuals are prepared to trade-off a 
constant proportion of their remaining years of life in order to improve their health 
status, irrespective of the number of years that remain (see Sackett and Torrance 
[ 1978] and Sutherland et al [ 1982]). 
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Criteria for choice 
It is therefore difficult to choose between SG and TTO on theoretical grounds since 
valuations from neither method can automatically be assumed to map directly onto 
utility. This is an important point since it implies rejecting the idea that the SG should 
be regarded as the "gold standard" for measuring health state values. Instead, a choice 
between the SG and the TTO needs to be informed by their respective performance on 
empirical grounds. The evidence here is limited since relatively few studies have 
obtained within-respondent comparisons of the different valuation methods (see 
Chapter 2.1). Empirical assessment of the different techniques involves considerations 
of feasibility, consistency, validity and reliability. 
Feasibility means that the method must be capable of being carried out in practice and 
be acceptable to respondents. This last point would appear to be satisfied by the high 
response rates and even higher levels of complete data that most studies have reported 
(Froberg and Kane [ 1989]). Consistency refers to the extent to which the health states 
used in a study are given a logical ordering within a method. This might be seen as 
construct validation in the sense that it tests the construct that "better" states of health 
should be given higher scores but since this has rarely been considered (in fact, 
inconsistent respondents have generally been excluded from data analysis; see Martin 
and Elliot [ 1992] and Torrance et al [ 1992]) it is treated here as a criterion in its own 
right. 
Essentially a measure is valid if it accurately reflects the concept or phenomenon it 
claims to measure. In establishing the validity of different methods, most studies have 
examined the extent to which the different methods yield similar results. This test, 
often referred to in the literature as concurrent validity, has been predicated on the 
notion that the SG represents the gold standard against which different methods are 
compared. Indeed, Torrance [ 1976] advocated the use of the TTO primarily because 
he found it to be correlated with the SG. The above discussion argues that the 
theoretical justification for according the SG such status is questionable. In this 
context, concurrent validity is an almost meaningless concept since it tells us nothing 
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about which method is more valid if the methods yield different results, nor whether 
both or neither method is valid if the methods yield similar results. However, if one 
method yields very different results from a number of other methods, then doubt MAY 
be cast on its validity. 
In the absence of a gold standard, the most rigorous approach to establishing validity is 
testing construct validity. A construct is a theoretically derived notion of what the 
method is intended to measure. An understanding of the construct allows the extent to 
which the method fulfils its predictions to be examined. Construct validity can be 
assessed by examining (a) the extent to which the valuations from the different 
methods are correlated with factors for which there is an a priori expectation of good 
correlation (sometimes referred to as convergent validity) and (b) the extent to which 
the valuations are not correlated with factors for which there is expected to be poor 
correlation (sometimes referred to as discriminant validity). 
The evidence currently available suggests that variation among population subgroups is 
not explained by the different demographic characteristics of respondents, such as age, 
sex, or socio-economic status. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that 
experience of illness may influence respondents' valuations of health states. For 
example, Sackett and Torrance [ 1978] reported that home dialysis patients assigned 
higher utility to kidney dialysis than did the general public. In addition, Rosser and 
Kind [ 1978], from comparisons of patients, nurses, physicians and the general public 
found significant differences between medical patients and physicians and between 
medical patients and psychiatric patients. The possibility that valuations differ 
according to illness experience has been noted by Froberg and Kane [1989] who state 
that "We have seen that patients with a particular condition often assign a higher utility 
than do patients without the condition". 
The reliability of a valuation method can be investigated in two ways; a) Split-test 
reliability which assesses an individual respondent's consistency when an item is 
presented more than once and b) Test-retest reliability which assesses the stability of 
values over short periods of time. Torrance [ 1976] found the SG and TTO to have 
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similar split-test correlation coefficients (between 0.80 and 0.90) and these results have 
been considered to be "acceptable" (see Froberg and Kane [ 1989]). O'Connor et at 
[ 1985] reported correlations of 0.80 to 0.87 for a one week retest of SG and TTO 
respectively, although some respondents may have remembered their initial valuations 
given the relatively short time interval between test and retest. 
Methods 
Against this background, four principal criteria were selected as the basis for choosing 
between competing valuation methods. These concerned the quality of the data 
elicited from the respondents, rather than the practical aspects of administering the 
different tasks (such as the burden placed upon respondents and interviewers) and 
were as follows: 
1) Completeness (as a measure of feasibility): the extent to which each method 
produces a complete data set. 
2) Logical Consistency: the extent to which the health states used were given a logical 
ordering within each method. 
3) Construct Validity: the extent to which valuations differ in accordance with prior 
expectations. 
4) Test-retest Reliability: the extent to which respondents' responses are stable within 
each method over a relatively short time interval. 
Results 
Completeness 
Table 2.2.1 shows that at both test and retest TTOP task was the most complete. In 
the test data, TTOP was significantly more complete than any of the other main 
methods (all at p<0.01). In the retest data, TTOP was more complete than SGNP 
(p<0.05), with no missing values. 
54 
Logical Consistency 
Given the ordinal structure of the component dimensions in the EuroQol descriptive 
system, some states are logically ordered with respect to others. For example, it would 
be expected that 21111 should be given a higher score (to indicate less severity) than 
21221 because it is better on at least one dimension and no worse on any of the other 
dimensions. For some pairwise comparisons, there are no a priori expectations of this 
kind, e. g. between 21111 and 11122. Where an a priori expectation holds, it is termed 
a logical consistency. 
With the states used here, 12 such comparisons are possible. A calculation has been 
made of the number of logically consistent rankings made by each respondent, 
expressed as a percentage consistency rate. Because the number of possible pairwise 
comparisons drops substantially when a respondent fails to value a state, the data of 
those respondents with more than one missing value on the SG or TTO were 
considered to be unusable in the calculation of consistency rates. In addition, the few 
respondents who gave the same score to five or all six states on the same method were 
also excluded from this analysis. The distribution of consistency rates was highly 
skewed, with the majority of respondents having rates close to 100% and a few 
respondents having rates below 50%. For this reason, the median was chosen as the 
appropriate measure of central tendency. Table 2.2.2 shows that the TTO variants 
have higher strong consistency rates than SG variants both at test and at retest but 
there are no statistically significant differences between any of the four main methods. 
Consistency rates on the VAS (in the region of 95%) were the same across the eight 
experimental groups, suggesting that differences in consistency rates between main 
methods were not attributable to a response bias. Consistency rates for each of the 
main methods when they were done first i. e. immediately after the VAS, showed no 
statistically significant differences, either at test or retest. Also, there was little 
difference between test and retest consistency rates since subtracting each respondent's 
consistency rate at retest from their rate at test yielded a median difference of zero for 
all methods. With respect to respondent characteristics, it appeared that level of 
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education and consistency rate were positively related, particularly for the SG variants 
where those with a minimum education had significantly lower consistency rates 
(p<0.05 on both variants). With respect to possible interviewer effects, a few 
interviewers had respondents with lower than average consistency rates, but results 
were not affected when data from these interviewers were removed from the analysis. 
Similarly, no 'learning effect' was identified when each interviewer's first three 
interviews they conducted were compared with their remaining interviews. 
Valuation Results 
Since there were no differences found for any of the methods according to the order of 
presentation of the task or according to whether the preceding task was a props or a 
no props variant, Table 2.2.3 shows the valuations for each health state (at test) from 
the four main methods. The predominant order of states is 21111,11122,21221, 
21232,22323,33333 but SGP produces a 'reversed' order for 21232 and 22323, 
although the valuations given to these two states are close together for all methods 
anyway. In general, it appears that the no props variants yield higher values than the 
props ones and that TTO values are higher than SG ones although, interestingly, 
TTOP is the only method which gives a negative median score to state 33333. Table 
2.2.4 shows the valuations elicited at retest where the predominant order of states is 
the same as that at test and again 33333 is, on average, considered to be worse than 
dead on TTOP. 
Table 2.2.5 shows the results of a within-respondent comparison of valuations using 
the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test. The results confirm those indicated in 
Tables 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 and the mapping functions in Chapter 2.1 i. e. that: 1) TTONP 
values are significantly higher than SGP ones for all states except 33333,2) SGNP 
values are higher than TTOP ones for the three most severe states, 3) TTOP values are 
higher than SGP ones for the three least severe states and lower for 33333, and 4) 
there are no significant differences between TTOP and SGP valuations. There are 
fewer significant differences between methods at retest than at test due partly to the 
smaller number of respondents at retest. 
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Construct Validity 
Construct validity relates to the background characteristics of respondents that are 
(and are not) expected to account for variance in valuations. The constructs tested 
here are that those in poor health should give higher valuations than those in good 
health but that valuations should not differ by any other background characteristic. 
Table 2.2.6 shows that respondents who were themselves in a dysfunctional health 
state (i. e. reported being in either level 2 or 3 on a dimension) did give significantly 
higher scores to some but not all states. Other background characteristics, such as age, 
gender and employment status, showed no systematic influence on valuations. 
Test-retest Reliability 
The interval between the first and second interview varied from 6 to 16 weeks (median 
of ten and a half weeks). At retest respondents were asked "Has anything important 
happened to you since the last interview a few months/weeks ago? ". 29 of the 110 
test-retest respondents (26%) reported that they had experienced an important event of 
whom all but three reported a deterioration in the own or someone else's health. As a 
group these people reported significantly more impairment of mobility and usual 
activities than the other respondents (both p<0.05), and also reported more pain 
(p<0.01) and anxiety/depression (p<0.05). Reflecting this, they also reported more 
personal experience of illness (p<0.05). Since this greater experience of very recent 
illness may affect the respondents' valuations of health states, those re-interviewed 
were separated into two groups on the basis of whether or not they reported that they 
had experienced an important event since the first interview. 
Treating the data first as ordinal and then as cardinal, Spearman's rank coefficient and 
Pearson's r coefficient were calculated. The mean correlations for those without and 
with important events are shown in Table 2.2.7 which shows that TTOP has the 
highest correlation coefficients and for those without important events performs 
significantly better than both SGP and TTONP (p<0.05). Table 2.2.8 shows the 
correlation coefficients for each method separated according to the time interval 
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between test and retest. TTOP and SGNP have the highest correlations for 
respondents re-interviewed 'early' i. e. within the median time interval of 73 days. 
While both the Spearman and Pearson correlations for SGNP fall as the time between 
test and retest increases, the corresponding values for TTOP remain at high levels. In 
terms of median differences in scores between test and retest, there are no significant 
differences between test and retest for any state within any method for those not 
reporting important events. For those with an important life event, only two 
differences are significant at the 5% level (both on SGNP), suggesting that important 
life events have negligible effects on state-by-state valuations. 
Discussion 
This chapter has looked at the criteria that can be used in order to make a choice 
between the SG and TTO methods. Since a choice could not be made between SG 
and TTO on theoretical grounds or on the basis previous empirical work, the study 
reported in this chapter was designed to allow a direct comparison between two 
variants of each of these two methods. On the grounds of completeness, there is 
evidence in favour of TTOP since it was significantly the most complete of the main 
methods at test and had no missing data at retest. No clear 'winner' emerged from a 
test of logical consistency but TTOP would be given a slight preference. This issue has 
rarely been considered in valuation studies and would be unimportant if all methods 
generated similar (high) levels of consistency. However, if consistency rates are low 
then doubt is cast on the feasibility of valuing health states in this way. Our experience 
here is that there is a 'threshold' level of consistency of somewhere in the region of 
85% for SG and 90% for TTO and I consider these rates to be acceptable. 
The construct validity of the methods was assessed according to the extent to which 
valuations differed by the background characteristics that previous literature had 
shown to be important (and unimportant) determinants of valuations. It was 
hypothesised that valuations would not differ according to the age, gender and 
employment status of the respondent but that higher valuations would be elicited from 
respondents with experience of illness. All methods yielded valuations which 
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supported the former construct whilst tentative support was lent to the latter construct. 
Of course, if the construct is not supported it does not necessarily invalidate the 
method as it may be that the construct itself is misspecified. More research is needed 
before the constructs hypothesised in this chapter can be considered to be absolute 
standards. 
The validity of health state valuations may also be assessed by considering the extent to 
which the valuations elicited by these methods are valid representations of individual 
preferences. One way to test this would be to examine the robustness or otherwise of 
the valuations. Less confidence would be placed in valuations that are sensitive to 
seemingly irrelevant changes in problem structure or question format, for example. It 
is encouraging that valuations from all methods appeared to be unaffected by the order 
of presentation i. e. valuations were no different whether that task was administered 
first or second, or whether it was preceded by a props or a no props variant. This 
finding contradicts that of Llewellyn-Thomas et al [ 1984] who found the existence of 
an anchoring effect when riskless methods such as the TTO were preceded by lottery 
questions, as in the SG. 
It is also encouraging that all the methods produce a similar ordinal ranking of health 
states, which suggests that they all allow respondents to differentiate between states of 
differing severity. However, differences in cardinal values are observed and possible 
reasons for this have been discussed in Chapter 2.1. Whatever the reasons, it appears 
that valuations from TTOP are the most central in that they are generally higher than 
SGP ones and lower than SGNP and TTONP ones. The exception appears to be state 
33333 which has a lower score on TTOP than on any of the other methods. Indeed, 
TTOP is the only method which results in a negativ e median value for this state. In 
other words, at least half the people valuing this state on this method consider it to be 
worse than death. This may be because the TTO method forces respondents to think 
more closely about the consequences of being in an extremely dysfunctional state for 
10 years without any change. In the SG, the duration element may be given less 
prominence by respondents. There is evidence to suggest that more states are 
regarded as worse than death the longer they last (see Chapter 4). In this respect, 
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valuations to TTOP may more accurately represent individual preferences for states 
that last 10 years without any change. 
Before definite conclusions can be reached on the issue of which method most 
accurately represents individual preferences, it is important to gain a better 
understanding of the reasons y valuations differ (both within and between sub- 
groups). This issue will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6 but is complicated by the 
fact that health state valuations from choice-based methods are likely to be a function 
of both the severity of the health state and the context of the choice. For example, 
responses to standard gamble questions are likely to be influenced by attitudes to risk; 
and responses to time trade-off questions are likely to be influenced by life expectancy 
and time preference. 
Test-retest reliability gave a more definitive answer in that TTOP valuations showed 
the most stability across time, performing significantly better than both TTONP and 
SGP and similarly to SGNP. It has been conventional in this field to assess test-retest 
reliability by calculating the correlation coefficient between the first and the second sets 
of scores obtained from each respondent. The coefficient of 0.81 for TTOP compares 
well with those from other studies (see Churchill et al [ 1984], [1987] and O'Connor et 
al [ 1985], particularly as the time between test and retest was longer at a median of ten 
and a half weeks. 
Bland and Altman [1986] have argued that use of correlation is misleading since it 
measures only the strength of a relation between two variables and not the agreement 
between them. Instead, they suggest plotting the differences in scores between two 
methods (or in this case the difference between test and retest scores) against their 
mean. By calculating 'limits of agreement' between the two sets of scores (defined by 
Bland and Altman as the mean plus and minus two standard deviations) and the 
confidence intervals associated with them, the degree of agreement between the sets of 
scores can be summarised. However, given that six states were valued using four 
methods, there would be twenty-four graphical representations of the differences 
between test and retest scores. This would mean that unless one method produced the 
60 
greatest agreement between test and retest for all six states (which is not the case), 
then it would be extremely difficult to determine the overall performance of each 
method. For this reason we feel that the correlation coefficient provides the best 
summary statistic available. 
On the basis of the results reported here, TTOP has been chosen as the valuation 
method to be used in the Main Study. This choice has been made in the context of a 
study conducted with a random sample from the British general population, using a 
particular descriptive tool for health status, and with specially designed boards and 
protocols. Although the method performed well, it was clear from interviewers' 
comments that improvements could be made to ease the handling of scripts, cards and 
boards in an often confined space. This would be particularly important in a clinical 
setting although it is encouraging that TTO has been found to be relatively easy in 
practice (see Torrance [ 1987]) and has been used fairly widely to generate valuations 
for health states (see Laupacis et al [ 1992] and Singer et al [ 1991 ]). It is not known 
whether the choice of the EuroQol descriptive system affected the outcome, although 
it is unlikely to have had a differential effect on the SG and TTO methods. 
It is recognised that no clear cut 'winner' emerged from this study and, in particular, 
there is little to choose between TTOP and SGNP. The need to select one method, 
however, has pushed the balance in favour of TTOP as the method which performed 
significantly better on completeness, marginally better on logical consistency, and 
significantly better than SGNP and TTONP on test-retest reliability. In addition, the 
possibility that questionnaire framing may bias responses to the no props variants casts 
some doubt on the validity of the valuations from these methods. 
61 
CHAPTER 3: GENERATING A SET OF VALUATIONS 
CHAPTER 3.1: THE TTO RESULTS FROM THE MAIN STUDY 
Study Design 
Choice of health states 
For the EuroQol to be used in evaluating the health benefits associated with 
different health care interventions, it is important to derive a single index value for 
each of the 243 health states it generates. Two pilot studies conducted prior to the 
Main Study suggested that no one respondent can be expected to value more than 
about 13 states using TTO in any one interview but this number was deemed to be 
too small to interpolate valuations for all possible EuroQol states from. Therefore, 
a larger set of 43 states was chosen in total and each respondent was asked to 
value a subset of these. 
In choosing the states both for use in the study itself and for each respondent, the 
most important consideration was that they should be widely spread over the 
valuation space so as to include as many combinations of levels across the five 
dimensions as possible. This was subject to the constraint that the states were 
likely to be considered plausible by respondents. Therefore, level 1 on usual 
activities (no problems) was not combined with level 3 on mobility (confined to 
bed) or with level 3 on self-care (unable to wash or dress self). Figure 3.1.1 shows 
the set of states chosen for direct valuation and how a subset of these were chosen 
for each respondent. 
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Structure of the interview 
Each respondent was first asked to describe their own health using the EuroQol 
descriptive system. They were then asked to rank a predetermined set of 15 health 
states (the 13 to be used in the TTO plus 11111 and "Immediate Death"), which 
were printed on cards, in order from best to worst. It was explained that each 
state was to be regarded as lasting for 10 years without change, followed by death. 
The respondent was then asked to indicate where on a vertical VAS with 
endpoints of 100 (best imaginable health state) and 0 (worst imaginable health 
state) they would rate each of the states. 
The 13 states were then valued by the TTO method using a specially-designed 
double-sided board similar to that described in Chapter 2.1 and shown in the 
appendix. For states that were regarded by the respondent as better than dead, 
respondents were led by a process of "bracketing" to select a length of time in the 
11111 state that they regarded as equivalent to 10 years in the target state and 
were given an opportunity to refuse to trade-off any length of life in order to 
improve its quality. In the case of states worse than dead, the choice was between 
dying immediately and spending a length of time (10-x) in the target state followed 
by x years in the 11111 state. At the end of the interview, personal background 
data were collected from each respondent. 
Retest interview 
In order to test the reliability of the TTO valuations, a sub-sample of 221 
respondents that were representative of the full sample in terms of sex, age, and 
qualifications were taken through exactly the same interview by the same 
interviewer about 10 weeks after the original interview. 
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The Sample 
In determining the size of the sample, there was the need for enough observations 
to be obtained so as to detect differences between the valuations given to different 
states and to be able to detect differences in valuations between different sub- 
groups of the population (e. g. by age, or social class, or geographical location). 
Although there is little evidence in the literature regarding what size difference is 
required to be considered meaningful (see O'Brien and Drummond [ 1994]), it was 
decided that a . 
05 difference between health states and between different sub- 
groups is likely to be considered important in many contexts. A sample size of 
3235 enabled such a difference to be detected between health states and between 
four equally-sized subgroups at the . 
05 level of significance with 80% power. This 
required the selection of 6080 addresses; thus allowing for a response rate of 53%. 
The sample was drawn up by Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR) 
using the postcode address file. The main fieldwork was carried out by 92 trained 
interviewers between August and December 1993. 
Study population and exclusions 
Of the 6080 addresses selected for sampling, 706 (12%) were found to be 'out of 
scope', being non-residential, empty/derelict, untraceable, or not yet built. Of the 
remaining 5324 addresses, 3395 interviews were achieved, giving a response rate 
of 64% on in-scope addresses. The main reasons for unsuccessful interviews were 
a refusal by the selected person. Table 3.1.1 shows that the sample had broadly 
similar characteristics in terms of age, sex, marital status. educational attainment 
and social class as the general population. Table 3.1.1 also shows the number (and 
background characteristics) of respondents excluded from subsequent data 
analysis. Because the criteria for excluding respondents were as stringent as 
possible, in total only 58 (1.3%) of respondents were excluded: 42 had insufficient 
data for further analysis; 7 had rated all states as worse than death; and 9 did not 
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understand the TTO task. It can be seen that excluded respondents were more 
likely to be aged 60 and over, to have no qualifications, to be in social classes III- 
V and to report problems on the EuroQol dimensions. However, given such a 
small number of exclusions, the 3337 respondents remaining in the data set were 
still broadly representative of the general population. 
Valuation results 
Distribution of scores 
Table 3.1.2 shows the transformed mean and median scores for all 43 states. 
Inspection of the range of health state values suggests that respondents were more 
prepared to sacrifice life expectancy for states that include "extreme problems" 
with any of the dimensions. Level 2 (which involves "some problems") on the 
dimensions appears to be much more tolerable. For example, state 22222 has a 
median valuation that is 0.13 higher than 11113 and 0.25 higher than 11131. This 
results in most states that include level 3 on two or more dimensions having values 
that imply they are, on average, perceived to be worse than death. In total, 17 
states have a negative mean score and 13 states have a negative median score (a 
further 4 had median values of 0.0). Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicated that the 
distribution of scores for each state was non-normal: the distributions were 
generally negatively-skewed for less severe states (indicated by higher median than 
mean values for such states) and positively-skewed for more severe states (as 
evidenced by higher mean values for such states). 
The effect of background characteristics 
Before addressing this issue, it was determined that the valuations were not 
susceptible to interviewer bias nor to regional effects. OLS regression analysis 
was used to assess the impact of a number of respondent characteristics on health 
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state valuations. The dependent variable was taken to be the TTO valuation and 
the independent variables were the different background characteristics (see Table 
3.1.3 for a description of these variables). Most of the variables are categorical 
except for age which is a continuous variable and age-squared which of the 
various transformations of age tested was found to be the most significant. To 
allow for the possibility that the impact of one or more of these variables may not 
be uniform across the entire range of EuroQol states, the regression was 
performed separately on the 'mild' (which included the set of five 'very mild' states), 
'moderate' and 'severe' states, as defined in Figure 3.1.1. 
The results are shown in Table 3.1.4. That the adjusted-R2s are so low is not in 
itself a cause for much concern since the object of this analysis is to assess the 
relative effect of different respondent characteristics on valuations rather than to 
find the model(s) which explains all the variance in valuations. Given the large 
number of observations in each regression, a particular variable is considered to be 
significant if the (absolute) t-statistic associated with it is greater than 3.29 (which 
corresponds to a probability value of 0.001). 
The results suggest that TTO valuations are primarily affected by the age and sex 
of the respondent. Figure 3.1.2 shows the effect of age on the valuations given by 
men and women, respectively, when all other dummies take a value of zero. They 
suggest that TTO valuations increase slowly from the age of 18 to about 40, then 
begin to fall slowly from about 40 to 60 and then fall sharply in later years. 
Although this pattern is observed for all three sets of states, it is more marked for 
moderate and severe states than for the mild states. The effect of gender is also 
more pronounced for more severe states: for the set of mild states, women give 
valuations that are, on average, 0.03 lower than those given by men but the 
difference increases to 0.06 for moderate states and to 0.07 for severe states. 
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In addition, the marital status of the respondent appears to be a statistically 
significant explanatory variable for the set of mild states (where, on average, the 
valuations of single people are 0.006 higher than the valuations of married people 
and 0.005 lower than those who are separated, divorced or widowed) and for the 
set of moderate states (where single people have valuations that are 0.008 lower 
than married people). However, it can be seen that the value of these coefficients 
is very small suggesting that, although statistically significant in the regression 
equation, the effect of marital status is negligible and unlikely to be meaningful in 
any practical sense. 
Quality versus quantity? 
The question of whether TTO valuations differ by sub-group is essentially about 
whether some people are more or less prepared to sacrifice life expectancy in order 
to avoid poor health than other people. In this context, there is another important 
question; namely, are some people more or less willing to sacrifice a life 
expectancy in order to avoid poor health than others? This draws a distinction 
between those willing to trade quantity (in terms of life expectancy) for quality (in 
terms of improvements in health), irrespective of the rate of exchange, and those 
unwilling to "play the game". In other words, there exists a qualitative difference 
between an implied health state value of 1.00 and any other value. 
46% of respondents were willing to sacrifice life expectancy to avoid all of the 
dysfunctional states they were presented with, and thus had no health state values 
of 1.00. A further 29% were willing to sacrifice life expectancy for all but one or 
two of the states. In such cases, the unwillingness to trade-off time was almost 
exclusively associated with one or both of the very mild states. In all, 95% of 
respondents were prepared to sacrifice life expectancy for 6 or more states. The 
25% of respondents who were unwilling to trade off time for three or more states 
were older and less educated than the remainder of respondents; 33.7% were aged 
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60 or over compared to 28.4% and 41.8% had no qualifications compared to 
34.7% in the group of respondents more willing to sacrifice life expectancy. 
Interestingly, the 5% of respondents who were unwilling to sacrifice any life 
expectancy in order to avoid more than half of the states they valued were no older 
than the remainder of respondents. Instead, such respondents were found to be 
less educated (45.6% had no qualifications compared with 33.9% of the other 
respondents). 
Test-retest reliability 
The 221 respondents in the retest were representative of those in the test in all 
respects except educational level, where 28.6% of retest respondents had no 
qualifications compared with 37.0% of respondents not in the retest (Chi=6.26, 
d. f. =1, p<0.05). For the purposes of group analysis, 4 respondents were excluded 
from the retest data set: 1 previously excluded from the test data set; I with all 
states missing at retest; 1 with all states rated as worse than dead; and 1 with the 
same score given to all states. At test, respondents taking part in the retest gave a 
significantly higher TTO score to state 33323 than respondents who did not go on 
to do the retest (p<0.01), but this was the only significant difference in the 
valuations given by the two groups of respondents. The results of Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-rank tests showed that no health state valuation at retest was 
significantly different from its corresponding value at test. However, Figure 3.1.3, 
which graphically represents the differences in median scores between test and 
retest, shows that for 2 (3) states the difference between the median at test is more 
than 0.20 higher (lower) than the median at retest. 
For comparisons on an individual-by-individual basis an intra-class correlation 
coefficient (ICC) was calculated for each respondent for each of the valuation 
methods. This statistic is calculated using the following formula; 
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ICC = (A2+B2-C2) / (A2+B2+D2-C2) 
where A is the SD of the difference between each score at test and the 
mean score at test 
B is the SD of the difference between each score at retest and the 
mean score at retest 
C is the SD of the difference between each score at test and each 
score at retest 
D is the mean difference between each score at test and each score at 
retest 
The closer the ICC is to 1, the greater the reliability. Figure 3.1.4 shows the 
distribution of ICCs. The majority of respondents had an ICC that was close to 1 
and only 24 (10.9%) had an ICC that was less than or equal to 0.5. The mean 
ICC was 0.73 (S. D. =0.22) and the median was 0.79 (IQR=0.64-0.88). ICCs 
appeared to be negatively related to educational attainment; those with a degree or 
equivalent had higher ICCs as a group than those with no qualifications at all 
(p<0.05). 
Discussion 
The group valuations elicited for the 43 health states suggest that members of the 
general public can distinguish between states of health that involve different 
degrees of severity. However, the measures of dispersion (SDs and IQRs) were 
much higher than expected which casts doubt on the assertion made by Torrance 
[ 1986] that "the mean utility value for a health state can be made as precise as 
desired by increasing the group size". Rather than reflecting the degree of 
consensus about the value that should be attached to a particular health state, it is 
possible that the large SDs and IQRs reflect the difficulties respondents 
encountered in imagining themselves being in the health states so described. That 
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the variance around the central tendency values increases as the severity of the 
health state increases, lends some support to this hypothesis. 
However, the interpretation of measures of dispersion does not tell the whole 
story, because it is quite plausible that respondents rank adjacent states in the same 
way, but some do so using high values, while others do so using low values. 
Analysing pairwise relationships between states (using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signed-rank test), revealed that there were no more than 4 states adjacent to any 
particular state which were not significantly different from it at the 1% level. 
Thus, it appears that the large SDs and IQRs obtained in this study, particularly for 
the more severe health states, are more likely a reflection of the fact that different 
people have very different views about the same health state, rather than an 
indication of respondent confusion. 
For TTO valuations to be interpreted on an interval scale requires each year of life 
to be valued equally. However, if people discount future years of life because of a 
positive rate of time preference (i. e. because they give greater value to years of life 
in the near future than to those in the distant future), then it is no longer valid to 
treat TTO valuations in this way. Moreover, if people are not prepared to trade- 
off a constant proportion of their remaining life expectancy in order to avoid a 
dysfunctional health state, then valuations elicited for states lasting ten years 
cannot be assumed to hold for states lasting for longer or shorter durations 
irrespective of the impact of duration. These issues are discussed more fully in 
Chapters 4.1 and 4.2. 
It is unclear how generalisable these results are since it is likely that are in part a 
function of the duration of the states. Since respondents were told to imagine that 
each state would last for ten years without any change, it is likely that some felt 
they could not tolerate extreme dysfunction (particularly pain) for this long. 
Whilst the finding that some states were considered worse than death is not unique 
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(they have appeared in several countries for several valuation methods; for 
example, see Rosser and Kind [ 1978] and Read et al [ 1984]), there is evidence to 
suggest that fewer states would be regarded as worse than death were they to last 
for less time and this issue is addressed in Chapter 4.3. 
There is also the issue of whether the order of presentation for states rated as 
worse than death may have had an effect on valuations: respondents may value a 
scenario in which a bad state is followed by a good state (as in this study) 
differently from one in which a good state is followed by a bad state (as suggested 
by Torrance [ 1986]), even though the time spent in each of the states may be 
identical. This is an empirical question which needs addressing. In addition, there 
is the question of how to interpret scores for states worse than dead. As discussed 
in Chapter 2.1, given the standard health preference scale, states preferred to death 
have an upper bound of one but there is no comparable lower bound for states 
rated worse than death. The asymmetry results from the TTO (as well as for the 
SG) producing an interval scale for positive scores and a ratio scale for negative 
scores. It seems reasonable to treat positive and negative scores in the same way 
i. e. to convert the ratio scores into interval ones, thus setting a lower bound of -1, 
and this adjustment finds support in the literature. 
One of the most important findings is the effect that the age and, to a lesser extent, 
the gender of the respondent has on health state valuations. Other background 
variables, such as social class and education, were found to be insignificant, and 
others (such as marital status), whilst statistically significant, are unlikely to be 
meaningful in programme evaluation. The importance of age and sex contradicts 
the findings of other studies: in their review of the literature to 1988, Froberg and 
Kane [ 1989, p586) find "little compelling evidence of population differences due 
to demographic characteristics". However, most of the previous studies of health 
state preferences have contained small numbers of respondents, and, as Froberg 
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and Kane readily admit [1989, p586] "low statistical power may be obscuring 
differences". 
The valuations of 'middle-aged' respondents appear to be higher than those of 
younger respondents, whilst older respondents have much lower valuations than 
those in the other two age 'groups'. This may lend support to the notion that the 
middle-aged have the lowest rates of time preference and thus place relatively 
more weight on years in the future (i. e. the ones they are being asked to sacrifice) 
than younger or older respondents. However, the fact that the effect of age is not 
uniform across all states, being more pronounced for moderate and severe states 
than for mild ones, may suggest that the effect of time preference for health is not 
independent of the severity of the health state. Again, see Chapter 4 for a fuller 
discussion of this issue. 
It may be that the much lower valuations of the older respondents in this study are 
an artefact of the TTO method. For states that were rated as better than dead, 
respondents were asked to imagine that each state would last for 10 years without 
any change, after which they would die. If they did not believe that they actually 
had 10 years life expectancy, they might willingly give up these "excess" life years, 
thereby depressing the apparent value attached to the health states. However, the 
effect of age appears to be more pronounced for the more severe states (which 
were much more likely to be rated as worse than dead) than for the less severe 
ones. It is unclear how and why an argument of this kind would apply with 
greater force to the worse than dead scenario than to the better than dead one. 
An alternative explanation is that, as people's life expectancy shortens, they see less 
reason to tolerate suffering during their remaining years. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that people become more tolerant of poor health as they get older, either 
through adapting to a general deterioration in health or through a lowering of 
expectations, and there is some empirical evidence to support this hypothesis (see 
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Sackett and Torrance [ 1978]). However, it is entirely plausible that somebody 
who has limited life expectancy and is possibly in a poor health state, may be 
prepared to sacrifice a great deal (either life expectancy for states rated better than 
dead or time in full health for states rated worse than dead) in order to avoid 
severe health states. In a study of cancer and renal patients with limited life 
expectancy, Shiell, King and Briggs [ 1993] found that TTO results were polarised; 
some would not trade off any life years, while others would trade off almost 
everything to have their final years as healthy ones. The older respondents in this 
general population study may have held similar views about the (severe) states as 
this latter group. 
In addition, older respondents may be more conscious of the burden that serious 
chronic illness can place on their family or close friends, particularly if they have 
experienced the suffering of someone close to them. This might explain why the 
valuations of older respondents were closer to those of other respondents for 
states they considered "tolerable" (both for themselves and for those close to 
them) yet much lower for states they considered would be "intolerable" for 
themselves and their family. It may also go some way towards explaining why 
women had lower valuations than men for the more severe states: women may be 
more concerned about the burden they would be to others than men are, 
particularly as they may be likely to have experience of caring for someone with 
serious illness. 
Before definite conclusions can be reached about the effect of certain background 
characteristics it is important to gain a better understanding of the reasons ML_ 
valuations differ (both within and between sub-groups) but, as noted in Chapter 
2.2, this issue is complicated by the fact that health state valuations from choice- 
based methods are likely to be a function of both the severity of the health state 
and the context of the choice. Therefore, some of the differences in health state 
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valuations reported in this chapter may be the result of different perceptions of 
time rather than differences perceptions of severity of illness per se. 
The premise of the discussion so far has been that differences in valuations 
according to the age and, to a lesser extent, gender of the respondent are real 
differences. However, it could be argued that this relationship is a spurious one; 
that the large number of variables being assessed and the large sample size, by 
chance, account for the results. Whilst this possibility cannot be completely ruled 
out, the fact that in the three regressions (one for each set of mild, moderate and 
severe states) the effects of age and sex are systematic (though not constant) 
suggests that genuine effects are being picked up. In addition, the use of 
regression analysis should isolate the effects the age and gender, and thus reduce 
the possibility that they are acting as proxies for other (more important) 
explanatory variables. 
Although almost half of the respondents were prepared to sacrifice life expectancy 
in order to avoid all of the dysfunctional states they were asked to consider, one- 
quarter were unwilling to sacrifice even a couple of weeks at the end of 10 years 
for 3 or more states. Such preference may be further evidence of the reference 
point effect discussed in Chapter 2.1. If perceived losses (in terms of life 
expectancy) are weighted more heavily than perceived gains (in terms of HRQoL), 
the effect will be to elicit a higher health state valuation than might otherwise be 
the case since respondents are asked to imagine that they are already in the poor 
health state. At the limit, the perceived loss is so great as to make any change 
(from 10 years in poor health) undesirable. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that the reference point effect would be more 
prevalent the more unclear respondents are about the choices they are being asked 
to make; an "if in doubt, stick with what you've got" hypothesis. The hypothesis 
might be, therefore, that less educated respondents are more likely to suffer from 
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reference point effects. The fact that less educated respondents were more likely 
to be unwilling to sacrifice a life expectancy, even for some moderate and severe 
states, lends support to this hypothesis. Certainly, the possibility of a reference 
point effect should not be overlooked and, as already discussed, may go some way 
towards explaining the observed differences between valuation methods that start 
with different "endowments". 
The results from the retest were encouraging. At the aggregate level, 32 of the 43 
states had a median at retest that was within 0.1 of the median at test and there 
were no significant differences in the valuations of any of the states between test 
and retest. This finding is consistent with other studies which found group values 
to be remarkably stable regardless of the make-up of the group [see Boyd et al 
[ 1982] and Wolfson et al [ 1982]). At the individual level, only I in 10 of the 
respondents had an intra-class correlation coefficient that was below 0.5. The 
mean ICC was 0.73 which is considered acceptable and compares well with the 
results of previous studies (see Chapter 2.2). 
Of course, the stability of the valuations of the general public does not necessarily 
imply that the valuations of all groups will be stable. For example, this study did 
not include test-retest measurements taken from patients before and after therapy, 
whose valuations of the same state might be expected to differ. Christensen- 
Szalanski [ 1984] found that women's preferences for anaesthesia during childbirth 
were labile; not surprisingly, perhaps, preferences for anaesthesia were more 
positive during labour than they were one month before or after labour. However, 
Llewellyn-Thomas et al [ 1993] found that patients' TTO valuations of hypothetical 
health states encountered during radiation therapy for laryngeal cancer remained 
stable when those states were experienced at a later time. 
Finally, with respect to the logistics of the study itself, representativeness was 
achieved and the data were near complete and highly consistent, thus refuting the 
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claim of Froberg and Kane [ 1989, p681 ] that the TTO "probably loses its 
advantage in large-scale studies due to its complexity and the resulting confusion 
and nonresponse". Despite the many unanswered questions, the results show that 
eliciting the preferences of the general public is feasible and indicate possible 
directions for future research. 
CHAPTER 3.2: MODELLING THE TTO DATA 
Introduction 
This chapter reports on the methodology adopted to allow valuations for all 243 
EuroQol states (referred to as the "tariff') to be interpolated from direct valuations 
on the 43 states used in the Main Study. To enable modelling of the TTO data at 
the individual level, only those respondents with complete valuations data have 
been included in the analysis. There are 2997 such respondents. Excluding those 
respondents with incomplete data did not compromise the representativeness of 
the sample. 
Methods 
The modelling in this chapter uses a generalised least-squares regression technique 
in which the functional form is additive. The dependent variable is defined as 1-S 
where S is the value given to a particular health state. Besides the intercept, the 
specification of the remaining independent variables derive from the ordinal nature 
of the EuroQol descriptive system. In total, three sets of dummy variables were 
created: 
1. Two dummy variables for each dimension; one to represent the (assumed 
equal) move between levels and one to represent the move from level 2 to level 3 
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(this allows the effect of the move from level 1 to level 2 to be different from the 
effect of the move from level 2 to level 3). 
2. Dummies to allow for possible (first order) interactions between dimensions. 
3. Dummies to count the number of times a health state contains dimension(s) 
which are at level 1 or at level 3. 
Figure 3.2.1 shows the independent variables used in the modelling. Notice one 
further dummy (N3) which represents whether a of the dimensions is at level 3, 
of which more anon. Because the objective of this chapter was to estimate one 
preference-based EuroQol tariff for the whole community, respondent 
characteristics such as age, sex and illness experience were not entered in to the 
model. Differences according to these characteristics may, of course, be important 
in some contexts and analysis along these lines is reported in Chapter 3.3. 
The approach adopted to model estimation followed the specific to general 
formulation in which simple models are initially estimated and new variables added 
if necessary. This was deemed the most appropriate methodology for this type of 
data since the alternative, the general to specific approach is more suited to time 
series data in which any known collinearity between regressors can be better 
accounted for (problems of multi-col-linearity are discussed further below). 
It was decided that analysis should take place on individual-level rather than 
aggregate-level data since it makes the maximum use of the available data. In 
addition, the results of aggregate-level analysis are likely to be uninformative in 
that it is possible to find different models which fit the data equally well, with no 
objective way of choosing between them. Analysis at the individual level is 
complicated by the fact that each respondent valued 12 EuroQol states and thus it 
is reasonable to assume that these 12 scores are related to one another. This 
means that if a respondent gives one valuation that is lower than the population 
mean, then they are more likely to give a value lower than the population mean to 
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the other states that they value. This means that the variance of the error term is 
likely to be partly determined by the individuals who value the health states and is 
therefore unlikely to be constant. This violates one of the key assumption 
underlying OLS regression and thus makes this estimation procedure inefficient for 
this data. 
The type of generalised least-squares (GLS) model that addresses this issue is 
known as the random effects (RE) model in which there is an overall intercept and 
an error term with two components; e; t + u;. The e; 1 is the traditional error term 
unique to each observation. The u; is an error term representing the extent to 
which the intercept of the ith respondent differs from the overall intercept. This 
model assumes that the "individual specific" error term is normally independently 
distributed which, given the size of the sample, seems a valid assumption to make. 
Using the RE specification will reduce the possibility of drawing erroneous 
conclusions; for example, from an OLS estimation it may be concluded that a 
particular respondent characteristic is an important determinant of the value 
attached to a health state but this may simply be picking up an effect that will be 
nested within the RE model. 
As a stringent test of the robustness of the models, each model has been estimated 
on a sub-sample of respondents (i. e. an internal sample) and a comparison made 
between the predicted values from this sub-sample with the actual values of the 
remaining respondents (i. e. an external sample). This method has the advantage of 
providing unbiased estimates of predictive ability, and avoids over-optimistic 
results that occur when the same data is used both to estimate and predict (see 
Copas [1983]). In this chapter, the internal sample was a randomly selected 
sample of two-thirds of respondents and the external sample constituted the 
remaining one-third of respondents. 
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The modelling has been carried out using the LIMDEP statistical package (see 
Greene [ 1992]). When estimating the RE model, LIMDEP produces the OLS 
equation by default. It automatically performs a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 
which is appropriate for large data sets like this. The LM test assess whether the 
unrestricted model (i. e. the RE one) represents an improvement on the restricted 
model (i. e. the OLS one). If the LM value is significant (p<0.05) then the RE 
model represents an improvement on the OLS one. The R-squared produced 
from the RE model may not be any greater than that produced by the OLS model, 
and may in some cases be lower. It must be remembered, however, that OLS is 
the Qnly estimation procedure that attempts to minimise the residual sum of 
squares; all other GLS models (of which RE is one) have a different objective 
function. Therefore, the R-squareds from the different models are not strictly 
comparable. The models were tested for misspecification in two ways: a Ramsey 
RESET test, and a test for general heteroskedasticity (see Chapter 2.1 for details). 
With regard to making a choice between different ways of representing the 
relationship between the valuations of EuroQol health states and the different 
dimensions and levels, the model that is ultimately chosen must predict a higher 
score for one state, A, than another, B, if A is logically better than B on at least 
one dimension and no worse on any other dimension. In choosing between the 
many models that satisfy this consistency condition, the one that best explains the 
differences in the valuations given to those states on which there is direct data was 
chosen. For models with comparable goodness-of-fit statistics, the ultimate choice 
was made according to parsimony i. e. the simplest model (both in terms of the 
number of independent variables and the ability to explain them) was chosen. The 
results presented below are from the "best" model according to these criteria. 
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Results 
After testing many different models, one that fits the data well (in terms of 
goodness-of-fit statistics) and that is readily interpretable is a main effects model, 
in which each of the 5 dimensions is independent of others. None of the models 
which allowed for interactions between different dimensions improved the model 
significantly and many introduced inconsistencies into the estimated values. The 
model does, however, contain one further variable; an intercept dummy for 
whether y of the dimensions is at level 3. Without this additional dummy, which 
can be interpreted as reflecting the much greater disutility associated with 
"Extreme problems", the residuals are systematically related to the predicted 
values in that the model underestimates the values of less severe states and 
overestimates the values of more severe ones. 
Thus, the regression equation is as follows: 
Y=a+ß, MO+ß2SC+ß3UA+ß4PD+ß5AD+ß6M2+ß7S2+ß8U2+ß9P2+ 
ß 10A2 + ßN3 
i. e. TTO scores are explained by 12 independent variables: two variables for each 
dimension (one to represent the move from level 1 to level 2 and one to represent 
the move from level 2 to level 3), a term which picks up whether any dimension is 
at level 3 and an intercept (the interpretation of which is discussed below). 
The coefficients on these variables for the full and internal samples are shown in 
Table 3.2.1. The R2 of 0.46 (in both cases) is very high given the type of (cross- 
sectional) data analysed here and the results of the LM test indicate the RE 
specification to be a substantial improvement over the OLS model. In addition, 
the remarkable similarity between the parameter estimates for the whole sample 
and those for the internal sample suggests that the model is robust. 
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However, this model (and all other models) failed the RESET test and suffered 
from general heteroscedasticity. That the model suffers from problems of omitted 
variables and/or incorrect functional form is not surprising given that the power of 
the RESET test increases as the sample size increases. Thus with 2997x 12=35964 
observations, gny model with relatively few independent variables is likely to be 
misspecified. The problems associated with heteroscedasticity are also difficult to 
overcome since the conventional means of dealing with them (e. g. transformation 
of one or more independent variables) are not feasible given the (categorical) 
nature of the independent variables. Correction methods such as White's 
correction have been used in other contexts (for example, labour supply) but will 
only reduce the standard errors on the parameter estimates, not change the 
estimates themselves. Since the purpose of this paper is to generate point 
estimates of valuations, and because heteroscedasticity here will result in inefficient 
rather than biased parameter estimates, it is less of a problem than in contexts such 
as estimating labour supply functions. 
Because the analysis concerns cross-sectional data, all variables from the main 
effects model have been left in the final equations, even those that might be 
considered "insignificant" (i. e. have a t-statistic whose absolute value is less than 
1.96). This is to avoid any pre-test type problems where "insignificant" variables 
may become "significant" if sampling were to be repeated. In addition, dropping 
variables whose absolute t-statistic is less than 1 is likely to result in the mean 
square errors being higher than they should be. Moreover, given that the 
regressors in this modelling are collinear, the significance of parameter estimates 
will vary according to the other independent variables in the equation. Since not 
enough is known about the nature of the functional form to address problems of 
multi-coIlinearity with any degree of confidence, it is considered appropriate to 
include even "insignificant" main effects variables. 
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In computing the tariff from the model output, there is an issue relating to how the 
intercept, a, is interpreted. The strict statistical interpretation of a is that it 
represents the estimated value for (one minus) full health (i. e. when all dummies 
take a value of zero we have the estimated value for 11111). Thus, all estimated 
values should be rescaled by dividing them by 1-a. Alternatively, given that by 
definition the value of 11111 is 1, we could interpret the intercept as representing 
any move away from full health. Thus, a could represent a discontinuity in the 
model between level 1 and level 2 in much the same way as the 'N3' term 
represents a discontinuity between level 2 and level 3. In other words, we could 
interpret the intercept as picking up whether any dimension is at level 2, just as 
'N3' picks up whether any dimension is at level 3. When predicted and actual 
values are compared, the algorithm in which a is treated in this way performs 
much better than when all estimated values are adjusted by 1-a. 
Table 3.2.1 shows that the constant is highly significant suggesting that a move 
away from full health is associated with a substantial loss of utility. For the full 
sample, it can be seen that the largest decrement for a move from level 1 to level 2 
is associated with pain or discomfort, some four times greater than that for the 
corresponding move on the usual activities dimension. Pain or discomfort 
continues to dominate the weighting for level 3, although mobility level 3 
(confined to bed) is given a somewhat similar decrement. For the mobility, pain or 
discomfort, and anxiety or depression dimensions, the move from level 2 to level 3 
is seen to involve a much greater decrement than the move from level 1 to level 2. 
The actual (mean) and predicted values for the 42 states directly valued in the 
study, together with the differences between them, are given in Table 3.2.2. For 
only three states (21312,23313 and 13332) does the difference between the mean 
and predicted value exceed 0.1 and the mean absolute difference (of 0.039) is 
considered acceptable. Table 3.2.3 compares the predicted values generated from 
the internal two-thirds of respondents with the actual (mean) values of the 
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remaining one-third of 'external' respondents. It can be seen that the predictive 
power of the model remains high; only 5 states have a predicted value that is more 
than 0.1 different from the actual value and the mean absolute difference is again 
below 0.05. 
Discussion 
The statistical analysis used in this chapter to interpolate valuations for all 243 
EuroQol health states from direct observations on a subset of 43 states is based on 
regression analysis in which the dependent variable is (one minus) the score given 
to the health states. All independent variables are dummies and derive from the 
ordinal nature of the EuroQol descriptive system. The functional form estimated is 
a linear additive one which seems a valid approach given the assumption that 
valuations elicited from the TTO method for states rated as better than dead 
exhibit interval scale properties (i. e. the difference between 0.2 and 0.4 is the same 
as the difference between 0.6 and 0.8). Besides, estimating and interpreting 
different functional forms would be difficult given the (categorical) nature of the 
independent variables. 
Analysis is of data at the individual level to make full use of the data available and 
is based on a form of GLS known as the random effects model. This specification 
accounts for the fact that groups of observations come from one individual. An 
alternative approach would have been a fixed effects (FE) model in which a 
dummy variable would be created for each respondent. However, models based 
on RE rather than on FE were deemed more appropriate for this data set for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, FE models, which produce results that are conditional 
on the units in the data set, are only reasonable if the data exhaust the population. 
If the data are a sample of a larger population (as is the case here), and if we wish 
to draw inferences regarding other members of that population (as is also the case 
here) then "the fixed effects model is no longer reasonable; in this context, use of 
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the random effects model has the advantage that it saves a lot of degrees of 
freedom" (Kennedy, [ 1992]). Secondly, given that we cannot fully account for 
how and why valuations differ across individuals, it is reasonable to treat this type 
of ignorance in a fashion similar to the general ignorance represented by the error 
term. Finally, there is the practical problem of estimating and interpreting 2997 
coefficients. 
Given that each respondent in this dataset valued a number of different health 
states, and thus the value a respondent gives to one state is likely to be related to 
the value they give to other states, it was expected that the RE models would 
represent an improvement over the OLS ones. The results of the LM tests 
confirmed this, suggesting that if a respondent values one state above (or below) 
the population mean, then they are more likely to value other states above (or 
below) the mean. It should be noted, here, that the beta coefficients (though not 
the standard errors) from the OLS equations are similar to those estimated by the 
RE models, and thus it appears that an OLS specification produces unbiased yet 
inefficient estimates. 
Given a dataset of the kind analysed here there is, of course, a degree of 
uncertainty about the precise value that should be attached to any particular health 
state. One way of expressing this uncertainty is to calculate confidence intervals 
around the predicted values. The 95% confidence intervals were approximately 
0.75 for all states, irrespective of their severity. Thus, the confidence intervals 
(even the 50% one, which is 0.26) are undoubtedly large, indicating (as the 
standard deviations around the mean values presented in Chapter 3.1 indicate) that 
different people attach very different valuations to the same health state. 
However, confidence intervals do not tell the whole story. They only allow us to 
make inferences about the degree of consensus regarding which value to attach to 
each health state but say nothing about the degree of consensus regarding the 
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(cardinal or ordinal) differences between states. As noted in Chapter 3.1, most 
repondents rank adjacent states in the same way; it is just that some do so using 
high values, while others do so using low values. That the RE specification is 
much more efficient than the OLS one confirms this. Therefore, while large 
confidence intervals around the point estimates suggest that it is difficult to say 
with any degree of confidence what value any given individual will attach to any 
given health state, we can be reasonably confident that the individual will be in 
broad agreement with the (cardinal and ordinal) differences between states as that 
implied by the tariff values. 
Besides the random effects specification, the model is as simple as they can be; the 
data is explained in terms of a main effects model with one additional term to 
account for the much greater disutility associated with having "extreme problems". 
On the whole, the results from this modelling appear encouraging. The R-squared 
(of 0.46) can be considered very good given the type of data analysed here. There 
is very little data with which a direct comparison of these results can be made since 
much of the analysis of health state valuations data has been performed on 
aggregate level data but, in a wider context, a number of econometric models, 
notably those concerning labour supply functions, report "robust" findings with 
Res as low as 0.1. 
In addition, the predicted values from this model are very close to the actual ones 
for the majority of EuroQol states and the mean absolute difference (of 0.039) is 
unlikely to be considered meaningful in many contexts. Finally, when the values of 
a randomly chosen two-thirds of respondents are used to estimate the values of the 
remaining one-third, the mean absolute difference is again below 0.05. In short, 
the (relatively parsimonious) model presented in this chapter appears to predict the 
mean values of the EuroQol states for which there are direct observations 
reasonably well and thus can be used to interpolate mean values for the states for 
which no direct observations exist. 
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CHAPTER 3.3: MODELLING THE EFFECT OF AGE AND GENDER 
Introduction 
The results from the Main Study and presented in Chapter 3.1 suggest that TTO 
valuations are different between groups of raters; principally between gender and 
age groups. This means that the set of 243 EuroQol health state valuations 
derived for the whole community from the results of the Main Study might not be 
considered appropriate in all contexts. For example, if the population affected by a 
particular policy is exclusively elderly people, then it might be considered more 
appropriate to give greater weight to the preferences of such people. Thus, a 
'tariff based on the valuations of respondents over the age of, say, 60 might be 
required. This chapter presents valuation tariffs for all EuroQol states based on 
the gender and the age group of the respondent. 
Methods 
The regression analysis in this chapter uses the same model and modelling 
technique that was employed in estimating the EuroQol tariff for the whole 
population. The analysis is again at the individual level and the same sample of 
2997 respondents is used. The question then arises of how best to incorporate the 
effect of age and sex into the model. To clearly differentiate the different tariffs 
generated and to enhance the practical and policy relevance of the tariffs, it was 
decided to separate respondents into two age groups: those aged 18-59 and those 
aged 60 or over. These two age groups represent the broad bands where 
valuations differ most and have some legitimacy in terms of health care 
interventions that might be aimed at 'young' or 'old' people. The model was 
estimated separately for the two age groups because the data set was too big to 
allow age dummies to be incorporated into the full model. 
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With respect to gender, it is important to allow for the fact that its effect is unlikely 
to be uniform across all states and that the interaction between valuations and 
gender may differ across levels within dimensions, or across dimensions 
themselves. Therefore, additional dummy variables (suffixed with gend) were 
created which were the product of the original 12 dummies and the dummy 
attached to the sex of the respondent. Thus the regression equation for both age 
groups is as follows: 
Y=a+ß1MO+ß2SC+ß3UA+ß4PD+ß5AD+ß6M2+ß7S2+ß8U2+ß9P2+ 
ß, oA2 +ß 11 N3 +ß 12gend +ß 13MOgend +ß 14S Cgend +ß 15UAgend +ß 16PDgend 
+ ß17ADgend +B 18M2gend + ß19S2gend + ß20U2gend + ß21P2gend + ß22A2gend 
+ ß23N3gend 
Results 
The coefficients on the 24 independent variables together with their associated t- 
statistics for the two age groups are shown in Table 3.3.1. The R2s of around 0.47 
are high but both models failed the RESET test and suffered from general 
heteroscedasticity. From Table 3.3.1, it can be seen that the constant for all four 
population sub-groups is highly significant suggesting that Any move away from 
full health is associated with a substantial loss of utility and the size and 
significance of the coefficient on N3 highlights the aversion that respondents in 
general have to "extreme problems" on any of the dimensions. 
From the significance of the coefficients on the variables designed to pick up the 
effect of gender, it would appear that its effect is negligible: all coefficients are 
insignificant (at the 5% level) in the 18-59 year-olds model and only significant for 
two variables (SCgend and ADgend) in the 60 or over model. However, when 
estimated values are calculated for the full set of EuroQol health states from these 
coefficients, it is found that the absolute difference between the estimated values 
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for men and women aged 18-59 is 0.05 or more for 133 states (55% of the total 
number). For the values of the 60 or over age group, the corresponding numbers 
are 197 (81 %) and 124 (51 %) respectively. 
Since the model could only be estimated for the two age groups separately, it is 
necessary to use the t-test to compare the impact of age on the relative decrement 
associated with the various dimensions and levels within dimensions. The results 
of all the possible comparisons are shown in Table 3.3.2 and suggest that one of 
the biggest differences between the under and over 60s is in their attitude towards 
self-care. The t-ratio on SC suggests that level 2 on self-care is considered to be 
much worse by older respondents than by younger respondents whilst the t-ratio 
on S2 suggests that there is less of a difference when self-care is at level 3. In 
addition, the t-ratio on N3 is highly significant, suggesting a greater aversion to 
"extreme problems" amongst the over 60s. 
To enable health state valuations to be readily calculable and to facilitate a 
comparison of the differential effects that age and gender have on the decrements 
attached to the dimensions, and to levels within the dimensions, Table 3.3.3 
presents the coefficients for each population sub-group in terms of their effect on 
each dimension and level within dimension. It appears that all respondents are 
most concerned about being in pain although (younger and older) men are almost 
as concerned about being confined to bed (mobility level 3). Women, on the other 
hand, attach a higher decrement than men to having problems with self-care. 
Women aged 60 or over have greater decrements for all dimensions that contain 
'some' problems (level 2) and greater decrements for 'extreme' problems on 
mobility and self-care, thus resulting in lower estimated values for most heath 
states. The usual activities dimension plays a consistently small part in accounting 
for changes in score, although level 3 attracts a greater decrement from younger 
than from older respondents. 
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Table 3.3.4 summarises how close the estimated values from the model come to 
the actual (mean) values of the 42 states directly valued in the study. Estimated 
values are very close to actual ones for the majority of states across the different 
population subsamples. The exception, perhaps, is the model using the values of 
females over 60, where the difference between the estimated value and the actual 
mean value is greater than 0.1 for 8 of the 42 states. Why the model should not 
perform so well on this particular subset of the data is unclear. 
Discussion 
One of the most important issues in the measurement of HRQoL is whose 
preferences should be given the greatest weight in constructing an index of health 
state valuations. If health state valuations do not differ significantly by population 
sub-group, then it is unlikely to matter whose preferences are used. Most studies 
have reported that variation in health state valuations is not explained by the 
different demographic characteristics of respondents, such as age or sex. 
However, results from the Main Study suggest that valuations for health states do 
differ according to both of these characteristics. 
This chapter uses the same regression techniques that were used to generate a set 
of valuations for all EuroQol health states for the whole community to generate 
different 'tariffs' according to the age and sex of the respondent. The regression 
results confirm the patterns from the 'raw' valuations presented in Chapter 3.1: 
women give valuations than are, on average, lower than those given by men, and 
this difference increases as the severity of the state increases; and those aged 60 or 
over give lower valuations than those aged under 60, and this difference also 
increases with severity. However, by explaining valuations in terms of the 
different EuroQol dimensions (and levels within dimensions), it is possible to 
provide an insight into the relative weights that different population sub-groups 
attach to the different salient features of health. The results suggest that men of all 
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ages assign a greater disutility to being confined to bed than women do. Younger 
women attach a greater decrement to pain and older women to self-care than their 
male counterparts. 
Whilst it is unclear why different population sub-groups attach different weights to 
the EuroQol dimensions, the fact that they do suggests that the question "whose 
values should count? " is an important one. It could be argued that it is appropriate 
to weight more heavily the preferences of those most directly affected by a 
particular policy or intervention. For example, when a comparison is being made 
between treatments for a particular population sub-group, there are strong 
grounds for using the values of that particular sub-group. However, when making 
comparisons of interventions that affect many different population sub-groups, it is 
likely that the views of the whole population will be most relevant. 
The choice of tariff may have important implications for resource allocation 
decisions, particularly as it has been shown that the effect of age and sex is not 
uniform across the range of health states. Thus, when the EuroQol tariff is used 
consecutively to quantify the relative changes in health status, the differences 
between population sub-groups may be even more marked. For example, consider 
the evaluation of two interventions: A, which is directed exclusively at those aged 
60 or over, and B, which is directed at the whole population. Both result in 
improvements in health from EuroQol states defined earlier as 'severe' to ones 
defined as 'mild'. If the tariff for the over 60s is used to evaluate A whilst the 
under 60s tariff is used to evaluate B, then, other things equal, A will appear more 
attractive since the difference in valuations between mild and severe states is 
greatest in the former tariff than it is in the latter one. The decision-maker's 
problems are not made any easier by the fact that this chapter shows that the effect 
of age and sex is also not uniform across dimensions. Although a decision about 
whose values should count is ultimately a political not a scientific one, empirical 
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evidence of the kind presented in this chapter can highlight the implications of the 
choices made. 
CHAPTER 3.4: THE ISSUE OF AGGREGATION 
Introduction 
An important question that arises with all health state valuation methods is how to 
aggregate individual responses. Economists have generally advocated that the 
theoretically correct way to aggregate individual preferences is to calculate the 
mean value from any given distribution, irrespective of the nature (or skewness) of 
that distribution. This is based on the principles of Paretian welfare economics 
which takes account of the strength, or intensity, of each individual's preferences. 
In this way, it is possible to apply the compensation test which states that a policy 
change yields an improvement in social welfare if the sum of the benefit to those 
who gain from the policy is greater than the sum of the disbenefit to those who 
lose. 
However, an alternative view is that, in the realm of public policy, group 
preferences should be expressed in terms of the median. For example, a health 
state value that is too high for 50% of the population yet too low for the remaining 
50% is one that represents the views of the median voter and therefore might be 
considered the most suitable. In essence, the difference between the mean and 
median can be stated thus: the mean takes account of intensity of preference whilst 
the median treats each persons valuation as equal in a voting context. 
Because regression analysis used data at the individual-level, the estimated values 
in the EuroQol 'tariff' presented in Chapter 3.2 provide good approximations of 
mean values but not good approximations of median values. Therefore, those who 
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consider the median to be a more appropriate measure of central tendency, may 
not consider that particular tariff to be the best representation of social 
preferences. Of course, no such problem would arise if the valuations from the 
Main Study were normally distributed, or, in the context of measuring health gain, 
if the difference between the mean and median was constant across all states. 
However, problems arise when distributions vary according the severity of the 
state. And as Figure 3.4.1 shows, the distributions were generally negatively- 
skewed for less severe states (indicated by higher median than mean values for 
such states) and positively-skewed for more severe states (as evidenced by higher 
mean values for such states). This means that the transition from a more severe 
state to a less severe one will be valued less according to the mean than the 
median. Therefore, this chapter uses data from the Main Study to estimate a 
EuroQol tariff of valuations based on median valuations. 
Methods 
Ideally, it is preferable to estimate a model at the individual level than at the 
aggregate level but the individual-level data were not readily transformed to a 
distribution in which individual-level data could be used to yield predicted values 
which approximate median ones. Therefore, it was decided that the model should 
be estimated on median values but that the specification of this aggregate-level 
model should be identical to the individual-level one. Analysis was performed 
using an OLS approach in which the objective is to minimise the residual sum of 
squares and hence maximise the R2. The model was also tested for general 
heteroscedasticity in the error terms. 
Results 
The coefficients on the 12 independent variables are shown in Table 3.4.1. The R2 
of 0.98 is very high but the model suffers from heteroscedasticity. Table 3.4.1 
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shows that the (negative) constant is not significantly different from zero but the 
size and significance of the coefficient on N3 highlights the aversion that 
respondents in general have to "extreme problems" on any of the dimensions. It 
can be seen that the largest decrement for a move from level 1 to level 2 is 
associated with the self-care dimension, whilst pain or discomfort dominates the 
weighting for level 3. Table 3.4.2 shows the actual (median) and estimated values 
for the 42 EuroQol states directly valued in the study, and the differences between 
them. Overall, the difference between the median and the estimated values is 
remarkably small: the mean absolute difference is less than 0.05. The biggest 
discrepancies occur for states 13332 and 33333 where the median value is 0.216 
lower and higher, respectively, than the estimated value, but there is only one other 
state (21323) for which the difference exceeds 0.1. When valuations for all 243 
EuroQol states are calculated, 73 (30%) have negative values, and are thus rated 
as worse than dead. 
Figure 3.4.2 compares the tariff of values estimated from median values with that 
estimated from the individual-level model. Unsurprisingly, the pattern is very 
similar to that in Figure 3.4.1: values estimated from medians are higher than from 
the individual-level model for the least severe two-thirds of states (reaching a 
maximum difference of 0.21 for state 23121), and lower for the most severe one- 
third of states (reaching a maximum difference of 0.25 for state 33333). 50% of 
values estimated from medians are at least 0.06 greater than the corresponding 
value based on individual-level data and the tariff based on median scores contains 
ten fewer negative values (73 compared to 83), i. e. states rated as worse than 
dead, than the tariff based on individual-level data. 
Discussion 
When eliciting the preferences of a group of people, an important consideration is 
how best to represent the overall preferences of that group. This issue is as 
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relevant to health status measurement as it is elsewhere, yet it has rarely been 
discussed in the literature. From the results of the Main Study, a EuroQol tariff 
was presented in Chapter 3.2. which, because of the methodology employed, 
provides a good approximation of mean values. The purpose of this chapter has 
been to present a set of valuations that approximate median ones. The same 
regression equation used in the individual-level model was adopted in order to 
generate the median-based tariff. 
There are a number of potentially important differences between the model 
estimated on the basis of median values and the one generated from individual- 
level data. Figure 3.4.2 shows that not only do valuations differ according to the 
measure of central tendency chosen, but that these differences are not uniform 
across the range of health states. For states that are, on average, rated as better 
than dead, the value estimated from medians is typically higher than the value 
estimated from individual-level data whilst for states that are, on average, rated as 
worse than dead, the reverse is true. 
Therefore, the benefit derived from moving between different health states will 
differ according to whether the set of social preferences that approximates mean or 
median values is chosen. Of course, the precise magnitude of the difference will 
depend on the initial and final health states. It would be impossible in the context 
of this chapter to illustrate the differential effect of movements between all possible 
pairs of states but for illustrative purposes, suppose that all patients with a 
particular condition fall into one of 5 groups of health states. Table 3.4.3 defines 
these groups and presents the mean health state value associated with patients in 
each group (there is very little difference between the mean and median value) 
according to whether values from the individual- or medians-based tariff are used. 
For simplicity, consider treatments that only involve movements 'up' one group. It 
can be seen from Table 3.4.3 that moving patients from states in group 3 to those 
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in group 2 and from states in group 2 to those in group 1 yields approximately the 
same benefit in terms of health gain whether the individual- or medians-based tariff 
is used. However, moving patients from group 5 to group 4 and from group 4 to 
group 3 yields considerably more benefit when the medians-based tariff is used 
than when the individual-based one is used. If the only objective of the health care 
system were to maximise health gain, in a choice between two policies; A, which 
takes one group of patients from group 3 to group 2 and another from group 2 to 
group 1, and B, which takes one group of patients from group 5 to group 4 and 
another from group 4 to group 3, then, ceteris paribus, A would be chosen if the 
individual-based tariff was used whilst B would be chosen if the medians-based 
tariff was used. 
Therefore, and in the absence of a "gold standard", whether A or B is chosen in 
this case is ultimately a function of one philosophical position on how preferences 
should be aggregated. The set of valuations presented in Chapter 3.2 are for use 
by those committed to the mean whilst the values presented in this chapter are for 
use by those who favour the median. 
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CHAPTER 4: INTERPRETING VALUATIONS AT THE 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
CHAPTER 4.1: POTENTIAL BIASES IN THE TTO 
Introduction 
Since valuations in the Main Study and hence the EuroQol tariff values were based 
upon responses to TTO questions, it is important to consider the extent to which such 
responses can provide unbiased estimates of the relative utility loss associated with 
different severities of illness. Although a number of authors have discussed the sources 
of potential bias in TTO responses (see, for example, Loomes and McKenzie [ 1989]), 
little attention has been directed towards explicitly setting out the likely magnitude of 
these biases. In considering the impact of time preference, this chapter could be 
properly regarded as a logical tidying up exercise. However, another potentially 
important source of bias considered in this chapter; namely, the reallocation of lifetime 
consumption, has not been discussed elsewhere. 
Consider first a Von Neumann Morgenstern (NM) expected utility maximiser facing 
current-year probabilities p and q of death and a permanently disabling illness/injury 
respectively. For simplicity, death and disability will be treated as mutually exclusive 
events, so that assuming strong separability on the time dimension (see Broome 
[ 1993]), and ignoring the possibility of injury or premature death in other than the 
current year, the individual's lifetime expected utility is given by 
T-I 
EU = 
[(1_p_q)(ptL(c»pTD] + 
[q(ptI(ä)+pTD)] 
+ pD 
where L(. ) and I(. ) denote the NM annual utility of consumption functions for full 
health and injury/illness respectively, C denotes constant consumption per annum 
conditional on full health, C denotes constant consumption per annum conditional on 
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injury/illness (where C may differ from C), p is a discount factor reflecting the 
individual's rate of time preference, T is the individual's maximum life expectancy and 
D denotes the NM utility associated with the prospect of death. Since the uncertainty 
in this expected utility framework is resolved in the initial period, it mimicks the 
formulation of TTO questions. 
Note that for simplicity it has been assumed that consumption is time-invariant. 
Indeed, it is probably impossible to interpret the response to a TTO question in relative 
utility terms without imposing a time-invariant condition on consumption. Of course, 
given that the only uncertainty in a TTO question is associated with the determination 
of the lifetime health state at the beginning of the first period, time-invariant 
consumption would in fact be optimal provided that the time preference and interest 
rates were equal. 
This can be illustrated by considering a simple two-period model. Suppose that the 
initial uncertainty is resolved such that an individual experiences full health. This 
individual's optimal life-cycle consumption decision is to maximise L(CI) +p L(C2) 
subject to C, + µC2 = W, where p and t are discount factors reflecting the time 
preference and interest rates respectively, and W is initial wealth, including first and 
discounted second period income. It is then straightforward to show that the solution 
to this constrained maximisation problem is such that if p=µ, then Ci = C2. Precisely 
the same argument applies if the initial uncertainty results in ill health. Here the 
optimal life-time consumption decision is to maximise I(C, ) +p I( C2) subject to C1+ 
µ C2 =W, where W may differ from W to the extent that ill health (presumably 
adversely) affects income. 
In the model developed in this chapter, it will be assumed for simplicity that p is 
independent of the health state and that D is constant, so that without loss of 
generality, L(. ), I(. ) and D can be scaled such that D=O. In addition, it will be assumed 
that 
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(L(C) > I(C ), 
> 0, 
and 
0<p<_1. 
Denoting the individual's marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of wealth for risk of 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
death and wealth for risk of illness/injury by MD and M, respectively, with D=O it is 
then straightforward to show that 
T-1 T-1 
Mi 
1ptL(C) 
- 
YýptI(C) 
_ _ 
c=o c=o 
MD T Y, P`LcC 
t=O 
L(C)-I(C) 
L(C) 
=1- 
I(C) 
L(C) 
(5') 
(5) 
While the argument is developed for the single-period case, precisely the same 
result follows for the multi-period case with lifetime expected utility expressed as 
in equation (1), given that D has been set equal to zero (see Jones-Lee [1989]). 
And whilst this result has been derived on the admittedly somewhat restrictive 
assumption of expected utility maximisation, it can be shown that with appropriate 
reinterpretation of L(. ) and I(. ), a similar result follows in the case of a wide range of 
non-expected utility maximisation theories provided that the latter satisfy the 
betweenness axiom i. e. an individual who is indifferent between X and Y will also be 
indifferent between those alternatives and every probability mixture pX + (1-p)Y, 0<p 
< 1, ensuring that indifference curves in the Marschak-Machina Triangle are linear (see 
for example Jones-Lee [ 1989, pp 34-36] or Jones-Lee et al [ 1993, Appendix 2]). 
(5) 
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Clearly, then, the principal focus is upon whether or not the response to a TTO 
I(C) 
question yields an unbiased estimate of L(C) . 
Suppose that in response to such a 
question, the individual, whose lifetime expected utility is as specified in equation (1), 
indicates that he/she would be indifferent between the certainty of spending 10 years in 
the state of injury/illness referred to above, followed by death on the one hand, and the 
certainty of spending i years in full health, followed by death on the other. 
Clearly, from (2) we shall have r<10. In what follows, I will focus upon the case in 
which the injury/illness concerned is not judged to be as bad as or worse than death, so 
that L(C)>I(C )>0 and hence r>0. With D=O, it follows that: 
T-I ±ptJ() 
p`L(C)= , 
(6) 
where C (>_ C) is the individual's planned annual consumption given that he expects to 
live for only i (<10) years. From (6), it is immediate that 
I(C) 
0<p<1>- (7) 
L(C) 10 
I(C) 
_i and p =1 ==> (8) L(C) 10 
Furthermore. given 12(. ) > 0, 
> I(C) > I(C) 
. (9) C =: > L(C) < L(C) 
Since it is highly unlikely that the individual would consume less per annum if they 
lived for i (<I 0) years rather than the full ten years, it seems reasonable to impose the 
99 
restriction C >_ C. Given this restriction, and given that the individual does not have a 
negative rate of time preference (see Chapter 4.2) over life years (i. e. 0<p< 1), it 
follows from (7), (8) and (9) that 
I(C) 
L(C) 
iff C=Candp=1. 
10 
(10) 
That is, in order for the response to the TTO question to provide a direct and unbiased 
I(C) 
estimate of the ratio 
L(C) , 
it is necessary that there should be no reallocation of 
lifetime consumption and no discounting of future utilities. If, by contrast, there is 
either reallocation (i. e. C> C) and/or discounting (i. e. 
unambiguously underestimate 
I(C) 
L(C) 
Lifetime reallocation of consumption 
O< p< 1), then 
1 
will 10 
If the individual has the opportunity to reallocate lifetime consumption then it seems 
likely that C will exceed C. For example, an individual who is to some extent 
consuming out of accumulated wealth and, in the model specified above, plans to 
consume at a greater rate if they knew for certain that their life expectancy were to be 
reduced. Since the TTO is based on the comparison of two alternatives for which the 
respective life expectancies are known for certain, lifetime reallocation of consumption 
is clearly a source of potential bias in TTO responses. 
However, it transpires that there are grounds for believing that the impact of such 
reallocation will be negligible. By applying a variant of the argument developed in 
Jones-Lee [ 1989, pp 115-1161 to equation (1), with D=O and assuming that L(. ) and 
I(. ) are bounded above (which is necessary if the individual is to be immune to 
versions of the St. Petersburg Paradox), it is fairly straightforward to show that 
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L* 
L(C) 
1pq 
l_p_q_Ap* 
(11) 
where L* denotes supL(. ) and Ap * is the individual's "maximum acceptable increase 
in p" i. e. the increase in p for which the compensating variation in terms of an increase 
in C becomes unbounded. 
Now, for most people it seems reasonable to assume that: i) their risk of death in the 
current period is less than 1 in 100 (i. e. p<10-2); ii) their risk of suffering other than the 
most minor injury or illness is less than 1 in 10 (i. e. q<10-'); and iii) the maximum 
increase in the risk of death they would be prepared to accept is also likely to be less 
than 1 in 10 (i. e. Ap *<10-'). It follows from equation (8) that even an unbounded 
increase in C will cause L(. ) to increase by, at most, about 13%. Indeed, with p=10-3, 
q=10-2 and Ap *=10-2 , which are not entirely 
implausible orders of magnitude, the 
increase would be only about M. It therefore seems clear that for the (relatively 
modest) increase from C to C that might be expected from a lifetime reallocation of 
consumption in the context of a TTO question, L(C ) would exceed L(C) only by a 
very small percentage. Of course, this ignores the fact that in practice most people will 
be consuming out of current income (not accumulated wealth) and will therefore have 
little scope for reallocating consumption in any case. 
Discounting 
If p=1, then each year of life in constant quality (L or I) yields the same utility. 
However, in responding to a TTO question, the individual may be prepared to sacrifice 
more years of life in the future relative to years of life now, in which case they have a 
positive rate of time preference and will be discounting the future; hence 0<p<1. 
The concept of time preference is an important one since it is one of three principal 
justifications for discounting the flow of future health care costs and benefits. The 
other two are the returns on investment, where the opportunity cost of a given outlay 
is assumed to vary through time due the possibility of earning interest, and the concept 
of diminishing marginal utility, which implies that the incremental utility derived from 
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health falls through time (see Warner and Luce [ 1982]). For these reasons, 
discounting is deemed appropriate if comparisons between immediate and delayed 
consumption are to be made. 
Most economic analyses of intertemporal choice rely on Discounted Utility Theory 
(DUT) which assumes the greater importance of today against the lesser importance of 
tomorrow. The present may be seen as more important than the future for a number of 
reasons. First, presently available money can gain interest and thus the receipt of £100 
now is likely to be preferred to the receipt of £100 delayed for one year. Second, 
because the enjoyment of things present is certain, whereas deferred pleasures are 
uncertain, people are likely to take what they can have now rather than wait for what 
they might not get later. Finally, people may simply derive greater utility from having 
good things as soon as possible and putting off bad things for as long as possible. The 
first reason is in part determined by the availability of financial markets, the second by 
people's attitudes towards risk, whilst the last reason is an example of pure time 
preference. 
In addition to assuming that value declines through time (i. e. the discount rate is 
positive), DUT also assumes that value declines at an annual exponential rate i. e. the 
same discount rate is applied in each successive time period [see Fisher 1930]. DUT 
offers a descriptive model of human behaviour i. e. people act as if they discount. 
Given a choice of pleasure now or pleasure later, people prefer pleasure now. Given a 
choice of suffering now or suffering later, people prefer suffering later. The concept of 
time preference is well established in the health economics literature; for example, it 
has been used to explain variations in diet, exercise, and cigarette smoking amongst 
individuals (see Fuchs [ 1982]). 
To get some feel for the extent to which 
IT 
might underestimate 
I(C) 
in the 
10 L(C) 
presence of positive time preference, consider integer values for 'r between I and 9 
and, in addition top = 1, three further values for p of 0.95,0.91 and 0.87 
(corresponding, approximately, to annual time preference rates of 5%, 10% and 15% 
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respectively). In view of equations (5") and (7), Table 4.1.1 shows the values of 
I(C) 
that would result. Although the effect of a positive rate of time preference is to L(C) 
increase the ratio 
I(C) 
for any given value of r, the effect is not uniform across all 
L(C) 
values of this ratio. The absolute difference between undiscounted and discounted 
values of 
I(C) 
is smallest for high and low values (i. e. for values of 
I(C) 
close to L(C) L(C) 
1 and 0) and largest for values around 0.5. Clearly then, even setting aside the possible 
impact of lifetime reallocation of consumption, assuming that p=1 (which is an 
assumption made in Chapter 3) will underestimate 
I(C) 
; the extent to which will 
L(C) 
clearly depend upon how far p deviates from 1 but also on the severity of the 
permanently disabling illness/injury. 
However, valuations generated by the TTO method do not have to be predicated on 
the assumption of no discounting. All respondents indicate in answering a TTO 
question is the number of years in L that are regarded as equivalent to a longer period 
of time in I. The value that is attached to 
I(C) 
(even assuming that C= C) is a 
L(C) 
separate issue. Thus, Table 4.1.1 shows how different values for 
I(C) 
can be L(C) 
generated from the same point of indifference established in a TTO question, 
depending on the value of p used. 
Discussion 
Despite being developed more than 20 years ago, surprisingly little attention has been 
directed at the extent to which TTO valuations will under- or over-estimate the 
required relative utility loss associated with illness. This chapter has shown that in 
order for a response to a TTO question to provide a direct and unbiased estimate of 
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the ratio 
I(C) 
, it is necessary that: i) there is no reallocation of lifetime consumption; L(C) 
and ii) there is no discounting of future utilities. If there is either reallocation and/or 
discounting, then it is shown that a TTO response that is not adjusted for these effects 
I(C) 
will unambiguously underestimate 
L(C) 
In the case of reallocation of lifetime consumption, the extent to which 
I(C) 
is 
L(C) 
underestimated is likely to be very small. Since most people consume out of current 
income, the extent to which they will be able to consume at a greater rate if their life 
expectancy were to be reduced is therefore highly constrained. Even for those people 
who are to some extent consuming out of accumulated wealth, it transpires that by 
making entirely plausible assumptions about the risk of death and the maximum 
increase in that risk that an individual would be prepared to accept, the impact of 
lifetime reallocation of consumption is almost certainly trivial. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to assume that C=C. 
The effect of discounting, however, is non-trivial. Assuming an annual time preference 
rate of 5%, an undiscounted TTO response will underestimate 
I(C) 
by as much as 
L(C) 
0.06 (in relation to a true value of 0.44). Therefore, unless a reliable method of 
exploring the effect of time preference on health state valuations (and benefits more 
generally) can be constructed, then choices between alternative uses of resources that 
have different benefit streams are unlikely to fully represent individual or social 
preferences. This is an issue which is addressed more fully in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4.2: THE EFFECT OF TIME PREFERENCE AND DURATION 
ON TTO RESPONSES 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown that for responses to TTO questions to provide 
unbiased estimates of the relative utility loss associated with different severities of 
illness, it is necessary that there is a zero rate of time preference i. e. that the timing of 
an event does not affect its relative value. The logical question to follow from this is to 
what extent is this a plausible assumption? There is some evidence to suggest that 
when a health state is experienced matters to significant numbers of people. For 
example, Redelmeier and Heller [1993], in a study of time preference rates over acute 
health states, found that the timing of identical periods of ill health mattered to a 
sizeable number of respondents (almost 40% of responses from a sample of medical 
students and doctors implied a non-zero rate of time preference). This chapter reports 
on a pilot study designed to test the feasibility of using the TTO to isolate the effect of 
pure time preference. 
The study was also designed to address another important and related issue; namely 
the effect that the time spent in a particular health states may have on its valuation. It 
has been common for researchers to weight each year of added life equally, that is, to 
assume that the value given to a health state is linearly related to the time spent in that 
health state. Thus, if the health state stays constant over time then the valuation is 
assumed to stay constant over time. However, the value of the health state is likely to 
be a function of how long the state lasts for. It is entirely plausible that its value may 
increase over time as people adapt to illness, or adjust their expectations in the light of 
changes in their circumstances. Equally, its value may decrease over time as severe 
dysfunction becomes increasingly intolerable. If the value of a health state is indeed a 
function of its duration then this needs to be taken into account when we are 
measuring the benefits associated with different health care interventions. 
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There is evidence to suggest that duration can have a significant effect on health state 
valuations (see Christensen-Szalanski [ 1984], Lipscomb [ 1989] and Burrows and 
Brown [ 1992]). Sackett and Torrance [ 1978] found from a sample of about 200 
members of the general public that when health states are specified for durations of 
three months, eight years and a lifetime, mean TTO valuations declined as the time 
spent in the state increased. Using the VAS for the same three time periods, 
Sutherland et al [ 1982] found from a convenience sample of 20 professional colleagues 
that the proportion preferring immediate death to varying durations in each of five 
health states increased as the duration of the states increased. More recently, Ohinmaa 
and Sintonen [ 1994] elicited VAS valuations from a convenience sample of 60 health 
economics students for states lasting one month, one year and ten years and also found 
valuations to be a decreasing function of duration. 
Therefore, there appears to be some evidence that some poor states of health become 
more intolerable the longer they last. However, none of these studies attempted to 
separate duration from pure time preference. Simply examining the variation of the 
health state valuation with the time spent experiencing the state will not adequately 
distinguish between these two effects. Hence the need for the study reported in this 
chapter. 
Study design 
Respondents were presented with 7 cards representing 6 EuroQol states (11111, 
11121,11122,21232,22233 and 33333) plus "Immediate Death". They were told 
that each state (except "Immediate Death") would last 10 years without any change 
and that what happens thereafter is not known and should not be taken into account. 
Respondents were asked to rank the 7 states in order from best to worst and then to 
rate them on a VAS with endpoints of 100 (best imaginable health state) and 0 (worst 
imaginable health state). Respondents then valued five states (in the order of 21232, 
22233,11121,33333,11122) on the TTO using the protocol outlined in Chapter 3.1. 
After completing these "standard" TTO questions for 10 years, respondents were 
asked TTO questions for one year and one month. As it was felt unreasonable to 
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present scenarios to respondents in which they would die after one year or one month, 
the shorter durations were supplemented with healthy time up to a total of 10 years. It 
is possible that much shorter life expectancy may bias responses although the direction 
of this bias remains unclear (see Shiell, King and Briggs [ 1993]). 
Given that time preference may affect valuations, it was also necessary to elicit 
valuations for states that last for the same duration but whose timing is different. This 
was achieved by asking respondents first to suppose that the one year in poor health 
happens at the beginning of the 10 year period and second to suppose that the one year 
in poor health happens at the end of the 10 year period. To avoid respondent burden, 
the TTO questions for one month were asked only for the one month of poor health 
occurring at the beginning of the 10 year period. In summary, respondents were 
presented with the following four scenarios for each health state, each of which was 
followed by death; 
1) 10 years of the specified health state, 
2) one year of the specified health state followed by 9 years of full health, 
3) 9 years of full health state followed by one year of the specified health state, 
4) one month of the specified health state followed by 9 years 11 months of full health. 
The way in which the scenarios were presented to respondents is shown in the 
Appendix. From the responses to the scenarios it was hoped that the effects of time 
preference and duration on health state valuations could be identified. Relative 
preferences over scenarios (2) and (3) can be seen as trade-offs between outcomes 
occurring at different points in time and thus from these responses each respondent's 
time preference rate for health could be estimated. The effects of these time preference 
rates on the implied valuations from all four scenarios can then be investigated. 
Interviews were conducted by six professional interviewers from SCPR. Each inter- 
viewer was asked to conduct either 6 or 7 TTO-based interviews in order to achieve a 
sample of 40. This sample size was deemed adequate both to test the feasibility of the 
protocol and to allow general conclusions about this type of approach to be drawn 
from quantitative data analysis. Because this was a Pilot Study, the sample was 
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not intended to be representative of the general population but was instead a quota 
sample of adults aged 18 or above living in a range of residential areas convenient to 
the interviewer. The interviews were conducted over a two-week period in September 
1993. 
Data analysis 
Raw VAS scores have been transformed onto a 'standard' 0-1 scale in order to produce 
a 'unit of health' which is comparable across all respondents. To allow for time 
preference in the TTO valuations, an implied discount rate, r, was calculated for each 
state for each respondent by finding the value of r which makes the number of healthy 
years elicited from scenarios (2) and (3) above equivalent to one another. For 
example, if one year in poor health followed by 9 years in full health (scenario (2) 
above) is equivalent to 9 and 1/4 years in full health whilst 9 years in full health 
followed by one year in poor health (scenario (3) above) is equivalent to 9 and 1/2 
years in full health, then: 
1+ 1/(l+r) + 1/(l+r)2 + ... + 
1/(l+r)8 + (1/4)/(l+r)9 = 
1/2 + 1/(l+r) + 1/(l+r)2 + ... + 
1/(1+r)8 + 1/(1+r)9 
which reduces to 1+ (1/4)/(1+r)9 = 1/2 + 1/(1+r)9 
rearranging and solving for r gives r= (1.5)19-1 = 0.046, or 4.6%. 
For the "standard" 10 year TTO questions, the value of a health state that is rated as 
better than dead is given by the formula x/t where x is the number of years in full health 
that is equivalent to t years in poor health. For a state that is rated as worse than dead, 
its value is taken to be (x/10)-l. These calculations assume that each year is weighted 
equally and thus assume that there is no time preference or discounting. The same 
assumptions apply to the scenarios in which one year, or one month, of poor health is 
experienced at the beginning of a 10 year profile (scenarios (2) and (4) above). For 
example, consider the case where one year in poor health followed by 9 years in full 
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health is equivalent to 9 and 1/4 years in full health. Attaching a value of 0.25 to the 
poor health state is only valid if the 9 months sacrificed at the end of 10 years are 
strictly comparable with one year in poor health now. An analysis of time preference 
rates may thus indicate the validity of these assumptions. 
Calculating a value for one year in poor health after 9 years in full health (scenario (3) 
above) from the stated number of years in full health that this is equivalent to, rests on 
a different assumption; namely, that the first nine years spent in full health are 
equivalent regardless of what is experienced in the tenth year. For example, consider 
the case where 9 years in full health followed by one year in poor health is equivalent 
to 9 and 1/2 years in full health. Attaching a value of 0.5 to the poor health state is 
only valid if the first 9 years (which are the same in both profiles) yield precisely the 
same level of utility as one another. Note that this assumption allows for any rate of 
time preference but nonetheless may be open to question (more anon). 
Because the distribution of health state scores was highly skewed, the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test was used to test for differences in the 
valuations of the same state lasting for different durations (significance level p<0.05). 
The analysis of whether time preference rates or valuations are affected by the 
background characteristics of the respondent is clearly limited by the relatively small 
number of respondents in the study. However, Mann Whitney U tests were carried 
out to see if these differed by age, sex, marital status, educational attainment or 
smoking behaviour. 
Results 
Respondent Characteristics 
Because of sonne minor fieldwork problems, 39 interviews were conducted. Table 
4.2.1 shows the background characteristics of the respondents. Despite being a quota 
sample, the respondents were broadly representative of the general population, 
although there were more females than males and the number with a degree or 
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equivalent was higher than the national average (of 8%). The mean age of respondents 
was 44.2 years (s. d. =18.1). 
VAS Valuations 
Table 4.2.2 shows the median transformed VAS values for the states used in this 
study. No statistically significant differences were found according to respondent 
characteristics and there was general agreement about the ordering of the states. It 
appears, then, that the VAS exercise performed its role of familiarising respondents 
with the health states. 
Time Preference 
Table 4.2.3 shows the respondents' preferences over the timing of poor health (i. e. 
their relative preferences over scenarios (2) and (3) above). Poor health later was 
considered to be preferred to poor health now if the respondent was not prepared to 
sacrifice as much life expectancy in order to avoid poor health in 9 years time as they 
were in order to avoid poor health now (and vice versa). This would imply positive 
time preference because poor health later involves less disutility than poor health now. 
Overall, only one-quarter of responses imply a positive discount rate whilst 39% of 
responses imply a negative discount rate. The remaining 36% of responses imply a 
zero discount rate; in other words, it did not seem to matter when the year of poor 
health was experienced for more than one-third of responses. 
Figure 4.2.1 shows the distribution of discount rates for each of the health states. 
There are fewer observations presented here (particularly for the two mildest states, 
11121 and 11122) because the calculation of a discount rate is conditional upon the 
respondent being willing to sacrifice some life expectancy in order to avoid both 
scenarios (2) and (3) above (see the formula for calculating discount rates shown 
above). For those respondents who were unwilling to sacrifice a life expectancy in 
order to avoid a poor health state either now or later implies that they considered the 
state to be equivalent to full health. Figure 4.2.1 shows that there were some 
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responses which imply very high (positive and negative) discount rates. Table 4.2.4 
shows the mean and median discount rates calculated for each of the health states. The 
median rate for all states is seen to be zero whilst mean discount rates are small 
negative numbers for four of the health states and a small positive number for state 
33333. The sign and the magnitude of the rate of time preference were not 
significantly related to respondent background characteristics. 
A within-respondent analysis of discount rates produces equivocal results. Table 4.2.5 
shows that the respondents fall into three equally-sized groups: one-third exhibit rates 
of time preference over the five health states that are always positive, or always 
negative, or (more frequently) always zero; one-third exhibit either positive and zero, 
or negative and zero time preference; one-third have both positive and negative 
discount rates. Whether a particular respondent exhibits positive, negative or zero 
time preference does not appear to be a function of the severity of the health state 
valued. In addition, these three groups of respondents are very similar to one another 
in terms of the background characteristics tested. 
7-TO Valuations 
Table 4.2.6 shows the implied median TTO values for the different durations. The 
valuations for ten years, one year now and one month now are based on the 
assumption that there is no time preference. The results of the preceding section 
suggest that, on average, this is a valid assumption. The valuations for one year at the 
end of 10 years require no assumptions about time preference but instead require that 
equivalent periods of full health yield the same level of utility as one another despite 
being followed by different events. It appears from Table 4.2.6 that spending 10 years 
in any of the health states was considered to be much better than spending only one 
year or one month in them. For example, 10 years in 21232 is, on average, better than 
dead whilst one year or even one month in the same state is worse than dead. These, 
and a number of the other valuations seem implausible: Do respondents really feel that 
spending one month in moderate pain with no other health problems (i. e. 11121) is 
only marginally better than being dead? It seems unlikely. 
Figure 4.2.2 shows the median values that are in Table 4.2.6 together with 
corresponding values that have been calculated as a proportion of the entire profile. 
For example, if one year in poor health followed by 9 years in full health is equivalent 
to 9 and 1 /4 years in full health then this profile has a value of 0.925. What Figure 
4.2.2 shows clearly is that respondents, on average, adjusted their responses to take 
account of the fact that shorter lengths of time in poor health are preferable 
(represented by higher profile scores for one year and one month than for 10 years) but 
failed to do so sufficiently for this to be represented in higher implied valuations. 
Discussion 
It appears that implied TTO valuations that are elicited in this study are more a 
function of questionnaire design or "framing" than they are a function of underlying 
preferences. Despite an increased reluctance to sacrifice life expectancy (for the profile 
as a whole), the algorithm used to calculate TTO valuations results in lower health 
state valuations. The powerful effect that experimental design can have on valuations 
is not a new phenomenon but it does raise questions about how the TTO technique can 
be used to value health states that last for short durations given that it may be deemed 
unreasonable to present respondents with scenarios in which they will be dead in a 
matter of months or even weeks. The conclusion may be that the TTO method is only 
feasible for valuing chronic health states that last for durations of, say, five years or 
more. This in itself is an important contribution of this exploratory study. 
The analysis of time preference is not prone to framing effects in the same way as 
implied valuations are since respondents' relative preferences over experiencing poor 
health now or in 9 years time are in many ways isolated from such effects. For 
example, if a respondent prefers poor health at the end of 10 years rather than at the 
beginning, then they should be prepared to sacrifice more life expectancy to avoid a 
year of poor health now than to avoid a year of poor health in nine years time, 
irrespective of the valuations that may be implied from that choice. As a descriptive 
model of human behaviour, DUT predicts that people will wish to postpone for as long 
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as possible events that yield disutility and will thus prefer the profile in which poor 
health is delayed by 9 years. In other words, they will exhibit positive time preference. 
At the aggregate level, it appears that there is indifference about the timing of poor 
health; median discount rates are zero for all states whilst mean rates range from -3.5% 
to +0.5%. These findings are broadly comparable with those of Redelmeier and Heller 
[ 1993] who, in response to questions regarding the timing of identical periods of poor 
health, observed discount rates of zero in 62% of cases. In addition, Cairns [ 1992], in 
a study of 29 economics undergraduates, found that the timing of an identical health 
state did not appear to matter as much as the timing of identical levels of wealth did. 
These findings suggest that the implicit assumption of the TTO method that the rate of 
time preference is zero is valid at the aggregate level. 
These results cast doubt on the practice common to many cost-effectiveness analyses 
of health care interventions of assuming that the value of the discount rate is similar to 
the financial rate of interest (see Weinstein and Stason [1977]). They also warn against 
discounting benefits at the rate of 6% which is currently used by the Treasury to 
discount costs. Moreover, support is lent to the assertion made by Parsonage and 
Neuberger [ 1992] that "non-monetary health benefits should not be discounted at the 
same rate as variables expressed in monetary terms ... 
instead the appropriate discount 
rate should be at or close to zero". In short, the practice of using DUT as a basis for 
making intertemporal comparisons of health benefits may not represent the preferences 
held by individuals. 
The results presented in this chapter show that there is wide variation in time 
preference rates at the individual level. Although the modal time preference rate is 
zero for all states, there are a number of responses which imply very high (positive and 
negative) rates (see Figure 4.2.1). The highest implied rate is 38.3%. That more 
responses imply negative rates of time preference than positive ones (see Table 4.2.3) 
contradicts the predictions of DUT. Instead of wanting to postpone poor health (as 
DUT would predict), it appears that more people want to get it out of the way. 
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The possibility that people may have negative discount rates (at least within some 
specified time period) is now recognised in the literature on time preference. For 
example, Loewenstein [ 1987] found that, although respondents discounted money 
values normally, their willingness to pay for a fleeting pleasure increased as delay 
increased to three days (and declined thereafter). Of more relevance to this chapter, he 
also found that respondents were willing to pay more to avoid receiving a fleeting 
unpleasantness that was delayed for three days than they were to avoid the event 
immediately. Knapp et al [ 1959] found that even rats, when faced with a choice 
between immediate and delayed pain, tended to choose the immediate pain. 
Loewenstein attributes such findings to "savouring", which is the positive utility 
derived from the anticipation of future pleasant consumption, and to "dread", which is 
the negative utility resulting from contemplation of future unpleasant consumption. In 
this study, respondents may prefer to experience poor health now as opposed to in 9 
years time because they are getting the worst outcome over with quickly and are thus 
eliminating dread. That people may wish to get unpleasant experiences over with as 
quickly as possible is evidenced in everyday life; witness how many people, for 
example, once having decided to visit the dentist, attempt to get an appointment as 
soon as possible. 
In addition, if the profiles used in the TTO are seen as sequences, it is possible to 
explain negative time preference in terms of "adaptation". If, as Loewenstein and 
Prelec [ 1991 ] assert, "people tend to assimilate to ongoing stimuli and to evaluate new 
stimuli relative to their assimilation level" (p348), then when separate events are seen 
as an integral consumption package, they will choose to start with events that yield the 
lowest levels of utility and finish with events that yield the highest levels of utility. In 
this study, poor health followed by good health may be preferred to good health 
followed by poor health because it affords a positive departure from one's adaptation 
level, unlike good health followed by poor health which involves a negative departure. 
Again, examples of this type of behaviour can be found in everyday life; think of the 
number of people who when eating a meal save the most enjoyable mouthful until last. 
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However, savouring, dread and adaptation form no part of DUT which assumes that 
the utilities of different events are independent of one another. In other words, the 
utility attached to a particular health state is independent of the state(s) of health that 
precede or follow it. If this assumption is violated, then, using our earlier example, the 
value attached to a health state, h, when 9 years in full health followed by one year in h 
is equivalent to 9 and 1/2 years in full health, will not be 0.5. If the utility derived from 
one health state depends on what state follows, then we cannot be sure of the exact 
value of h because the utility of the first 9 nine years will not be the same in the two 
profiles even though the health states over this period are the same. There is certainly 
the need for additional research into the extent to which the value given to health state 
is influenced by the health state that precedes it, or is expected to follow it. 
The discussion so far has been premised on the proposition that, in aggregate, 
respondents' answers reflected their true preferences more or less accurately. 
However, there appears to be good reasons to doubt whether this was actually the 
case. For example, one-third of respondents had positive discount rates for some 
states and negative rates for others. Whether a positive or a negative rate was elicited 
was unrelated to the severity of the health state. This suggests that some factor other 
than remoteness in time i. e. other than time preference, is being picked up here but it is 
hard to tell what this factor, or factors, might be. 
Indeed, from a quantitative study of this kind, it is hard to tell what respondents had in 
mind when they valued the various profiles; specifically, we cannot be sure whether 
respondents were giving answers to precisely the questions that were being asked of 
them. For example, despite being told that each ten year profile was to be experienced 
with certainty, we cannot be sure that respondents treated the scenarios in this way. 
This may be particularly true of the profile in which poor health was to be experienced 
in 9 years time; for example, it is plausible that some respondents may have thought 
that a "cure" would be found, others that they would end their life when their time to 
"suffer" came. Of course, problems of this kind are true of any study which requires 
answers to hypothetical questions but they seem particularly relevant to questions 
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which ask respondents to imagine with certainty something that will happen in a 
number of years' time. 
Whilst it is unlikely that the use of patient populations could overcome this problem, it 
may be that such samples could be used to better measure the extent to which 
savouring, dread and anticipation affect attitudes towards current and future health 
states. In a study of women's' attitudes towards anaesthesia during pregnancy and 
childbirth, Christensen-Szalanski [1984] found that discount rates changed dramatically 
during pregnancy, suggesting that these phenomena are important ones. Whilst there 
is undoubtedly the need for more research here, if one objective is to estimate the time 
preference rates over health for society as a whole then general population samples will 
also continue to be important. 
This exploratory study has shown that separating out the effect of time preference and 
duration is a difficult and complex task and the valuations derived lack validity. 
However, although the results concerning time preference contain a large amount of 
variance, they suggest that further doubt can be cast on the axioms of DUT as a 
descriptive model of human behaviour. Of course, as Weinstein [1993] points out, 
"To abandon the normative practice of discounting in cost-effectiveness analyses, 
would require new arguments that it is normatively flawed, and not just evidence that 
individual preferences from surveys do not conform to the descriptive model" (p219). 
However, the motivation to search for new arguments will come from the results of 
studies such as this which do indeed suggest that individual preferences do not 
conform with the exponential discount model. 
CHAPTER 4.3: THE EFFECT OF DURATION ON VAS VALUATIONS 
Introduction 
As previous studies (see Chapter 4.2) have shown duration can 
have a significant effect 
on valuations, it is important that we have some idea about 
its magnitude so that 
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valuations for one duration can be adjusted to better represent valuations for different 
durations. We could look at the results of the previous studies and then make some ad 
hoc adjustments for the effect of duration by amounts in line with those indicated in the 
previous studies. But there are three main problems with these studies. The first 
relates to their generalisability: since most studies have used relatively small 
(convenience) samples it is questionable to what extent the results can be considered 
representative of a wider population. The second problem is that their conclusions 
often only refer to results at the aggregate level, usually in the form of mean valuations. 
However, it is also important to know the extent to which results at the individual level 
conform to the apparently robust results at the group level. Finally, none of the studies 
have considered whether valuations for the same health states lasting different 
durations can be related to one another in a systematic way. 
Or we could assess the effect that the time spent in a health state has on its subsequent 
valuation ourselves using more representative samples. Ideally, we would wish to 
elicit valuations for different durations using the same method. Thus, since the tariffs 
reported in Chapter 3 were based upon TTO valuations for states lasting ten years, we 
would like to use the TTO to elicit valuations for other shorter durations. However, 
the results reported in the previous chapter have shown that using the TTO to assess 
the effect of duration on health state valuations (whether time preference can be 
accounted for or not) is problematic. 
Since previous studies have shown that it is feasible to use the VAS to elicit valuations 
for different durations, an alternative strategy might involve the following two stage 
process: first, to elicit VAS and TTO valuations for a long duration and to derive a 
functional relationship between the two sets of values; second, to elicit VAS valuations 
for shorter durations and to use the mapping function estimated in stage 1 to 'convert' 
short-duration VAS valuations into short-duration TTO ones. Given that the 
Main 
Study elicited both VAS and TTO valuations for states lasting ten years, this strategy 
is 
a feasible one. However, there are at least two problems associated with the approach: 
first, the results from Chapter 2.1 suggest that it is difficult to estimate a robust 
relationship between VAS and TTO valuations; and second, even 
if a robust 
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relationship could be found, the strategy is based on the assumption that the 
relationship found for the long duration will hold for other shorter durations. 
Because of these problems, this strategy is not adopted in this thesis. However, there 
are still strong grounds for eliciting VAS valuations for different durations from a 
representative sample of the population. First, to test whether results generated using 
small convenience samples are replicated when using a larger general population 
sample. Second, to provide insights into the magnitude of the effect that duration has 
on valuations. Of course, differences in VAS valuations will not yield precise estimates 
of differences in TTO valuations, but they may provide information on the broad range 
of values that should be used when subjecting TTO valuations to sensitivity analysis. 
Finally, the VAS results themselves will be of interest to those using health state 
valuations in clinical decision-making (where the VAS is widely used) and to those 
generating their own valuation 'tariffs'. Considerations about the time spent in a 
particular health state will be important when assessing the contexts in which it is 
appropriate to use valuations derived from such health status measures as the 
McMaster health state classification system (see Feeny et al [ 1995]), which 
incorporates lifetime duration into the procedure used to derive valuations, and the 
EuroQol `postal' questionnaire (see The EuroQol Group [ 1990]), in which a duration 
of one year is incorporated into the standard descriptive format. 
This chapter reports on a large scale general population study in which valuations for 
three different durations were elicited using the VAS. The study was designed to test 
the hypotheses that: i) health state valuations are a decreasing function of duration; ii) 
the differences in valuations between durations will be larger, the more severe the 
health state; and iii) the likelihood of a health state attracting a negative value (i. e. 
considered to be worse than dead) increases as the duration of the state increases. In 
addition, VAS-based EuroQol tariffs have been estimated for the three durations for 
which valuations were elicited. Finally, using data at the level of the individual, an 
attempt is made to estimate a functional relationship between health state valuations 
for different durations. Analogous to the rationale for estimating a relationship 
between different methods, if an algorithm can be found which maps valuations from 
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one duration into those for a different duration, then it might be possible to elicit 
valuations for one duration and "convert" them into values for other durations by use 
of this algorithm. 
Methods 
Study design 
The sample was drawn from respondents who expressed a willingness to be re- 
interviewed in the Main Study. In order to achieve a sample of 208 respondents, 
experience of response rates indicated that (at most) 1.5 times as many people needed 
to be sampled. Assuming that the standard deviations associated with the health state 
valuations would be similar to those found in the Main Study, a sample of this size 
would enable a 0.1 difference in valuations between the different durations to be 
detected at the 0.05 significance level with 80% power. Thus, 312 of those who 
expressed a willingness to be re-interviewed were sampled. The sample was chosen to 
be representative (in terms of age, sex, marital status and educational attainment) of the 
respondents in the Main Study. The interviews were carried out between March and 
May 1994 (about four months after the Main Study) by 20 interviewers from SCPR. 
Each respondent was interviewed by the same interviewer as in the Main Study. 
Each respondent was presented with the same states that they valued in the Main 
Study. Initially they were told that each state (except "Immediate Death") would last 
10 years without any change. Respondents were asked to rank the 15 states in order 
from best to worst. They were then asked to rate the 15 states on a VAS, with 
endpoints of 100 (best imaginable health state) and 0 (worst imaginable health state). 
The cards describing the health states were then taken up and shuffled, and presented 
once more to the respondent, who was then asked to rank and rate them again but this 
time to imagine that they last for one month. When this second cycle was complete, a 
third cycle was initiated in which the duration of the state was one year. 
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The VAS valuations were elicited using a method of "bisection", which, it has been 
argued, generates an interval scale (see Stevens [1971). Respondents first rate their 
best and worst ranked states on the VAS. They then choose from the remaining states 
the one whose value on the VAS is roughly halfway between the values assigned to the 
two extreme states, and assign a value to that state. They are then asked to rate the 
state whose value on the scale is roughly halfway between this mid-state and the best 
state, and then to rate the state whose value on the scale is roughly halfway between 
the mid-state and the worst state. Respondents are then left to rate the remaining 10 
states in any order they chose and are allowed the same value for more than one state. 
It was decided to tell respondents that what followed the specified time in a particular 
health state was not known and should not be taken into account. This was considered 
preferable to the state being followed by immediate death which, for the shorter 
durations, might dominate the valuations that respondents give, thus artificially driving 
valuations for these short durations downwards. In any event, not knowing what 
follows a specified period of poor health is a more plausible scenario and much more 
like the real world. After completing the valuation tasks, respondents were asked 
whether their valuations were influenced by the duration of the states. Finally, 
respondents were asked to give important background information, including their age, 
sex and educational attainment. 
Data analysis 
Valuations have been transformed onto a 0-1 scale in order to produce a unit of health 
which is comparable across all respondents and all durations. The regression 
techniques and specification tests used to generate EuroQol tariffs for states lasting 
one month, one year and ten years are identical to those reported in Chapter 3.2. 
Given the richness of the data available and to avoid the problems of not being able to 
sufficiently describe individual behaviour from the results of an aggregate level model, 
the relationships between valuations across the different durations have also been 
investigated at the individual level, using the Tobit specification and associated 
adjustments as outlined in Chapter 2.1. 
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An aim of this study was to assess whether differences in valuations between durations 
were larger for more severe health states. This could be investigated by modelling the 
relationships between different durations for each of the possible health states valued, 
and comparing the observed relationships found. If they remained the same as states 
became progressively worse, then one could conclude that valuations between 
durations were constant across health state severity. However, the large number of 
health states available, coupled with the fact that respondents were only required to 
value a random sample of health states makes this method problematic. Alternatively, 
the health states have been grouped into five categories on the basis of severity on the 
EuroQol dimensions. 
In order to achieve greater specification of the models, additional independent variables 
have been introduced which pick up the effect of a number of background 
characteristics which were found to affect VAS valuations in the Main Study (see 
Gudex et al [ 1996]). To capture adequately the effect of age, a cubic expression has 
been used whilst dummy variables have been introduced to pick up the effect of 
educational attainment. The models themselves have been estimated separately for 
males and females. Table 4.3.1 defines the explanatory variables used in this analysis. 
The models presented in the results refer to those that are considered the `best' at 
describing the relationship between valuations for the different durations. To choose 
between competing models, goodness-of-fit statistics were compared and a RESET 
test was applied to test for evidence of misspecification. In addition, the predictive 
ability of the regression models has been assessed by randomly dividing the 
respondents into two: two-thirds to re-estimate the model and one-third to cross- 
validate its performance. This has been assessed using the square root of average 
squared prediction error, calculated as n] . 
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Results 
Study population 
Of the 312 people selected for sampling, 236 (76%) yielded an interview. 
Unsuccessful interviews were largely due to a refusal by the selected person or to the 
interviewer being unable to make contact with the selected person. Table 4.3.2 shows 
that the sample was broadly representative of the general population in terms of age, 
sex and educational attainment. Two respondents had to be excluded from further 
analysis because they had not given valuations for the one month and one year 
durations. The data for the remaining 234 respondents, however, was highly 
complete. Overall, only about 1% of the ranking and VAS data was missing and for 
the first duration valued (i. e. 10 years) there was no missing data on the ranking 
exercise and only one missing VAS valuation. 
Valuations 
Table 4.3.3 shows the mean VAS scores for the three durations. For 34 of the 43 
states, the mean value for a state lasting one month is significantly higher statistically 
(paired t-test; p<0.05) than the mean value attached to the same state when it lasts for 
10 years. The value for one month is higher than the value for one year on 18 
occasions and the value for one year is higher than the value for ten years for 13 of the 
states. With regard to the hypothesis that dysfunctional states of health are more likely 
to be rated as worse than dead the longer they last, Table 4.3.4 shows the number of 
times each state was given a lower value than dead for each duration. Whilst very few 
respondents consider any of the mild states to be worse than dead irrespective of its 
duration, the number of times a moderate or severe state is rated as worse than dead 
increases as the time spent in it increases. 
In response to the question "How did the differences in the length of time spent in each 
state affect your answers? ", 49.3% explicitly stated that they thought the states (often 
the more severe ones) got worse (often worse than death) as they lasted for longer, 
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although almost one-fifth felt that their answers were not at all affected by the 
durations specified. However, the differences in scores for these respondents, as well 
as their background characteristics, were no different from the remainder of 
respondents. 
Estimating the tariffs 
The coefficients on the 12 independent variables for three durations are shown in Table 
4.3.5. The Res (ranging from 0.55 to 0.63) are very high given the type of data 
analysed but all models suffered from general heteroscedasticity. The constant for all 
three durations is highly significant suggesting that ay move away from full health is 
associated with a substantial loss of utility and the size and significance of the 
coefficient on N3 highlights the aversion that respondents in general have to "extreme 
problems" on any of the dimensions. It can be seen that for all three durations the 
largest decrement for a move from level 1 to level 2 is associated with pain or 
discomfort, which continues to dominate the weighting for level 3, although mobility 
level 3 (confined to bed) is given a somewhat similar decrement. With respect to 
differences across durations, the largest and most systematic shifts occur in the 
constant term and in the N3 term, where the decrement associated with each increases 
as duration increases. There is little or no systematic shift apparent for most 
dimensions, except perhaps for self-care where the decrements associated with both 
levels 2 and 3 increase marginally as the time spent in the health state increases. 
The actual (mean) and estimated values for the 42 states directly valued in the study 
are compared in Figure 4.3.1. The difference between actual and estimated values for 
all three durations is remarkably small. The biggest discrepancy is for state 32211 for a 
duration of ten years where the estimated value is . 
093 greater than the mean value for 
this state, but for only 23 of the 126 comparisons does the difference exceed . 
05. 
Figure 4.3.2 compares the estimated values of the same 42 states for the three 
durations. It is clear from the Figure that the effect of duration is not uniform across 
the range of health states, being more pronounced for more severe states than for less 
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severe ones. As would be expected, and as can be inferred from the coefficients in 
Table 4.3.1, the largest differences in valuations are between the 10 year and one 
month durations. For less severe states, the values when the states last for 10 years are 
about 0.05 below those when the states last for one month. This difference increases 
with severity, reaching about 0.15 for the more severe states. Interestingly, the 
differences between the values for states lasting ten years and one year are of 
approximately the same magnitude as the difference between one year and one month 
values. In both comparisons, the value for the longer duration is about 0.03 below that 
for the shorter duration for less severe states, and about 0.07 lower for more severe 
states. 
Comparisons with the Main Study 
Since VAS valuations for the 10 year duration were elicited in exactly the same way 
as in the Main Study, it is possible to compare the two sets of valuations, and hence 
to make some judgements about whether the one month and one year valuations 
elicited in this study would be likely to be those that would have been obtained had 
the sample been larger. A stringent test involves comparing the 243 estimated 
values from the 10 year valuations in this study with those derived from the Main 
Study. The following ordinary least-squares regression equation was used to 
compare the estimates: 
y=a+ (3x 
where y is the 10 year VAS valuation from this study and x is the 10 year VAS 
valuation from the Main Study. The results were as follows: 
y=0.02 + 0.98 x 
(6.75) (118.6) 
R'` = 0.98 
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Since the intercept term is very close to zero and the slope term is very close to 1 and 
given that this simple specification did not suffer from any heteroscedasticity, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the corresponding valuations are very close to each other. 
The relationship between durations 
The results of regressing VAS scores for states lasting one month against VAS scores 
for states lasting one year are given in Table 4.3.6. For both males and females, the 
coefficients on the values for one year confirm the hypothesis that health state 
valuations are a decreasing function of health state duration and the coefficients on the 
health state group dummies suggest that the effect of duration is greater for the more 
severe states. It appears that, for the same `one month' valuations, males consistently 
give lower `one year' valuations (as evidenced through the smaller constant and larger 
negative coefficients attached to the health state group dummy variables). For males, 
there appears to be a relationship between educational attainment and health state 
valuation that is not observed for females. Specifically, for the same `one month' 
valuation, males with greater educational qualifications generally give higher `one year' 
valuations those with lesser qualifications. However, neither gender exhibits a strong 
age effect. 
Table 4.3.7 presents the results of regressing valuations for states lasting one year 
against on those for states lasting 10 years. Again, and as expected, the more severe 
the health state, the greater the (negative) effect of duration on valuations. These 
models contain a set of dummy interaction terms between health state group and ten 
year duration score. Although their inclusion significantly improves the model fit and 
all have positive coefficients, no consistent pattern is observed. This is most obviously 
observed for females where the coefficients attached to group 2 and group 5 are the 
same. Once again, males tend to take greater account of the duration of the states i. e. 
for given `one year' scores, they give lower `ten year' valuations than females (as 
evidenced by the striking difference between the intercepts for the genders). However, 
neither age nor educational attainment (rather surprisingly, given the results in Table 
4.3.6) appear to affect the relationships between valuations for the different durations. 
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The results in both Tables 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 show that the majority of variation in health 
state valuations occurred within individuals (i. e. between health states). Having said 
this, approximately a quarter (24% for males and 28% for females) of the total 
unexplained variation in the `one month-one year' model is due to differences between 
individuals, whilst in the `one year-ten year' model the corresponding figures are 43% 
and 28%, respectively. No evidence of misspecification is observed in any of the 
models presented here. However, with regard to the performance of the models in 
terms of their abilities to predicted observed health state valuations from the set of 
explanatory variables and the valuation of the same health state for a different duration, 
the models do not perform very satisfactorily. As Tables 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 show, the 
square root of the average squared prediction error varies between 0.151 and 0.184. 
Accordingly, estimated health state valuations are, on average, between 15% and 18% 
from actual valuations. 
Discussion 
The results presented in this chapter confirm those of previous studies and suggest that 
the valuation given to a health state is a function of both its severity and its duration. It 
was found that the mean score for a state lasting 10 years is lower than when the same 
state lasts for one year which in turn is lower than when that state lasts for only one 
month. There is also an increasing propensity for respondents' to rate a state as worse 
than dead as the duration of that state increases. The hypotheses, then, that 
dysfunctional health states will be seen as increasingly intolerable the longer they last 
and that the likelihood of a health state being considered as worse than dead increases 
as the duration of the state increases, are both supported by these data. Moreover, 
these results are supported by what a large number of respondents thought they did 
when probed about whether the time spent in the health states affected their answers: 
almost 50% explicitly stated that the states were worse for longer durations. 
The results from the estimation of tariff values are encouraging and suggest that the 
same functional form used in the Main Study is equally applicable to this data. The Res 
of between 0.55 and 0.63 can be considered good, the estimated values for all three 
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durations are in the majority of cases very close to the actual ones and the results 
confirm the findings outlined above. The estimated score for a state lasting 10 years is 
lower than when the same state lasts for one year which in turn is lower than when that 
state lasts for only one month and it appears that the differences between ten year and 
one year values are approximately equal to the differences between one year and one 
month values. The coefficients on the dummy variables for the different dimensions 
show no systematic pattern, suggesting that the effect of duration is not dimension- 
specific; rather that it is the severity of the health state overall that matters. Given that 
the estimated values for states lasting ten years in this study were very similar to the 
estimated values in the Main Study, it seems reasonable to conclude that, if 
respondents in the Main Study were asked to value states of one month and one year 
duration, they would have given very similar values to the corresponding ones obtained 
here. 
This has important implications for those involved in measuring the benefits associated 
with health care and suggests that the results of studies in which the value given to a 
health state is assumed to be linearly related to the time spent in that health state should 
be treated with caution, and subjected to sensitivity analysis over an appropriate range 
of values. To give some idea about what this range of values should look like, this 
chapter also sought to estimate a functional relationship between valuations of the 
same health states for the three durations. Using Tobit regression analysis, models 
were estimated which related valuations for states lasting one month to those for one 
year, and valuations for states lasting one year to those lasting ten years. The 
modelling of individual level data was an attempt at assessing whether it is possible to 
estimate a robust relationship between the valuations elicited for one duration and 
those elicited for the same health states but for different durations. If such a function 
could be estimated, the parameters in the sensitivity analysis would be even more 
clearly defined. 
Although the results confirm the hypotheses cited above, it was not possible to 
establish a systematic relationship between the severity of the health state and the 
difference in valuation across durations. The predictive capability of the models was 
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also not very encouraging: on the standard 0-1 (dead-healthy) scale, the value from 
one duration can only predict the value from another duration on average to within 
between 0.15 and 0.185 of the actual value. However, these results are not overly 
surprising given the disparate views that individuals have about health and illness and 
similar results were observed in Chapter 2.1 when individual data was used to predict 
health state preferences derived from different valuation methods. 
The results do, however, provide some evidence that the relationships between the 
different durations are influenced by the gender of the respondent. Broadly speaking, 
men appear to take greater account of the time spent in the health state than females 
do; they give lower `one year' valuations for the same `one month' scores and lower 
`ten year' valuations for the same `one year' scores. It is unclear why males and 
females should have different mapping functions and, as noted before, the literature to 
date does not help to shed much light on this subject. Although gender is generally 
regarded as having negligible a impact on health state valuations, much of the analysis 
has concentrated on differences within a given duration and not across durations. 
Future research efforts should be directed towards addressing this issue; in the first 
instance, towards testing its robustness. 
Given the nature of the study reported in this chapter, the findings that a) all health 
state valuations are a decreasing function of the time spent in them, and b) duration has 
a differential effect on the genders, are both with respect to valuations of hypothetical 
health states elicited from a broadly representative sample of the UK general 
population. Contrariwise, a number of studies have shown a direct positive link 
between time in chronic illness and adaptation to that illness (for example, see 
Meyerowitz [ 1983] and Cassileth et al [ 1984]). The suggestion that those in poor 
health successfully compensate for it may result from an adjustment or response to 
"cognitive dissonance" whereby people adjust their expectations in the light of changes 
in their circumstances (see Festinger [ 1957]). Therefore, it seems entirely plausible 
that the preferences of the general public might also differ from those of patients with 
regard to the effect of duration, and that valuations of the milder health states would 
actually increase as the time spent in them increases. 
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As with the generation of different sets of valuations according to different background 
characteristics, the issue that arises here is whose preferences should be used in 
determining priorities in health care. It could be argued that it is appropriate to weight 
more heavily the preferences of those who have been in poor health states for a period 
of time which is considered long enough for them to have adapted to their dysfunction 
and/or to have made the necessary adjustments to their expectations. But as discussed 
in Chapter 1.2, since resource allocation decisions primarily affect future (rather than 
current) patients, it seems legitimate to give weight to the ex ante preferences of 
potential patients when making ex ante resource allocation decisions. Again, this is 
ultimately a political issue. 
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CHAPTER 5: USING INDIVIDUAL VALUATIONS AT THE 
SOCIAL LEVEL 
CHAPTER 5.1: INDIVIDUAL VERSUS SOCIAL PREFERENCES 
Introduction 
Chapter 4 assessed the extent to which responses to TTO questions yield unbiased 
estimates of an individual's preferences over health states and considered whether an 
individual's VAS valuations for different health states differ according the time spent in 
those states. The primary purpose for eliciting such valuations, though, is to inform 
decisions at the social level. Therefore, it is important to consider the extent to which 
individual valuations can be used to express social preferences. Of course, an 
important issue in this regard has already been addressed in Chapter 3.4 where the 
issue of aggregation was discussed. In fact, whether the mean or median is chosen as 
the most appropriate measure of central tendency (and the choice between them is 
ultimately a philosophical one), the preferences of each individual are given equal 
weight: in calculating the mean, each individual's strength of preference is weighted 
equally whilst each individual is counted as one `voter' when the median is calculated. 
But the issue of whether the aggregation of individual preferences is a good 
approximation of social preferences still remains. 
In addressing this issue, I will concentrate on the quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) 
approach which attempts to combine the value of quality-of-life with the value of 
length of life into a single index number, which may then be used as a currency in 
which the benefits of health care interventions can be expressed. Although QALYs 
can be used to measure the benefit derived from different therapies by an individual 
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patient, in this chapter they are discussed in terms of their use in the allocation of 
scarce health care resources among different patients. 
In the simplest case, in which a person remains in the same health state for a number of 
years, QALYs (assuming no discounting) are calculated according to the formula 
H*Y, where H is the relative weight attached to a particular health state and Y is the 
number of years spent in that health state. If the value of H is a function of its duration 
(see Chapter 4.3) then the algorithm for calculating QALYs needs to be modified if 
they are to more accurately represent preferences and if the possibility of drawing the 
wrong policy conclusions is to be minimised; Ht*Y, where H varies with time. When 
H changes over time, the QALY algorithm assumes that the utility derived from 
the whole profile is equal to the sum of the QALYs derived from each health state. 
In other words, it is assumed that each individual's utility function is strongly 
separable on the time dimension i. e. U(H', H2.... H°; Y', Y2,... Yn) = U(H')*Y' + 
U(H2)*Y2 + ... + U(H")*Y°. Whilst recognising that this assumption is a 
restrictive one (see Chapter 4.2), issues regarding its appropriateness are not 
addressed in this chapter. 
It has been suggested by a number of economists that decisions about how to allocate 
scarce health care resources should be informed by the cost-per-QALY of the different 
alternatives (for example, see Williams [ 1985]). According to Weinstein and Stason 
[ 1977], the alternatives should be ranked according to the aggregate unweighted 
number of QALYs gained i. e. those that yield more QALYs are ranked higher than 
those that yield less. The alternatives are then "selected from the top until available 
resources are exhausted". This defines the objectives of the health care system in terms 
of the maximisation of health gain (which in this chapter is defined as efficiency) and is 
consistent with defining need in terms of capacity to benefit: that Weinstein and Stason 
and Williams define need in this way is therefore not surprising. 
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In this respect, it has been argued that the QALY approach fails to take account of 
distributional issues that are known to be important in the context of health care (see 
Nord et al [ 1993] and Nord [ 1994]). It is argued that people would want decision- 
makers, when choosing between alternatives, also to be concerned with how those 
QALYs are distributed, and again different definitions of need are relevant. For 
example, if need is defined in terms of ill health - those in the worst health states are 
those most in need of treatment - then pre-treatment health status becomes the most 
important consideration in determining priorities. Alternatively, if need is defined in 
terms of final health status, then post-treatment health status is more important. There 
are clearly a number of other definitions of need (for a more detailed discussion see 
Culyer [ 1995]), each with different implications for the allocation of resources, but the 
definitions cited above highlight the tension between efficiency (defined in terms of 
health gain) on the one hand, and concerns for equity (defined in terms of pre- and 
post-treatment health status) on the other. 
It is likely, then, that people would want resource allocation decisions to be informed 
both by efficiency and equity considerations. In economics, we typically try to 
answer questions of this kind by considering the form of the social welfare 
function (SWF) to be employed. For example, Wagstaff [ 1991 ] has noted that 
"this [inequality] aversion could be incorporated into resource allocation decisions 
by using an appropriately specified SWF", and a number of others authors have 
addressed this possibility (for example, see Mooney and Olsen [ 1991 ] and the 
empirical analysis presented in Chapter 5.2 below). In this chapter, an approach is 
suggested which uses a particular class of health-related social welfare functions 
(HRSWF) [first proposed by Atkinson in 1970] which allows efficiency and equity to 
be considered independently. A particular functional form is postulated which is 
sufficiently flexible to represent a wide range of social preferences. Whilst Wagstaff 
[ 1991 ] and Jones-Lee and Loomes [ 1995] have employed this functional form, this 
chapter shows how the framework suggested allows a number of different hypotheses 
to be tested in a relatively straightforward way. 
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The social welfare function 
Following Ng (1983), we may characterise social welfare by a vector of individual 
welfares, (W', W2,..., W'), where W is is the welfare (or "good") of the ith individual 
and I is the number of individuals. Economists have typically argued that individuals 
are the best judges of their own well-being, and that social welfare depends only on the 
welfare of persons in society. A Bergsonian SWF (Bergson 1938) may then be written 
as 
W= f(W', W 2,...., W') (1) 
where the precise form off is unspecified other than that it is strictly increasing in all of 
its arguments. In this way, welfare economics can be said to be written largely from a 
consequentialist and individualistic standpoint, implying a refusal to adopt a 
paternalistic attitude. Note that paternalism is acceptable under the social decision- 
making approach to resource allocation, which suggests that policies which 
maximise the objectives of the decision-making unit (for example, the NHS) 
should be adopted (for more details of this paradigm, see Sugden and Williams 
[ 1978]). In this chapter, however, it is not only assumed that individuals are the 
best judges of the their own (real or hypothetical) health state but also that the 
objectives of government are defined in terms of individual preferences i. e. in 
terms of arguments in the SWF 
According to the Pareto criterion (see Pareto [1935]), an increase in some W' and 
decrease in no W is a sufficient condition for an increase in social welfare. Some 
economists argue that this is a sufficient and a necessary condition for an 
improvement in social welfare (see, for example, Gravelle and Rees [1981]). 
However, this very narrow interpretation implies that improvements in social 
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welfare can only be brought about from a policy change in the (highly unlikely) 
event that nobody loses (and at least one person gains) from the proposed change. 
Thus, others (for example, Sugden [1981 p37]) suggest that the Pareto criterion 
is only sufficient for an improvement in social welfare Therefore, 
bf >_ 0 for all I (2) owi 
Another more restrictive definition of social welfare is the (Benthamite) utilitarian 
concept of the sum total of individual happiness 
W= U' +U 2 +.... U I .... U' =I U' (3) 1 
where U' is a utility index representing the preferences of individual I. In this chapter, 
it is assumed that Ui is a cardinal utility index, unique up to a positive 
proportionate transformation i. e. if Ui is a representation of the individual's 
preferences then the only admissible transformation is aUi where a>O. The 
advantage of this approach is that the SWF aggregates individual utilities in a direct 
and transparent manner. 
In the discussion that follows, it is necessary to assume that it is possible to make 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. It is now well established that different SWFs 
require different types of comparability (see Sen [ 1977]). For example, maximising the 
sum of individual utilities requires that differences in utilities can be compared (referred 
to as unit comparability) whilst adoption of the Rawlsian criterion of maximising the 
welfare of the worst-off individual requires only that we know whether one person is 
better or worse off than another (referred to as level comparability). For the purposes 
of this chapter, full comparability, which subsumes both level and unit comparability, is 
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required. By going beyond individual orderings, problems associated with Arrow's 
General Possibility Theorem (see Arrow [ 1951 ]) are avoided. In addition, and without 
loss of generality, no distinction is made between welfarism, which is concerned with 
self-assessed utility, and extra-welfarism, which is typically the framework adopted 
in measuring health gain since it is often assumed that a given health state has the 
same value across all individuals. 
The application of a utilitarian SWF to health care implies that HRSW is maximised 
when the total number of QALYs gained (subject to a budget constraint) is maximised, 
irrespective of how those QALYs are distributed. It is this approach that Nord et at 
[ 1993] appear to object to, claiming that "The rule is almost certainly defective as it 
ignores distributional considerations and issues of entitlement that are known to be of 
importance in decision-making, especially in the health sector". I agree. But the 
utilitarian approach is only one approach to deriving a HRSWF from individual 
utilities. Another might be to adopt a decision rule that gives greater weight to one 
individual's utility than to another's. For example, a Rawlsian "maximin" approach 
would require giving greatest weight to the treatment of the most seriously ill 
individual since maximin judges states of the world according to the level of 
(health-related) utility of the worst-off person. Between the utilitarian and 
Rawlsian formulations lies the "convex" SWF which implies that there exists a 
trade-off between efficiency and equity. 
Therefore, taking account of equity and distributive considerations is not inconsistent 
with the measurement of individual utility, nor is it inconsistent with the interpersonal 
comparison of individual utilities. For example, assuming that an agreed unit of value 
applicable to each individual has been established, the conclusion that individual i is in 
better health than individual j, and that i's gain in health from a change from Y to Z will 
exceed j's loss (i. e. a positive statement) does not imply what ought to be done until an 
objective function (i. e. a normative statement) is specified. Therefore, if our objective 
is to maximise the sum of health utilities (i. e. the utilitarian SWF), we choose Z; if we 
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want to maximise the health of the worst-off individual (i. e. the Rawlsian SWF), we 
choose Y. Of course, there are a number of other objectives which we may wish to 
satisfy, and these will be considered below. The measurement of individual utilities, 
then, provides us with the flexibility to formulate (and even subsequently revise) any 
number of possible SWFs from them. And the process of collapsing individual utilities 
into an overall SWF makes explicit the assumptions and philosophical basis on which 
such aggregation is based. 
Distributive justice and the social welfare function 
If we assume that HRSW is a function of individual utilities i. e. that factors other than 
individual utilities are either regarded as irrelevant to social welfare or as being 
held constant, we can use the tools of welfare economics to represent a number of 
different SWFs. In Figure 5.1.1, the utility derived from different states of health by 
two (or two groups of) individuals, i and j, are shown on the x and y axes, respectively. 
Notice in this example that health state utilities have an upper bound of 1 (full 
health) and a lower bound of 0 (death). It would, however, be possible to expand 
this analysis to allow for states that attract negative utilities i. e. for those 
considered to be worse than dead. Four SWFs are postulated: 
The utilitarian SWF (UB): a straight line drawn at right angles to the 45° line, 
indicating that maximising total health gain is the objective, irrespective of 
distributional considerations. 
2. The Rawlsian SWF (UR): welfare is not increased unless the health state of the 
most seriously ill individual is improved. 
3. The convex SWF (UC): implies that there exists a trade-off between efficiency (i. e. 
maximising health) and equity (i. e. greater concern for those in poor health). 
4. The concave SWF (UI): implies inequality proneness. 
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In addition, it is possible that the objective is to equalise the health of both 
individuals (i. e. strict egalitarianism) which means the SWF would consist of 
points on the 45° line with points further from the origin being preferred to those 
closer to the origin. However, assuming that pathological budget lines or utility 
possibility frontiers (UPFs) are ruled out, preferences for strict egalitarianism will 
lead to the choice of the same point on the UPF as Rawlsian preferences. 
All these possible formulations can be represented by a class of SWF first proposed by 
Atkinson [1970]. 
W= 
1 
[(u, )A+B(uj)A], ABO, 0<B<1 (4) 
A' 
W =1n(u; ) +Bl n(u1 ), A=0,0 < B: 5:, _1 (5) 
The parameter A determines the curvature of the iso-welfare loci, thereby reflecting the 
degree of aversion (or proneness) to inequality in the distribution of health state utility 
between individuals (or groups) i and j. In the case of a utilitarian SWF i. e. UB in 
Figure 5.1.1, A will take a value of 1 and for the Rawlsian case, UR, will be equal to 
negative infinity. Clearly, A will he somewhere between these values for SWF (such as 
UC) that represent some trade-off between efficiency and equity. In the case of 
inequality proneness, as shown by UI in Figure 5.1.1, A will be greater than 1. The 
parameter B determines the steepness of the iso-welfare loci, thereby reflecting the 
weight given to individual j relative to individual i. In Figure 5.1.1, B=1 which means 
that in every respect other than health, i and j are considered to be equal. In the 
original Atkinson formulation, it is assumed that each individual is treated 
symmetrically (by assuming two anonymous individuals whose (different) income 
levels are all that is known). In this way, B forms no part of the original 
formulation. 
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Cobb-Douglas preferences 
For illustrative purposes, let us assume that the SWF takes the log-linear form, such 
that A=O. In such circumstances, the SWF is analogous to a Cobb-Douglas (CD) 
utility function 
U(ui, uj) = u. 
aUj(1-a) 
(6) 
U(u;, uj)=aIn u; +(1-(x)In u. (7) 
where a lies in the [0,1 ] interval. Thus, in terms of the formulation in () and (5), B= 
(1-a)/a. CD preferences are the standard example of indifference curves that look 
well-behaved; in terms of a SWF they imply an aversion to inequality. 
In Figure 5.1.2, a is assumed to be 0.5 (i. e. B=1) which means that the same weight is 
given to individual i as to individual j, perhaps because in every other respect save 
health they are considered to be equal. Consider an initial point such as A which 
results in a health state utility of 0.4 for individual i and 0.2 for j. Suppose that, given 
resource constraints, it is only possible to treat one person. We can either improve the 
health of j from 0.2 to 0.4 (i. e. move to point B) or improve the health of i from 0.4 to 
0.8 (i. e. move to point Q. An individual (or society) with CD preferences which give 
the same weight to each individual will be indifferent between these two alternatives. 
This is because, given a=0.5, U(u;, uj) = 0.51nui + 0.51nuu. We already have one 
point, B, on the indifference curve which yields a utility of 0.51n(0.4) + 0.51n(0.4) 
and we know that to be on the same indifference curve, that this must be equal to 
0.51nu; + 0.51n(0.2). Rearranging and solving for i gives I=0.8. Note that to be 
indifferent between the two alternatives, the health gain of the healthier individual, i, 
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(0.8-0.4=0.4) has to be greater than the health gain of the sicker individual, j, (0.4- 
0.2=0.2), representing a distributional consideration. 
The convenience of assuming CD preferences is highlighted when a (linear) budget 
constraint is introduced into the model. It is then straightforward to show that the 
optimal choices that satisfy this type of SWF are 
ui = oc (m ), 
P; 
u; _ (1-a)(m ) 
P; 
(8) 
where m is the size of the total budget and p; and pj are the (constant) costs per unit of 
utility of treating i and j, respectively. Rearranging these formulae gives 
u, p; =am, ujpj =(1-(X)m (9) 
This means that a fixed fraction of the health care budget is spent on each individual. 
The size of the fraction is determined by the exponent in the CD function (i. e. by the 
value of B in the class of SWF specified in (4) and (5)). 
Clearly, this property of CD preferences is useful when considering the distribution of 
health care expenditure between two individuals who are not considered to be equal. 
Indeed, previous research has shown that the general public may wish to weight 
more heavily the health needs of particular groups in society; for example, the 
young, those with children, and those who have looked after their own health (see 
Williams 1988 and Charny et al [1989]). If we assume that individual j is given 
greater weight than individual I, then a<1-a (i. e. B>1) in the specification of the SWF. 
For example, if a=0.2 (hence 1-a=0.8) then a CD SWF takes the form U(u,, u; ) = 
0.21nu; + 0.81nu1. Thus, we know that society wishes to allocate 20% of its health care 
budget to the treatment of individual i and 80% to the treatment of individual j. 
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Because social preferences (for fixed values of p; and p; ) are a linear function of m, this 
will be true irrespective of the overall size of the health care budget. 
We know from our earlier example (assuming a-0.5) that a health gain of 0.2 to 
individual j was equal to a health gain of 0.4 to individual i. For expositional purposes, 
assume that there are no diminishing returns in the treatment of individuals I and j; in 
other words, the relationship between costs and health gain is linear. Under such 
circumstances, for the budget he, or the utility possibility frontier (UPF), to pass 
through these two points requires the slope of the UPF to be -0.5 i. e. we can gain 0.5 
units of health for j for every one unit of health we gain for i. At this rate of 
transformation a society with CD preferences would be indifferent between treating i 
and j. Were the gradient of the UPF to be steeper than -0.5 (for example, treating 
individual i becomes relatively more expensive), point B would be chosen, if it were 
flatter (for example, treating individual i becomes relatively cheaper), point C would be 
chosen. 
Assuming a continuous UPF between B and C, means that we can maximise HRSW 
by doing something for both individual i and individual j. In health care, the UPF is 
most likely discrete rather than continuous i. e. we can either improve the health of 
one person or we can improve the health of the other, but in some cases a trade- 
off may exist. In our example, tangency between the SWF and the UPF is where i's 
health improves from 0.4 to 0.6 and j's health improves from 0.2 to 0.3, as shown by 
point D in Figure 5.1.3. As proof, we know that u; =0.5m/1 and u1=0.5m/2, so, if 
u; =0.4 and uj=0.4, we know that 1 is spent on i and 2 is spent on j, and if u; =0.8 
and uj=0.2 we know that 1.6 is spent on i and 0.8 is spent on j. In other words, 
m=2.4. For tangency with a higher SWF, we know with CD preferences that the 
budget is spent in proportion to the exponents a and 1-a, which when a=0.5 
means that 1.2 is spent on i and 1.2 on j. Substituting these values back into our 
original equations gives u1=0.5* 1.2=0.6 and uj=(0.5* 1.2)/2=0.3 
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Empirical investigation 
In the absence of firm empirical evidence, it could be argued that a log-linear SWF 
(which, ceteris paribus, considers a health gain of 0.4 to an individual in a pre- 
treatment health state valued at 0.4 to be equivalent to a health gain of 0.2 to an 
individual in a pre-treatment health state valued at 0.2) is preferable to a utilitarian 
SWF which is concerned only with the maximisation of total health gain, irrespective 
of whether the person in the better or worse health state gets it. But if the premise that 
public sector decisions should reflect the strength of preferences of those who will be 
affected by those decisions is accepted, then it becomes an empirical question whether 
society is prepared to trade efficiency and equity against each other in this (or any 
other) way. And in principle, the framework presented in this chapter allows us to 
derive the precise shape of the SWF from responses to very simple questions. 
Initially, the utility a respondent attaches to different states of health can be estimated 
using the SG or TTO. The x and y axes (i. e. the utilities of individuals i and j) can then 
be calibrated with health states that the respondent has valued for themselves. The 
respondent could be told that individuals x and y have preferences over health states 
that are identical to their own. They can then be asked questions along the lines of "if 
you had to choose between treating individual j who is in this health state (one the 
respondent valued at, say, 0.2) before treatment and this health state (one the 
respondent valued at, say, 0.4) after treatment or individual i who is in this health state 
(one they valued at, say, 0.4) before treatment and this health state (one the respondent 
valued at, say, 0.6) after treatment, which one would you choose to treat?. The final 
health state of individual i can then be made better or worse depending on whether the 
respondent chooses to treat j or i, respectively. In this way, the value of A can be 
estimated. The value of B could be estimated by stating that i and j differ according to 
a characteristic other than health; for example, age or sex. 
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In addition, if it is assumed that the respondent is not inequality prone such that their 
iso-welfare loci over the treatment of two individuals are not concave (i. e. that A is less 
than or equal to 1), then responses to these types of questions can also be used to test 
the validity of individual utilities. For example, if a respondent strictly prefers moving 
someone from a health state utility of 0.8 to full health to moving someone else from a 
health state utility of 0.1 to 0.4, then it is unlikely that the health state valuations 
elicited from this respondent can be treated as having interval scale properties with 
respect to health. 
Alternatively, with respondents that are familiar with the concept of health status 
measurement and particularly with the notion that health states may lie on a continuum 
from full health to (or beyond) dead, it might be possible to present them directly with 
health state valuations rather than using health states that have an implied value. This 
was an approach taken with a convenience sample of 35 undergraduate students at the 
University of Newcastle. The students had taken an option in Health Economics and 
as such were familiar both with the concept of health status measurement and the 
techniques that can be used to elicit valuations. 
In each of four seminars, 8 or 9 students, were asked to imagine that there are two 
individuals, i and j, who have preferences over health states identical to their own and 
are the same in all relevant respects except health. They were told that, at the moment, 
i is in a health state valued at 0.4 and j is in health state valued at 0.2. Respondents 
were then asked the following question: "Imagine that there is a treatment available 
which could move i to a health state valued at 0.6 or move j to a health state valued at 
0.4. If you could only treat i or j but not both, who would you choose to treat? " 
In total, one respondent preferred to treat i, stating that she felt it was better to have 
one person in a 'good' health state and one person in a 'bad' state rather than to have 
both in 'moderate' states. Two respondents were indifferent between treating i and j, 
stating that the health gain was the same in both cases. The remaining 
32 respondents 
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said they would prefer to treat j because it is 'fairer'; either because j is initially in a 
worse health state or because the distribution of health after treating j is more equitable 
than after treating i. The 32 respondents who preferred to treat j were asked a second 
question: "Imagine that, as before, the treatment will move j from a health state valued 
at 0.2 to one valued at 0.4 but that the treatment will now move i from a health state 
valued at 0.4 to full health (i. e. valued at 1.0). If you again had to choose between 
treating i and j, who were choose to treat? 
8 respondents still chose to treat j for both the reasons of 'fairness' cited above. 24 
respondents now chose to treat i on the grounds that the benefit to i is now much 
larger than the benefit to j. The 24 respondents who now chose to treat i were asked 
one final question: "Imagine again that the treatment will move j from a health state 
valued at 0.2 to one valued at 0.4 but that the treatment will move i from a health state 
valued at 0.4 to one valued somewhere between 0.6 and 1.0. Where between 0.6 and 
1.0 would the treatment have to move i to, so that you are indifferent between treating 
i and j? ". 
The responses were as follows: 0.65 =3; 0.70 =7; 0.75 =4; 0.80 =5; 0.85 =1; 0.90 =2; 
0.95 =2. The median value for the full group of 35 respondents is 0.80 (inter-quartile 
range = 0.70-0.95). In other words, moving one person from a health state valued at 
0.2 to one valued at 0.4, on average, yields the same social value as moving another 
person (who is identical in all respects except health) from a health state valued at 0.4 
to one valued at 0.8. For this group of respondents, then, the log-linear HRSWF 
described in this chapter would be a good approximation of their preferences. 
Discussion 
The class of HRSWF that has been postulated here is sufficiently comprehensive to 
encompass a wide range of prescriptions concerning the distribution of (health state) 
utility. In this chapter, the HRSWF is characterised by two parameters; A, reflecting 
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aversion (or proneness) to inequality in the distribution of utility, and, B, reflecting the 
relative weight given to the treatment of different individuals or groups. 
Particular attention has been given to the log-linear form (A=0) which implies 
inequality aversion and is analogous to a Cobb-Douglas utility function. This is largely 
for expositional purposes (CD preferences are well-behaved and have a number of 
useful properties) but partly because they enable us to represent various kinds of trade- 
off that society may be prepared to make between efficiency, in terms of health gain, 
and equity, in terms of severity of (pre- and post-treatment) illness and other relevant 
characteristics. In fact, the results from a preliminary experiment suggest that the log- 
linear form might indeed represent the average preferences of groups of respondents. 
Of course, these results should in no way be considered definitive but they do suggest 
that the approach is a feasible one. 
CHAPTER 5.2: MEASURING EQUITY USING THE ATKINSON INDEX 
Introduction 
As with efficiency, where there are a number of ways in which health gain (or, 
more accurately, values for health states) can be measured, so to with equity. 
Whilst the approach presented in the previous chapter does indeed appear to be a 
feasible one, it is not the only approach. Since economists have typically 
concentrated on defining and measuring efficiency and have been remarkably silent in 
providing answers to the fundamental questions concerning the definition of equity and 
its relationship with efficiency (notable exceptions include Broome [ 1991 ], Sen [ 1982] 
and Sugden [ 1981 ]), it is necessary to explore different approaches. 
In this chapter, the method first described by Atkinson [1970] in order to measure 
the shape of the SWF with respect to income distribution is used to allow the 
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shape of the SWF with respect to the distribution of health gain to be measured. 
The results of a questionnaire-based study are presented which, by attempting to 
calculate an Atkinson Index (see below), aimed to quantify the extent of the 
efficiency-equity trade-off. It is important to note here that one crucial 
modification to the Atkinson method needs to be made. In the original 
formulation, one unequally- distributed income was compared with another 
equally-distributed income but, whilst it is possible to transfer income between 
individuals, it is not possible to re-distribute health in the same way. Therefore, 
Atkinson's method has been applied to gains in health (which result in different 
distributions of prospective health outcomes) rather than to health per se. 
The framework is illustrated in Figure 5.2.1. The axes represent the value of 
different health states to X and Y, again assuming that an agreed unit of value 
applicable to each individual has been established. Consider an initial situation, 
represented by point A, in which two individuals, X and Y, are in health states 
with the same value. Assume that under the current allocation of resources, it is 
possible to treat both X and Y so that point B can be reached. Although both 
individuals have benefited from treatment, it is clear that Y has benefited more. 
According to Atkinson [1970], there is a level of health gain, x, that equally 
distributed between X and Y, has the same social value as the unequally 
distributed gain associated with point B. 
By drawing a perpendicular from B to the 45° line (resulting in point C) the same 
total health gain is yielded as at point B. These two points would yield the same 
social value for an individual who is inequality neutral (i. e. an individual who is 
concerned only with size of the total gain and not with how that gain is 
distributed). This implies a utilitarian SWF. For an individual who is inequality 
averse, such that they are prepared to accept a smaller total health gain than is 
implied by B in order that the health gain is equally distributed, the SWF would be 
convex to the origin and in the diagram cuts through the 45° line at point D. 
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Clearly, the more convex is this contour, the greater the inequality aversion. In 
the case of the Rawlsian SWF, the contour is parallel to the x- and y-axes such 
that point E yields the same social value as point B. For an inequality seeking 
individual, the SWF would be concave to the origin. 
Using the framework developed by Atkinson, it is possible to derive an inequality 
index, I, which quantifies the extent to which a respondent weighs considerations 
about the size of the total health gain against considerations about how that health 
gain is distributed. The index is calculated as 1- x/M. For an inequality neutral 
individual, I=0 since x=M. For an inequality averse individual, I>0 since x< 
M. The more total health gain such an individual is prepared to sacrifice in order 
for that gain to be equally distributed, the higher the value of I. For an individual 
with preferences akin to the Rawlsian SWF, I is at its upper boundary point. The 
precise boundary points on the Atkinson Index are defined by the initial 
distribution of health gain between the two individuals: when all the gain is initially 
going to one individual, a Rawlsian would forego the entire amount of health gain 
in order to achieve equity. In such circumstances, I=1. The more equitable the 
initial distribution, the smaller is the range of values that I may take. This 
highlights the descriptive element embodied in the Atkinson Index (for a fuller 
discussion of this issue see Sen [1982]). For an individual who is inequality 
seeking I<0 since x>M. 
Methods 
Valuation exercise 
In order to introduce respondents to the notion that health states have a 'value', 
they were asked to complete a VAS exercise. Respondents were first given 5 
EuroQol health states which represented a spread in terms of severity. They were 
then presented with a 100- point scale, the top of which was marked full health 
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(100) and the bottom was marked dead (zero) and asked to place the health states 
on this scale such that the distance between states represented their relative 
strength of preference for one state compared with another. In this way, 
respondents were required to consider what 5 points (assuming no ties) on the 
scale meant to them personally in terms of an associated health state and in 
relation to the endpoints of full health and dead. In the exercises to follow, they 
would be required to consider points on the valuation space other than those they 
themselves had identified with a particular health state. Thus, respondents were 
asked to imagine a health state classification system which was sufficiently 
sensitive to result in a continuum of values covering the entire space between full 
health and dead. It is possible to allow for states that are rated as worse than dead 
but for simplicity this questionnaire concentrated on states rated as better than 
dead only. 
Equally distributed health gain question 
The remainder of the questionnaire consisted of three sections, A, B and C which 
will be explained in detail below. However, the questions in all three sections 
followed the same basic format, each based upon 'equally distributed health gain' 
as described above. Throughout, respondents were asked to make choices 
concerning the health status of two individuals, X and Y, who were assumed to 
have preferences over health states identical to their own. Respondents were 
asked to suppose that X and Y are currently in health states to which they both 
attach the same value (as does the respondent herself). Further, they were asked 
to imagine that treatments are available which will be of benefit to both individuals 
but that the amount of benefit they each receive differs. They were told that, 
because of the way in which resources are currently allocated between the 
treatments of the two individuals, X would end up in a state valued lower than 
would Y. Respondents were then asked to suppose that resources could be re- 
allocated between the treatment of the two individuals in such a way that X and Y 
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would end up in the same health state. They were then asked to think about what 
value they would have to attach to this health state in order to make them 
indifferent between this common outcome and the different outcomes brought 
about by the current allocation of resources. 
The different prospective health outcomes currently faced by X and Y (as 
illustrated in the appendix) were shown on the left hand side of the page. On the 
right hand side of the page respondents were presented with a range of possible 
values for a common outcome which could be brought about by a re-allocation of 
resources. Although it is possible that a respondent with the blind pursuit of 
equity as a goal may well prefer a common health state in which both individuals 
are worse off than under the current allocation, the range of SWFs was restricted 
to those in the Paretian class and hence ruled out such pathological functions. 
Similarly, responses where requiring both individuals to be better off in the 
common health state were ruled out. Thus, in each case, the right hand scale was 
bounded above and below by the different prospective health outcomes faced by Y 
and X under the current allocation of resources. Whatever these endpoints 
happened to be, the right hand scales were made equal in length and calibrated 
such that they were equally sensitive with respect to the calculation of the 
Atkinson index. Respondents were asked to place a tick next to that value of the 
common health state which would make them indifferent between both individuals 
ending up in that state and X and Y ending up in different states. 
What respondents are being asked to consider is how much, if any, of the total 
current potential health gain they would be willing to sacrifice in order to achieve 
equality of health gain (and, because both X and Y start off in states with the same 
value, hence outcome). As indicated above, inequality neutral respondents will 
require the same total gain in both the inequitable and equitable outcome 
situations and hence will set the equally distributed gain equal to the mean gain. 
Those respondents who are inequality averse will accept less total gain in order to 
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achieve equality and thus will set the equally distributed gain below the mean gain. 
Inequality seeking respondents will require more total health gain in order to 
compensate for the re-distribution of that gain and hence would set the equally 
distributed gain above the mean gain. 
Section A 
Section A tested respondents' attitudes towards equity when the two individuals 
differed only with respect to the health gain they derive under the current 
allocation. Thus, respondents were asked to assume that X and Y are identical in 
every other respect and that both would live for 50 years and then die. The 
questions were designed to test whether attitudes towards equity were invariant 
with respect to the following: 
1. The mean health gain. 
2. The initial health status of the two individuals. 
3. The distribution of the health gain. 
One assumption implicit in the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) class of 
SWF is that of constant (relative) inequality aversion. This implies that if the 
distribution of gains between one pair of individuals is simply a scaled up version 
of that between another, then a respondent will feel the same degree of inequality 
aversion to both situations. Thus, aversion to inequality may be assessed 
independently of the mean gain. On the other hand, the degree of aversion an 
individual feels for any given distribution may well depend upon the size of the 
total gain available as well as on the 'starting point' in terms of the current level of 
health. Although differences in degrees of inequality aversion across different 
distributions of gains cannot be measured directly by the Atkinson Index, it is 
important to test whether or not respondents were equally likely to be averse to 
inequality across two different distributions of gains. Thus, respondents were 
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asked a series of 6 questions using the starting points, mean gains and distributions 
indicated in Table 5.2.1. 
Table 5.2.1 indicates that a comparison of the responses to QA 1 with QA2 and 
QA3 with QA4 will test the sensitivity of the Atkinson Index when only the mean 
gain is allowed to vary. There are 3 possible comparisons which can be made in 
order to test starting point effects, namely, QA2 vs QA5, QA2 vs QA6 and QA5 
vs QA6. Differences in each pair of responses are tested using a Wilcoxon sign 
test at, given the sample sizes outlined below, the 10% level of significance. In 
addition, a comparison of responses to QA 1 with QA3 and QA2 with QA4 
isolates the effects of changing the distribution of the gains. As indicated above, 
changing the distribution of gains changes the endpoints of the Atkinson Index, 
making comparisons of the magnitude of I between different distributions 
problematic. Thus, only the direction of individual responses with respect to 
attitudes towards equity (using a chi-square test) will be compared in these cases. 
Sections B and C 
As noted in Chapter 5.1, previous studies have indicated that respondents are 
willing to prioritise treatment between groups on the grounds of certain non-health 
characteristics. To test whether these factors would influence the trade-offs 
respondents were willing to make for the sake of equity, in Sections B and C, X 
and Y were no longer to be considered identical. All questions were of the same 
format used in QA5 and thus a comparison between QA5 and the responses to 
Sections B and C will indicate the extent to which each non-health characteristic 
influences attitudes towards equity. 
In Section B, respondents were again asked to assume that both individuals would 
live for 50 years and then die but now they were no longer to be considered 
identical in every respect other than the benefit they received from treatment. In 
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QB 1, respondents were told that X was a smoker whilst Y had never smoked. It 
was hypothesised that respondents would now be less willing to give up health 
gain in order to achieve equity than when the behaviour of both individuals was 
identical. Thus, we would expect the Atkinson index to be lower than in QA5. In 
QB2, X had no children whilst Y had dependent children. It was hypothesised 
that respondents would be less willing to give up total gain in order to re-distribute 
some of Y's potential gain to X than when their family circumstances were 
identical. Again, we would expect the Atkinson index to be lower than in QA5. 
In QB3, X was from social class 5 whilst Y was from social class 1. Were 
respondents to be concerned about equity with respect to social class, then they 
ought to be more willing to give up some total health gain than when the 
respondents were from the same social class. Under these circumstances, we 
would expect the Atkinson Index to be higher than in QA5. 
In Section C, respondents were asked to assume that the individuals were different 
ages. In order to make one of the individuals 60 years old, it was no longer 
plausible for both individuals to live for 50 years. Therefore, the questions in 
Section C asked respondents to assume that the individuals would live for only 20 
years and then die. Respondents were first told that individual X is 60 years old 
whilst Y is a 25 year-old. Under these circumstances it was hypothesised that 
respondents would be less willing to give up total health gain in order to re- 
distribute some of Y's potential gain to X than when they had been the same age. 
Thus, we would expect a lower Atkinson Index in QC 1 than in QA5. The second 
question did not give rise to any a priori expectations; X being a 25 years old and 
Ya5 year-old. 
The Sample 
The sample comprised of 23 of the 35 undergraduates used in the experiment 
reported in Chapter 5.1 and 14 students on an MA in health service studies at the 
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University of Leeds. The results are presented for the entire sample since there are 
no significant differences in responses according to gender or whether the 
respondent was in the Newcastle or Leeds group. The mean age of respondents is 
25 and the sample is made up of 18 men and 19 women. Five of the 37 
respondents smoke and 5 have children. There was no missing data. 
Results 
Section A 
Table 5.2.2 gives the results from Section A, both in terms of the equally 
distributed gain responses and the corresponding value of the Atkinson Index. 
The results indicate that, at the aggregate level, there is no tendency to trade-off 
total health gain for the sake of equity. Whilst median responses to each question 
indicate inequality neutrality, the mean responses to five of the six questions in this 
section suggest very slight inequality proneness. Thus, it appears that, if anything, 
respondents require more total health gain when this gain is distributed equitably 
than is available under the inequitable distribution. Table 5.2.3 shows the pattern 
of responses at the individual level and highlights the relatively large number of 
respondents whose responses suggest they are inequality seeking. The following 
pattern emerges when individual responses are analysed across the 5 questions: 6 
respondents were inequality seeking throughout, 11 were either inequality seeking 
or neutral, 5 were either inequality averse or neutral whilst 10 exhibited both 
inequality seeking and averse behaviour within their set of responses. No 
respondent displayed inequality aversion throughout their set of responses. 
As indicated above, this section was designed to test whether attitudes towards 
equity were invariant with respect to a number of variables. Allowing only the 
mean gain to vary, responses to QA I and QA2 are statistically significantly 
different (p-value < 10%) from one another as are those to QA3 and QA4 (p-value 
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< 5%). In each case the index is higher in the first question in the pair reflecting 
more aversion to inequality (or at least less inequality seeking), the higher the 
mean gain. In the tests for 'starting point' effects, two of the three comparisons 
(QA2 vs QA6 and QA5 vs QA6 but not QA2 vs QA5) were statistically 
significantly different from one another at the 5% level. In each case the index is 
higher, the higher the current health status of the two individuals. 
Thus, there seems to be at least some evidence to suggest that equity may be more 
of a concern at the 'top end' of the scale when both individuals are in a relatively 
good health state, than at the 'bottom end' when both are in health states to which 
low values are attached. This is most clearly highlighted by the fact that the only 
question which generates a positive mean Atkinson Index value (i. e. implying 
inequality aversion) is QA6 where both individuals start off in health states valued 
at 76 and one of them returns to full health. Of course, this finding contradicts the 
assumption of constant proportional inequality aversion. 
A chi-square test found no statistically significant differences at the 10% level in 
the proportion of responses displaying inequality aversion between QA 1 and QA3 
and between QA2 and QA4, where only the distribution of the health gains 
differed. Thus, it would appear that the willingness of respondents to give up 
some total health gain in order to achieve equity is unrelated to the degree of 
inequity which exists in the distribution of gains under the current allocation of 
resources. 
Section B 
The results in Table 5.5.4 show that inequality seeking predominates when X and 
Y are no longer considered identical in every respect other than the benefit they 
receive from treatment. The Atkinson indices for QB 1 and QB2 are significantly 
lower than for QA5, (sign test p-value < 10% in both cases). The median 
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responses suggest that an additional 27% of total health gain is required in order 
to compensate for re-distributing some health gain from a non-smoker to a smoker 
or from somebody with children to somebody without. Responses to QB3 are not 
significantly different from those to QA5, indicating that no additional weight is 
given to equity with respect to social class. The significantly lower index for QC I 
than for QA5 (sign test p-value < 10%) indicates a greater reluctance to re- 
distribute health gain from the 25 year-old to the 60 year-old than when both 
individuals are the same age. Although the effect is not so marked in QC2, where 
X was a 25 year-old and Y was a5 year-old, the Atkinson Index was lower than in 
QA5 (sign test p-value < 5%) indicating that respondents were again showing a 
preference for the younger of the two individuals. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to test whether Atkinson's equally 
distributed income model could be modified to measure attitudes towards 
inequality in the distribution of health gain. This study has shown that the 
questions asked posed few problems for a relatively educated sample although the 
true test of feasibility will come when questions of this kind are asked of a more 
representative sample of the population. 
The results themselves suggest that when two individuals differ only with respect 
to' the benefit they derive from treatment, respondents are, on average, indifferent 
between an allocation of resources such that health gain is unequally distributed 
between the two individuals and one in which that same health gain is distributed 
equally. This suggests that on the whole respondents are inequality neutral: they 
are concerned with the size of the gain and not with how that gain is distributed. 
Although this result was robust across different distributions in the `unequal' state 
of the world, statistically significantly different results were obtained when the 
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mean gain and/or the initial health status of the two individuals were allowed to 
differ. This finding casts doubt on a crucial assumption in the CES class of SWF; 
namely, that of constant (relative) inequality aversion. Specifically, the results 
suggest that there is greater aversion to inequality when both individuals (even the 
one who gains least in the `unequal' state of the world) end up in health states that 
have values closer to full health than to dead. In other words, it would seem 
invalid to assume that the same degree of inequality aversion applies to two states 
of the world where one is simply a scaled up version of the other. 
This suggests that distributional considerations may be given greater weight when 
both individuals can achieve a "decent" level of health (however defined), no 
matter how the benefits are allocated. Similarly, less weight may be accorded to 
an equal distribution of health gain if, in bringing this about, neither individual 
achieves this "decent" level of health. In this way, it might be that equity can be 
considered to be a "luxury" good i. e. concern for it is an increasing function of 
overall (or average) health status. There is certainly the need for more research 
here, perhaps looking at attitudes to equity in countries with low levels of overall 
health (however defined) compared to those with higher levels of overall health. 
A separate, though not unrelated issue, is whether or not it is appropriate to 
assume that preferences elicited over the treatment of two individuals can be used 
to infer preferences over the treatment of two groups of individuals. Future 
research effort could therefore also be directed towards considering such "scale 
effects". 
A number of questions were also designed to test how attitudes to equity might 
vary with respect to certain non-health. characteristics. The results from these 
questions were largely as expected: relative to their preferences when two 
individuals differ only with respect to their benefit from treatment, respondents are 
reluctant to re-distribute health gain from a non-smoker to a smoker; from an 
individual with children to one without; and from a younger to an older individual. 
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However, the most striking and unexpected feature of the results is the general 
apparent lack of aversion to inequality in any of the questions. This runs counter 
to the findings presented in Chapter 5.1 and is particularly striking given the 
considerable overlap between the two groups of respondents. Therefore, the 
apparently different attitudes towards inequality in this study compared to the one 
reported in Chapter 5.1 must be due to something other than the different samples 
used. Since it is now widely recognised that the way in which a question is framed 
can have a significant effect on responses (and this has been shown elsewhere in 
this thesis), the differences may lie in the nature of the tasks respondents are asked 
to do in each case. Specifically, the rather different attitudes uncovered here may 
be due to the fact that reference point effects, first introduced in Chapter 2.1, were 
playing a significant role. Although reference points were originally developed to 
describe individual decision-making, there is no reason in principle why it should 
not be used to describe an individual's preferences when they are asked to place 
themselves in the position of a social decision-maker. 
Of course, the questions in this study do not involve any actual losses; X and Y 
each receive a gain in health status from their initial position (point A in Figure 
5.2.1) and this was stated explicitly in the instructions to all respondents. 
However, it seems plausible that certain respondents may have adopted the 
potential gains available under the current allocation of resources (point B in 
Figure 5.2.1) as their reference point, in which case any redistribution necessarily 
involves a 'loss' to individual Y. Indeed, when respondents were later presented 
with, and invited to discuss, the results that they had collectively generated, it 
became apparent that for many loss aversion had played a significant role in their 
responses. 
In the analysis above it was assumed that Y's potential losses were weighted 
equally to X's potential gains and the inequality neutral position was taken to be 
that point at which the equally distributed gain, x, was equivalent to the mean gain, 
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M. Consider QA 1 as an example. This question sought to elicit from respondents 
that value for x which would set U( 24,96) equal to U(x, x), where 24 and 96 are 
the potential gains available to X and Y respectively under the current allocation 
of resources. If the loss (of potential gain) to Y is weighted equally to the gain (of 
potential gain) to X then U(96-x) = U(x-24), and an inequality neutral respondent 
would set x equal to 60. Therefore, U (24,96) =U (60,60) for such a respondent. 
However, when losses are weighted more heavily than gains, an inequality neutral 
respondent would set x above M. Suppose, for example, that Y's losses were 
weighted twice as heavily as X's gains (dealing with wealth, Kahneman and 
Tversky [ 1979] suggest a loss-to-gains slope ratio of 2: 1 whilst Fishburn and 
Kochenberger [ 1979] estimated the relationship empirically and found it to be 
closer to 5: 1). In this case, 2U(96-x) = U(x-24) and x must now take on a value 
of 72. Thus, U(24,96) = U(72,72) for an inequality neutral respondent. The 
inequality neutral level of x has shifted up from a point halfway between the initial 
distribution of gains to X and Y to a point two-thirds of the way between the two. 
This holds for each of the questions in section A and for all other situations in 
which losses are weighted twice as heavily as gains. 
Moving the inequality neutral level of x up in this manner results in a positive 
(mean and median) Atkinson Index for all questions in Section A and in more 
respondents appearing to be inequality averse (I > 0) and fewer being inequality 
seeking (I < 0). Tables 5.2.5 and 5.2.6 are the analogue of Tables 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 
when losses (of potential gain) are assumed to be weighted twice as heavily as 
gains (of potential gain). Whilst this is purely illustrative, it does highlight that the 
failure to take account of aversion to losses will necessarily underestimate the 
extent of any aversion to inequality. 
This analysis assumes the loss-to-gains slope ratio to be constant over the entire 
valuation space. In other words, the extent to which losses are weighted more 
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heavily than gains is considered to be the same at the top end of the scale as at the 
bottom. However, it is conceivable that the magnitude of this ratio may depend 
upon where in the valuation space the losses and gains occur. This offers an 
alternative explanation of the finding that there is a greater aversion to inequality 
when the individuals concerned end up in health states that have values closer to 
full health than to dead. In fact, the same pattern of responses would be generated 
by a respondents whose aversion to inequality remains constant over the entire 
scale but who weights losses and gains more equally at the top end than at the 
bottom. When designing this study, we were was insufficiently alert to the 
potentially important role that a reference point effect might play in generating the 
results. Therefore, it is impossible from responses to this questionnaire to 
disentangle the effect of inequality aversion and the contradictory effect (in terms 
of its impact on responses) of loss aversion. 
The question that arises is whether or not it is appropriate to incorporate loss 
aversion (resulting from a reference point effect) into the HRSWF. It could be 
argued that loss aversion (even aversion to potential losses) is a legitimate factor 
which ought to be incorporated into a SWF since any real re-allocation of 
resources in order to promote equity will of course deny some potential health 
gain to the group or groups who stand to do better under the current allocation. 
There is no obvious reason why one and not the other of these two factors ought 
to be incorporated into a SWF. 
However, any aversion to potential losses at the societal level will at the margin 
result in a pressure to maintain the status quo, presumably no matter how 
inequitable this status quo is. Therefore, loss aversion (which, in this case, works 
in precisely the opposite direction to inequality aversion) is likely to perpetuate 
any current or past (mis)allocation of resources. It is questionable whether we 
would want to take account of such a tendency. Moreover, it can be easily shown 
that having differential weights for potential gains and losses can result in 
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intransitive SWFs. It might be argued, therefore, that questions designed to 
formulate the SWF should control out the possible effects of a status quo bias. 
This might be achieved through presenting respondents with a series of pairwise 
choices (one where health is equally distributed, the other where it is not) and 
asking them to choose between the two outcomes without specifying which one is 
currently available. This author hopes to address these issues in future work. 
CHAPTER 5.3: USING THE PERSON TRADE-OFF APPROACH 
Introduction 
Chapters 5.1 and 5.2 have discussed how equity might be taken account of in resource 
allocation decisions, but only after an efficient allocation has been determined. In other 
words, valuations for health states, aggregated according to the mean or median 
response, are used to determine the maximum amount of benefit (defined in terms of 
QALYs) that can be accorded given a fixed budget. If social preferences over different 
allocations of the health care budget can be represented by a lexicographic ordering in 
which health gain is the dominant argument in the HRSWF, then we need proceed no 
further. Given that distributional considerations, for example, are also likely to matter, 
the previous two chapters develop a framework in the simple QALY-maximisation 
approach can be adapted to take account of such considerations. 
An alternative approach is proposed by Nord [ 1995] who argues that "weights for life 
years in the QALY procedure should not be derived by asking individuals to value 
health states for themselves.. [but] .. should ultimately reflect responses to person 
trade-off questions asked in a resource allocation context" (p202). The person trade- 
off (PTO) approach involves asking respondents how many outcomes of one kind they 
consider equivalent in terms of social value to X outcomes of another kind. The 
method was originally developed by Patrick et at [ 1973] who called it the `equivalence 
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of numbers' procedure but Nord's terminology is used in this chapter. It is Nord's 
contention that PTO responses capture concerns that are relevant to social decision- 
making, most notably considerations about the initial severity of illness (see Nord 
[1994]). 
This chapter reports on a pilot study which was designed to assess whether two 
treatments that yield the same benefit to the individual are also considered, by that 
individual, to yield the same benefit to society (as measured by responses to PTO 
questions). This is a unique approach because it is the first time that the two options in 
a PTO question have been chosen only after it has first been established that they yield 
the same benefit to the individual respondent. Hitherto, studies have used health states 
descriptions to generate PTO scenarios that are assumed to yield the same benefit for 
each successive move between levels of severity (for example, see Nord [1993]). 
The null hypothesis in this chapter is that two treatments that have the same individual 
utility will also have the same social value. That is, the respondent will only be 
indifferent between the two treatments when the numbers receiving each treatment are 
identical. The alternative hypothesis is that, of two treatments with equal individual 
utility, the treatment with the greatest initial severity of illness will yield the greatest 
social value. That is, the respondent will be indifferent between the two treatments 
when fewer people receive the treatment with the greatest initial severity. This 
hypothesis is developed from results obtained by Nord [ 1993] which suggest that (for 
a Norwegian population) pre-treatment severity is a more important explanatory 
variable in PTO responses than treatment effect. 
Study design 
Respondents were presented with 15 cards, representing 14 EuroQol states (chosen to 
give a spread in terms of severity) plus 'Immediate Death' and were told that each state 
(except Immediate Death) would last for 10 years without any change after which they 
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would die. They were asked to sort and rank the cards so that the one they thought 
best was at the top and the one they thought worst was at the bottom, and to place any 
they felt were the same alongside each other. 
Respondents were then asked to imagine that they were in state 22323 and that a 
treatment (referred to as Ti) was available which would move them to state 12223, 
thus offering improved mobility and improved ability to perform usual activities. They 
were then asked to imagine instead that they were in state 22222 and another 
treatment (referred to as T2) was available which would move them to a state which 
they had ranked above 22222. These states were chosen for the two treatments so as 
they were a priori plausible treatment possibilities. The aim of what followed was to 
identify the state that when moved to from 22222 yields the same benefit as the move 
in Ti from 22323 to 12223. Initially T2 was defined as the move from 22222 to the 
state ranked 4th by the respondent. If they found this equally as good as T 1, this card 
was taken as the 'interval' state. If T2 was found to be better (worse) than Ti, an 
iterative process was conducted using lower (higher) ranked cards until an interval 
state was identified. Where the respondent was unable to identify an interval state two 
states were identified: one referred to as BIS (a `better than' interval state), which 
when moved to from 22222 was considered to yield more benefit than T 1; and one 
referred to as WIS (a `worse than' interval state), which when moved to from 22222 
was considered to yield less benefit than T 1. 
Respondents then rated 8 states on a VAS with endpoints of 100 (best imaginable 
state) and 0 (worst imaginable state) and then valued 5 states using TTO method 
which asked them to compare 10 years in each of the states with shorter periods of 
time in full health. Neither the protocol for these methods nor the results from them 
are reported in detail here because the focus of the chapter is to compare the results 
from the comparison of treatments with those from the PTO, which followed the VAS 
and TTO tasks. 
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A specially designed board was used to present the PTO task (see appendix). 
Respondents were asked to imagine that there were 10 people who would spend 10 
years in state 22323 (the initial state for T 1), after which they would die, and that there 
were another 10 people who would spend 10 years in state 22222 (the initial state for 
T2), after which they would die. They were asked to imagine that the two groups 
were the same in every way they conside red relevant. Respondents were then 
presented with two possible treatments. Treatment 1 would move the 10 people in 
state 22323 to state 12223 for 10 years after which they would die. Treatment 2 
would move the 10 people in state 22222 to the interval state for 10 years after which 
they would die. In the absence of an interval state the WIS was used wherever 
possible but where this was not possible (for example, in those cases where no WIS 
was identified) BIS was used. 
Respondents were told that only one of the treatments could be provided and were 
asked if they would choose treatment 1, treatment 2 or whether they would not mind 
which one was chosen. If the respondent chose treatment 1, further questions were 
asked in which the number who would benefit from treatment 2 remained unchanged 
but the number who would benefit from treatment 1 was changed; initially to 5 and 
then, by an iterative process using smaller or greater numbers of people, until a point of 
indifference with treatment 2 was reached. Similarly, if the respondent chose treatment 
2, the number who would benefit from treatment 1 remained unchanged but the 
number who would benefit from treatment 2 was changed until a point of indifference 
with treatment 1 was reached. All respondents were asked to articulate why they 
made the choices they did. Specifically, they were asked "Could you please tell me 
why you made this choice? ". At the end of the interview socio-economic data were 
collected. 
Interviews were conducted over a two-week period in late July/early August 1995. 
The sample was a convenience sample drawn from secretarial, administrative and 
academic staff of various departments at The University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne. 
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Each respondent was paid £10 for participating. All interviews, with the consent of the 
respondents, were tape-recorded. 
Results 
Descriptive analysis 
In total, 28 interviews were conducted. Table 5.3.1 shows the background 
characteristics of the respondents. As expected, the sample were more qualified and 
younger than a representative sample of the general public would have been. Table 
5.3.2 details the states used in the study together with their mean rank. The ranking 
given by each respondent was analysed for any inconsistency, defined as the case 
where, in a comparison of two states, the state which is logically better on at least one 
dimension and no worse on the other dimensions is ranked below the other. The 
ranking data were highly consistent with 16 people having no inconsistencies at all and 
a further 8 having only one. Those inconsistencies that did exist appeared to be 
unrelated to a particular state, although as expected most occurred between the 
comparison of two states that were close together in the logical structure. 
Table 5.3.3 shows the state that was identified as the interval state (or BIS and/or 
WIS) for each respondent. The most frequently chosen states are 21222, which is 
chosen as the interval state 4 times and as BIS 6 times, and 11122, which is chosen as 
the interval state 4 times and as BIS or WIS 3 times. Given that each respondent's 
ranking of the health states was central to the identification of an interval state, the 
ranking data was checked for any obvious patterns of response. For example, it was 
checked whether one particular ranking was chosen most frequently as the interval 
state and whether the difference in rankings between the two states in T1 influenced 
the choice of the interval state in T2. No obvious patterns were apparent from this 
analysis. 
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Comparing individual preferences with PTO responses 
In the comparison of treatments exercise, each respondent identified two treatments 
(T 1 and T2) that for them yielded the same benefit. Therefore, if an individual feels the 
same about the treatment of other people as they do about their own treatment, then 
their PTO response should be that they are indifferent between 10 people receiving Ti 
and 10 people receiving T2. In this case, the ratio of the number of people receiving 
T2 that is considered equivalent to the number of people receiving T1 would be 1. A 
ratio >I implies that, in the treatment of other people, the respondent prefers TI to T2, 
whilst a ratio <1 implies that the respondent prefers T2 to T 1. 
The PTO responses and resulting ratios for each respondent are shown in Table 5.3.4. 
It can be seen that only 3 respondents consider that 10 people receiving T1 yields the 
same social value as 10 people receiving T2. Of the remaining 24 respondents who 
answered the PTO question (the one non-response is discussed below), 7 prefer Ti to 
T2 whilst 17 prefer T2 to T 1. The proportion preferring T2 is statistically significantly 
different from the proportion preferring Ti (p<0.01). In aggregate, the preference for 
T2 is reflected by a geometric mean of 0.7 which suggests that, on average, 10 people 
receiving T1 yields the same social value as 7 people receiving T2. 
The analysis of whether PTO responses are affected by the background characteristics 
of the respondent is clearly limited by the relatively small number of respondents in the 
study. However, preferences over Ti and T2 do not appear to be systematically 
related to the age or sex of the respondent, nor, importantly, do they appear to be 
related to the choice of the interval state. 
Qualitative responses from the PTO exercise 
Table 5.3.5 gives an interpretation of the comments made by respondents in the PTO 
task. Of the 7 respondents who preferred Ti, 5 commented on the fact that they 
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would prefer to help those who were worse-off; for example, No. 24 said "The group 
which needs treatment 1 is the group suffering the most". The other 2 respondents 
who preferred T1 stated that they felt T1 gave a greater improvement in health. Of the 
17 respondents who preferred T2,12 commented that Ti did not offer a great deal of 
benefit to those receiving it; for example, No. 15 commented "I'm thinking about 
quality of life.. I would say that treatment 2 was a definite improvement.. in 
treatment 1 the difference isn't so great". 
In thinking about their PTO response, 3 respondents (all of whom preferred T2) 
mentioned that they were considering the implications of their choice for society as a 
whole (for example, the costs of keeping people in a particular health state). When 
faced with a decision involving an unequal number of people being treated, 16 (out of 
24) respondents referred to the numbers of people involved, with 8 seemingly using the 
numbers involved as a decision variable. It can be seen from Table 5.3.5 that there was 
one non-response to the PTO question (No. 13). This respondent refused to take part 
in the exercise on the grounds that decisions about which patients should be given 
priority was one that the public should not be asked to make. Instead, those with more 
knowledge and experience in making such decisions should decide. 
Discussion 
One of the main aims of this study was to test whether two treatments that are 
considered equivalent by an individual are also considered equivalent when the same 
individual has to make choices about the treatment of other people. If respondents' 
preferences change when they are asked to imagine themselves in the role of social, 
rather than individual, decision-maker, then, it is questionable whether social 
preferences can be accurately represented by the unweighted summation of individual 
utilities. 
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When asked to compare two treatments using the PTO method, which Nord 
recommends as one way of measuring social value, all except 3 respondents strictly 
prefer one treatment to the other, despite the fact that the two treatments generate the 
same utility (according to the comparison of treatments exercise) for respondents 
themselves. This suggests that social choices are indeed considered differently to 
individual ones. Thus, the null hypothesis that two treatments that have the same 
individual utility will also have the same social value is rejected by the results from this 
study. This indicates that unadjusted individual utilities cannot be used to represent 
social values. 
However, the data does not appear to support the alternative hypothesis either; that the 
treatment with the greatest initial severity of illness will yield the greatest social value. 
Table 5.3.4 shows that more than twice as many respondents prefer T2 to Ti than 
prefer Ti to T2. Since T2 involves the move between two states that might be 
regarded as higher up the utility scale and T1 is the treatment with the greatest initial 
severity, these results do not suggest that people are more concerned about doing 
something for those in severe states than they are about doing the same (in terms of 
health gain) for those in less severe states. Clearly, initial severity does matter to some 
respondents (for example, 5 of the 7 who chose Ti mentioned this as an important 
consideration) but the results presented here suggest that, for the majority of 
respondents, it is better to give a benefit of the same magnitude to someone who is in a 
better health state to start off with. 
This discussion has been premised on the notion that indifference between the two 
treatments, established very early in the interview, is maintained throughout. 
However, it is possible, as respondents proceed through the interview and become 
more familiar with the health states, that their preferences may become more refined. 
Thus, a comparison between the comparison of treatments stage near the beginning of 
the interview and PTO responses near the end of the interview is not unproblematic. 
Indeed, the process by which an interval state is selected remains a crucial 
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consideration for any future study which attempts to address the issues raised in this 
chapter. In this study, the interval state was determined before valuations were elicited 
so that respondent burden in subsequent valuation tasks could be minimised. Selecting 
the interval state after valuations had been elicited might have reduced the likelihood 
that a 'wrong' choice was made through inexperience but might also have increased the 
likelihood that a 'wrong' choice was made through fatigue since many more valuations 
would need to be elicited. 
That 14 respondents (2 who preferred Ti and 12 who preferred T2) indicated that 
their choice was based on the fact that one treatment yielded more (or less) benefit 
than the other, might indicate that preferences changed as the interview progressed. 
Whilst this possibility cannot be discounted, it is expected that 'preference refinement' 
of this kind would result in T1 being preferred to T2 roughly as often as T2 is 
preferred to T 1, which is clearly not the case. Thus, it is puzzling why so many more 
respondents should explicitly state (in the PTO exercise) that T1 does not confer as 
much benefit as T2 rather than vice versa, particularly as the move in T2 for 8 of these 
12 respondents is to a state (21222 or 22112) that might be considered to be very 
close to the initial state (22222). 
If perceptions of T1 relative to T2 change as respondents progress through the 
interview because their own individual preferences over T1 and T2 change, it is 
difficult to make inferences about the acceptability of either the null hypothesis or the 
alternative hypothesis since both require that the benefits from T1 and T2 are 
considered to be equivalent. However, if perceptions of T1 relative to T2 change 
because the context of the choice that the respondent faces changes (i. e. they are 
initially faced with a choice about their own treatment and then with a choice about the 
treatment of other people), then the null hypothesis can de facto be rejected but the 
alternative hypothesis cannot. 
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Whilst, then, the alternative hypothesis cannot be rejected given the results from the 
qualitative data, these data do give some more general indications about the degree to 
which subjects emphasise benefit of treatment relative to initial severity of illness. 
Moreover, T1 does confer some benefit on those receiving it (they can move from 
22323 to 12223). Therefore, it would appear that more respondents in this study 
focused on the benefits from the two treatments (whether they were considered to 
yield the same benefit or not) than on the severity of the pre-treatment health state, 
which all respondents considered to be worse in Ti than in T2. 
That T2 was preferred by more respondents than T1 in the PTO exercise might 
suggest that the health state that people are in after treatment is also an important 
consideration. Even after a beneficial treatment, people who receive Ti are still left in 
a relatively severe health state; they are still extremely anxious or depressed, for 
example. It may be that unless somebody in a severe state can benefit more 
substantially from treatment, respondents would rather give a benefit of a similar 
magnitude to someone who is in a less severe pre-treatment state. It is difficult to tell 
from the qualitative data the extent to which such considerations were taken into 
account by respondents but it is another way (in addition to considerations about 
health gain) in which comments to the effect of "Ti doesn't do much good" could be 
interpreted. 
If considerations of this kind are important, then the relationship between health gain 
and severity may be a rather more complex one than hitherto suggested. For example, 
consider the (highly-stylised) scenario where a given health gain can only be afforded 
to one of three patients, x, y or z, such that h,, >hy>h, where h; is the initial health state 
of patient i. Rather than being indifferent about who should receive treatment (as 
would be the case if maximising health gain were the sole objective) and rather than 
having a preference ordering such that z >- y >- x where ` >- ' indicates `preferred to' (as 
would be the case if those with a greater initial severity were given priority), it might be 
that social preferences would imply an ordering such that y>- z>- x. In other words, 
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there might be a non-monotonic relationship between efficiency and equity in the 
HRSWF. Results rather similar to this were reported in the previous chapter, 
where it was noted that there was apparently greater aversion to inequality when 
both individuals end up in health states that have values closer to full health than to 
dead. The possibility, then, that equity might be considered a "luxury" good 
appears to be a strong one. 
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CHAPTER 6: AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Introduction 
In this chapter, three important themes which have emerged from this thesis will be 
discussed in the context of how they may provide a general strategy for future research 
into the measurement and valuation of health. Specific suggestions for future research, 
relating to particular topic areas, can be found in the discussion sections of the preceding 
chapters. 
The nature of individual preferences 
Since the majority of this thesis has been centred around a number of empirical studies 
which have attempted in various ways to elicit individual preferences, it is worth 
considering the nature of these preferences. The received wisdom amongst economists is 
that individuals have clear, well-defined preference functions which can be 'tapped into' by 
appropriate questions. This viewpoint is referred to by Fischhoff [ 1991 ] as the philosophy 
of articulated values and is summed up by the notion that "if we've got questions, then 
they've got answers" (p835). An implication of this viewpoint is that if a particular 
respondent gives different answers to two questions, then implicitly the questions must 
have been different. Proponents of this paradigm focus on ensuring that questions are 
formulated and understood as intended, arguing that any 'slip' could invoke a precise, 
thoughtful answer to a "wrong" question. 
However, this paradigm has been called into question by many studies which have shown 
that seemingly subtle changes in problem structure, question format, or other aspects of 
the assessment process, can sometimes dramatically change the stated preferences of 
respondents (for good examples of this, see Kahneman and Tversky [ 1981 ] and Fischhoff 
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and Furby [ 1988]). This thesis contains a number of examples of possible frarning effects 
of this kind. Perhaps the most obvious can be found in the study reported in Chapter 2 
where, contrary to expectations, greater discrepancies in valuations were found across 
different variants of the SG and TTO rather than between the methods themselves. And 
the results of the study reported in Chapter 4.2 suggested that the way in which the TTO 
questions were framed resulted in one month in a particular dysfunctional state appearing 
as worse than ten years in that same state. 
Such findings can be accounted for by an alternative paradigm - referred to by Fischhoff 
[ 1991 ] as the philosophy of basic values - which asserts that people cannot be expected to 
have articulated opinions on more than a small set of issues (of which health is unlikely to 
be one) with which they are very familiar. In complex or unfamiliar decision problems, 
Slovic [ 1995] argues that "preferences are not simply read off some master list but are 
constructed on the spot by an adaptive decision maker" (p369). Thus, if responses are 
affected by superficial changes in question formulation, then respondents must not have 
'true' underlying preferences; rather, the elicitation procedures are major forces in shaping 
stated preferences. But arguably there are examples in this thesis where this paradigm is 
also questionable. For example, in the study reported in Chapter 2, valuations appeared to 
be unaffected by the order of presentation of the tasks and throughout the thesis there is 
evidence that the ordinal rankings of health states are robust to changes in value elicitation 
procedure. 
A philosophy of partial perspectives lies somewhere between the extremes of articulated 
and basic values. This viewpoint holds that, whilst preferences, particularly regarding 
health, do not come as fully fledged and instantly accessible as economists typically believe 
(or at least believed), people in very general terms do have what Fischhoff refers to as 
"stable values of moderate complexity" (p836). Such a viewpoint would suggest that 
elicitation procedures can help to shape preferences but also that, after deliberation and 
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reflection, respondents are able to give answers to questions that enable us to infer 
something about their `true' preferences. 
The prevailing philosophical framework upon which the studies reported in this thesis have 
been based is this partial perspective. As with the philosophy of articulated values, it is 
crucial when adopting a partial perspective that respondents interpret questions in the way 
that they are intended to be interpreted and that the context of the question is plausible to 
respondents. In addition, respondents must be given time and opportunity to think about 
what is being asked of them. The sections in Chapters 2.1 and 3.1 which described the 
designs of the pilot and main studies, respectively, provide only a snapshot of the 
considerable time, effort and resources that went into formulating questions that were 
likely to be considered meaningful by respondents yet also isolated from factors (such as 
financial considerations) that were considered irrelevant and extraneous. 
In the context of the Main Study, an important objective was that respondents should 
become as familiar as possible with the EuroQol health states before being asked to value 
them using the TTO (subject to the constraint that each interview should not last more 
than about one hour). This familiarisation was crucial since respondents were unlikely to 
have previously thought about health in the way they were being asked to in the interview. 
For these reasons, all respondents were presented with ranking and rating tasks, which in 
many cases took over half of the time for the whole interview, before TTO valuations 
were elicited. All the indications from the quantitative data (for example, in terms of 
logical consistency in the TTO responses) and from interviewer feedback were that 
respondents benefited from these 'warm-up' tasks. 
Of course, the spectrum that the philosophy of partial perspectives covers is wide given 
the difference between the philosophies of articulated and basic values. The paradigm 
adopted in the work of the MVH Group was possibly closer on the continuum to the 
philosophy of articulated values than to the philosophy of basic values.. For example, in 
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the studies reported in Chapters 2-4, respondents were engaged in one (one-hour) 
interview during which time they were required to assimilate all the information provided 
to them and asked to give valuations to a number of health states, in many cases using a 
number of different valuation methods. Whilst the studies using convenience samples that 
were reported in Chapter 5 were principally aimed at testing the feasibility of different 
approaches to measuring social preferences, they too were essentially of the same format 
i. e. some introductory information and `warm-up' exercises followed immediately by value 
elicitation procedures. But as Loomes [ 1994] suggests "many respondents cannot attach 
values to the quality of life entailed by states of health unfamiliar to them". 
So perhaps future studies should begin by adopting a partial perspective that is closer to 
the philosophy of basic rather than articulated values, on the basis that people's 
preferences over states of health and illness are not very well developed but could be better 
constructed if they were provided with even greater opportunity to consider their 
responses. This might involve presenting respondents with a summary of all of their 
responses at the end of an interview and allowing them to revise any of their answers in the 
light of this `overview', or even confronting them with any apparent inconsistencies and 
again giving them the opportunity to revise their responses. It might also be that 
respondents are better able to articulate something approximating a `true' preference if 
they are given much more time for the deliberation and reflection alluded to above. This 
could involve more than one interview, possibly including a pre-interview focus group 
meeting in which respondents discuss issues relating to health and illness and a post- 
interview feedback meeting in which they review their responses. 
Whatever their precise protocols, such studies would, of course, be much more resource 
intensive per respondent than the Main Study was but perhaps we have now reached the 
stage where more in-depth studies are necessary. Before the Main Study, most health 
status measurement studies had been conducted with small convenience samples of 
respondents; about half of the studies using the VAS, SG or TTO have used less than 100 
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subjects, typically patients or students (see Froberg and Kane [ 1989]). This led many to 
question their generalisability, particularly economists brought up in a tradition of 
quantitative data (and, of course, a philosophy of articulated values). Therefore, the Main 
Study, with a representative sample of nearly 3500 members of the UK population, was a 
necessary response to this. Now that such a large-scale study has been conducted, we 
might be more willing to trade-off quantitative data for the more detailed qualitative data 
that intensive questioning would generate. 
This qualitative data should provide insights into the cognitive processes that respondents 
use in order to arrive at their responses, thus enabling researchers to get a better 
understanding of why valuations differ in addition to how they differ. Many of the 
empirical chapters in this thesis have been written in a way typical of an economist; namely 
to postulate a null hypothesis, to then collect quantitative data that tests the hypothesis, 
and finally to engage in considerable 'post-hoc' theorising when the results, as invariably 
happens, do not conform with the null hypothesis. Rather than 'second guessing' 
respondents, the collection of qualitative data "straight from the horse's mouth" appears a 
more appropriate strategy in this context. Such data might then help us get a clearer 
picture of why valuations appear to be as much a function of the way in which a method is 
administered as they are of the method itself, why some respondents are unwilling to 
trade-off any time in order to avoid poor states of health, why valuations differ according 
to the background characteristics of the respondent, and so on. 
In addition, it is now widely recognised that the specific context of a particular choice can 
have an significant effect on a respondent's stated preference. For example, in Chapters 
2.1 and 5.2, particular patterns of responses have been explained in terms of perceived 
reference points. Of course, such an effect has no place in standard economic theory 
which is built around an EU framework. The only considerations that yield utility in such a 
framework are the outcomes resulting from the particular choice, thus ruling out any utility 
associated with the process of that choice. However, a number of alternatives to EU have 
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been proposed by economists which allow for the context of the choice to play a role in 
determining the overall level of utility. Qualitative data can help shed light on which 
choice contexts are, at a descriptive level, considered relevant and which are not. And, as 
noted by Froberg and Kane [ 1989], "to predict new context effects we need to better 
understand the psychological processes inherent in decision making". 
A more 'in-depth' approach to preference elicitation should also enhance our understanding 
of the extent to which observed disparities (for example, between different population sub- 
groups or between different ways questions have been framed) are "real" or "artefactual". 
For example, the results from the Main Study suggest that TTO valuations are primarily 
affected by the age and sex of the respondent (see Chapter 3.1). In an attempt to gain a 
better understanding of the causes for such differences, a more qualitative follow-up study 
was conducted in which 45 respondents who had taken part in the Main Study were re- 
interviewed using a protocol similar to that used in the Main Study but with fewer health 
states (see Robinson et al [ 1996]). Respondents were asked to 'think aloud' as they 
completed the interview, and to explain why they made certain decisions during the TTO 
exercise; for example, why they decided that a particular health state was better or worse 
than dead and, if applicable, why they were unwilling to sacrifice any life expectancy to 
avoid a particular state. 
No compelling explanation was forthcoming as to why female respondents assign lower 
valuations than do male respondents, suggesting that differences in valuations according to 
gender are "real" differences. However, it emerged that older respondents were less likely 
than younger respondents to find the worse than dead scenario plausible. Whilst none of 
the fifteen respondent in the 18-39 age group questioned whether they would return to full 
health after a number of years in poor health, seven of the fourteen respondents in the 60 
or over age group said they thought this was impossible. These seven respondents gave 
lower valuations for the states rated as worse than dead than the other seven respondents 
in their age group did, Thus, there is some evidence that the lower values elicited from 
175 
older respondents might be attributable to this particular artefact. Without this qualitative 
follow-up study, this possibility would not have been brought to our attention. 
Although the collection of qualitative data was not a primary objective of the study 
designed to elicit attitudes towards inequality using the Atkinson method, when 
respondents were invited to discuss the results that they had collectively generated, it 
became apparent that for many loss aversion had played a significant role in their 
responses (see Chapter 5.2). Although we may well have posited this as an 
explanation for the surprising lack of inequality aversion amongst respondents, to 
have the conjecture supported by evidence obviously enhances its credibility. In the 
study using the person trade-off method, respondents were encouraged to `think aloud' 
(see Chapter 5.3). Although the results were by no means conclusive, the qualitative data 
did give some general indications about the degree to which subjects emphasised benefit of 
treatment relative to initial severity of illness. Thus, although neither study involved the 
degree of intensive interviewing described above, useful additional data was generated. 
The emphasis in this discussion that has been placed on "getting behind the numbers" does 
not conform to the standard welfare economics framework in which preferences are 
relegated to the status of a (given) 'black-box'. But then economics is not the only 
discipline that contributes to the study of preference elicitation, be it in health or elsewhere. 
For a great many years, psychologists, sociologists and philosophers have also contributed 
greatly to the area. In the context of preference elicitation, this author is inclined to agree 
with Etzioni [ 1986] who argues that the complaint that preferences are not the economist's 
concern is "but one reason for a paradigm change, to combine economics with psychology 
and sociology, to develop a socioeconomics". And, as Fischhoff [1991] points out, 
understanding the source of one's own and other disciplinary prejudices is essential both 
for paradigms to evolve and for this multi-disciplinary collaboration to work. 
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The measurement of social welfare 
The Main Study reported on in Chapter 3 was principally designed to allow a social tariff 
(or tariffs) of values for all 245 EuroQol health states to be generated, which can then be 
used to inform policy decisions. The methodology adopted to do this was in line with 
standard economic practice: that is, to represent the views of a given group, we first elicit 
the preferences of the individual members of that group and then we aggregate them. The 
first issue has been addressed by eliciting TTO-based valuations from a representative 
sample of the UK population. Questions can be (and of course have been) raised about 
the extent to which the TTO (or, indeed, any of the other methods) yields valid 
representations of individual preferences, but in principle the method provides answers to 
the questions that standard economic theory requires to be asked. 
On the issue of aggregation, many economists would argue that it is important to take 
account of the strength of preference of each individual and thus advocate aggregating 
individual valuations by taking the mean. However, in the realm of public policy, others 
have suggested that we should take the preferences of the 'median voter' as our 
'representative' value. Therefore, from the same set of TTO valuations, it has been 
necessary to generate both a means-based tariff (see Chapter 3.2) and a medians-based 
tariff (see Chapter 3.4). The important point is that, whichever measure of central 
tendency is adopted, the starting point is the same; namely, individual valuations. 
Since the implications for health care priorities may depend on how individual preferences 
are aggregated, we may not be able to make an unambiguous choice between different 
policy options (see Chapter 3.4 for an example). However, given that the aggregated 
health state utilities are, for the purposes of public policy, interpreted as measures of social 
value, then the appropriateness of the different measures of central tendency can be tested 
by asking respondents whether they agree with the implied priorities for health care that 
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result from their use. This is referred to by Rawls [ 1971 ] as a test of reflective equilibrium. 
That some people may disagree with the policy implications that result when individual 
utilities are aggregated is not surprising. After all, no-one is suggesting that the mean or 
median view is an accurate representation of the preferences of each and every individual 
member of the group from whom individual valuations were elicited. Thus, there are likely 
to be people within the group who also disagree with the resultant policy implications. 
But each individual counts for only one. Therefore, since an individual may disagree with 
the implications of mean or median values simply because their own individual valuations 
differ from the mean or median ones, the issue is whether the implications of the use of 
mean or median values are agreed with by the `mean' or `median' person. 
Nord [ 1995] suggests that this issue should be addressed by presenting respondents with a 
series of PTO questions (as described in Chapter 5.3) and then looking at whether either of 
the TTO-based tariffs provides a good approximation of the values implied from the PTO 
responses. However, this is predicated on the assumption that, in determining the social 
value attached to different states of health, the PTO represents the "gold standard" by 
which other methods are to be judged. But the interpretation of PTO responses is 
problematic. This is because such responses will contain the relative weights a respondent 
attaches to a number of different attributes. These include the severity of the pre- 
intervention health state, the severity of the post-intervention health state, the health gain 
as a result of intervening, and the number of persons treated. Some respondents might 
also think about the resource implications of people being in particular health states (as 
indeed some did in the study reported in Chapter 5.2), even if they are explicitly told not 
to. 
Therefore, it is virtually impossible to disentangle the relative weights attached to each of 
these considerations and hence it is difficult to generalise from results generated by the 
PTO method. Whilst all the attributes are likely to be important, different weights attached 
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to each may have quite different implications for the nature of the trade-off (if any) 
between efficiency and equity and thus for resource allocation decisions. In addition, the 
fact that respondents are asked to weigh up a number of quite diverse things when 
thinking about their answers to PTO questions, increases the likelihood of cognitive 
overload and thus may reduce the validity of responses. There is no doubt that future 
research is needed to address these issues and the study reported in Chapter 5.3 shows one 
way in which such research might proceed. Certainly much more work is needed before 
we are in a position (if ever one could be reached) to argue, as Nord does, that preferences 
over the treatment of other people should be used as the "gold standard" by which to 
judge the aggregation of individual preferences. 
Moreover, those who advocate the PTO do so on the grounds that it includes factors 
relevant to social decision-making (for example, attitudes towards inequality) which 
measures of individual utility, like the TTO, ignore. But it has already been shown that 
taking account of equity and distributive considerations is not inconsistent with the 
measurement of individual utility (see Chapter 5.1). This, together with the uncertainty 
about what valuations elicited by the PTO are based upon (unlike those by the TTO which 
are based on the elicitation of individual preferences), suggests that future research effort 
should also be directed towards estimating the shape of the health-related social welfare 
function. 
This approach, unlike the PTO methodology, allows us to address two key issues: 1) how 
individuals value one health state compared with another, and 2) how society values those 
same health states. It is important that these two questions are kept separate since each 
may need to be answered in a different way in different contexts. For example, in 
conducting a clinical trial we may want to concentrate only on the first issue whilst when 
comparing the results of different clinical trials, we will have to compare "health gains" 
from one activity with those from another. It is at this second stage level that we may wish 
to import notions of distributive justice, but we may not wish to use the same rules in all 
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situations. Keeping efficiency and equity arguments separate should enable us to look 
explicitly the types of equity that are considered important in different contexts and at the 
extent (if any) of the trade-offs between efficiency and equity that result. 
The framework developed in Chapter 5.1 should also enable us to consider the extent to 
which the value attached to a health benefit depends on who is to receive it. The general 
assumption is that it is the nature of the change in the recipient's HRQoL that is the focus 
of interest, not who the recipient is. As well as being convenient for research purposes, 
this assumption has a strong ethical justification. However, as has been shown in previous 
research as well as in the results from Chapter 5.2, many people think that priority should 
be given to the young over the old and to people who have cared for their own health over 
those who have not (see Williams [ 1988]). Whether policy-makers would ultimately wish 
to take such considerations into account is not discussed here, but the framework is in 
place should they wish to do so. 
An important issue relates to the way in which we measure attitudes towards equity. In 
the studies reported in Chapter 5, respondents were asked to make choices about the 
treatment of other people. They were effectively asked to imagine themselves in the role 
of a social decision maker who was personally unaffected by the choices they made. This 
is also the way in which PTO questions have typically been framed. The processes by 
which respondents arrive (or should arrive) at an answer might be unclear; for example, do 
(or should) they base their responses on what they think other members of society would 
prefer or do (or should) they really play the role of a social decision-maker, in which case 
their answers might be 'contaminated' by the 'political baggage' that real-world policy 
making comes with (e. g. considerations about the likelihood of public or media outcry 
about one decision compared with another)?. But the outcomes are clear; the source of 
value for making these judgements about equity is detached from an individuals vested 
interests - in the words of Culyer [ 1980] it is extrinsic to preferences. 
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There is, however, an alternative approach which requires respondents to think about the 
impact that their resource allocation choices will have on their own well-being. For 
example, respondents could be asked to base their answers on what they themselves would 
prefer were they to face the (known or unknown) probability of being the individuals they 
are asked to choose between (or in the groups they are asked to choose between in the 
case of the PTO). In other words, respondents would be required to make their choices as 
if behind a veil of ignorance' which insures that these choices are impartial in certain ways 
(see Rawls [ 19711). This approach means that factors intrinsic to the individual, such as 
their attitude towards risk. will be important parameters that influence responses. The 
approach has recently be used by Johannesson and Gerdtham [ 1996] who asked 
respondents, from behind a veil of ignorance, to choose between two societies that differ 
with respect to the number of QALYs received by two groups. The results suggested 
that, on average, respondents are willing to give up 1 QALY in the group with more 
QALYs to gain 0.45 QALYs in the group with fewer QALYs. 
It is not immediately obvious which of these two broad approaches is the most appropriate 
for addressing issues related to distributive justice and one will depend on the philosophical 
perspective taken. In Rawls' world nobody is sick but it is possible to simply include 
health amongst the primary social goods (although Daniels [ 1985] agues that a `thinner 
veil' would be needed when selecting principles to govern health care resource allocation 
decisions since we must know something about the society; for example, its resource 
limitations). However, Dworkin [1977] questions whether Rawls' contract would be 
binding; "the fact that a particular choice is in my interest at a particular time, under 
conditions of great uncertainty, is not a good argument for the fairness of enforcing that 
choice against me later under conditions of much greater knowledge" (p 153) ... 
"His 
[Rawls'] contract is hypothetical and hypothetical contracts do not supply an independent 
argument for the fairness of enforcing their terms. A hypothetical contract is not simply a 
pale form of an actual contract, it is no contract at all" (p 151). 
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These are philosophical questions that cannot be dealt with in the context of this thesis. 
However, it is an empirical question whether the `social decision-making' and `veil of 
ignorance' approaches yield substantively different results. Therefore, future research 
effort should be directed towards asking the same question (in any one of the forms 
outlined in Chapter 5) but from each of these two perspectives. If the results do not differ 
greatly from one another, then, so far as the implications for resource allocation decisions 
are concerned, the philosophical issues will be of little practical significance. 
Implications for the use of the tariffs 
The discussion in this chapter has raised a number of important methodological questions 
and provided important challenges for future research. It also raises the question of 
whether the empirical results presented in this thesis, and particularly the tariffs generated 
in Chapter 3, are currently of any practical use, or whether the methodological issues need 
to be addressed before the tariffs can be used as an aid to health care decision-making in 
any meaningful way. 
In attempting to answer a question of this kind, it is important to be clear about the 
context in which the discussion should take place. Whilst it is possible to judge the 
appropriateness (or otherwise) of the different EuroQol tariffs against the yardstick of the 
properties that the `ideal' or `perfect' tariff might contain, this author feels that this is not a 
particularly useful framework within which to operate. If this were the background 
against which all new technologies were judged, then almost all would fall a long way 
short of the ideal, and hence current practice would prevail. But, of course, much of what 
is currently practised also falls a long way short of being ideal. Thus, a much more useful 
starting point for a discussion of a new technology is to compare the situation without the 
technology with that which results from its introduction. 
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If the benefits associated with different health care programmes or policies a) do not 
contain information on the effects associated with changes in HRQoL and b) cannot be 
expressed in monetary terms (and Chapter 1.1 suggested reasons why the latter might not 
be possible), then an evaluation of the alternatives must rely on cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA). Since benefits in a CEA are measured in terms of a single outcome expressed 
in natural units, this type of evaluation is of limited use at the level of allocating 
resources across different programmes and policies (again see Chapter 1.1). 
In principle, then, there is little doubt that the tariffs presented in Chapter 3 represent 
a better and more useful way of informing resource allocation decisions than the use 
of, say, life years gained. In practice, of course, there a number of problems 
associated with using the tariffs to inform such decisions. In addition to the issues 
raised earlier in this chapter, perhaps the most fundamental issue concerns the 
generalisability of the valuations contained within the tariffs. All tariffs presented in 
Chapter 3 relate to valuations elicited for states of health which last for 10 years. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to use these valuations in the context of interventions 
which, in very general terms, are directed at chronic conditions. But given the impact 
that the time spent in a state can have on its subsequent valuation (an issue which is 
discussed at some length in Chapters 4.2 and 4.3), it is questionable whether the 
tariffs can be so readily applied to acute conditions. 
Of course, that health state valuations might differ according to a particular effect is 
not a problem in itself. If the nature and extent of the effect can be estimated then the 
appropriate adjustments can be made to the valuations in order to account for the 
effect. For example, in addition to a duration effect, this thesis has also shown that the 
benefit derived from moving between different health states will differ according to: i) 
which method is used (see Chapters 2.1 and 2.2), ii) how valuations are aggregated (see 
Chapters 3.2 and 3.4), and iii) which population sub-group is used (see Chapter 3.3). 
Although the precise magnitude of these differences will depend on the initial and final 
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health states, it has been possible to some extent to draw general conclusions about the 
differential effect that using one set of TTO valuations will have compared to another (see 
Chapters 3.3 and 3.4 for illustrative examples of the differences that might result from 
using a tariff based on the values of those aged 60 or over compared to one based on the 
values of the whole population, and from using a tariff that approximates mean values 
compared to one based on median values, respectively). 
But as much of the discussion in Chapters 4.2 and 4.3 suggests, it is very difficult to 
estimate the magnitude of the duration effect. Therefore, in the absence of further 
empirical evidence on the different levels of HRQoL associated with different lengths 
of time spent in particular health states, this author would be cautious about attaching 
values derived for states of health lasting 10 years to health states that last for much 
shorter periods of time, such as a few weeks or months. But without information on 
the extent to which the use of the tariffs presented in Chapter 3 might misrepresent 
the HRQoL effects associated with improvements in acute conditions, it is difficult to 
make a judgement about precisely how cautious to be. 
This suggests that in a practical policy sense, a more important question than "what is 
the magnitude of a particular effect on the tariff values? " is "what difference does using 
one tariff as opposed to another actually make when applied to real choices? " The short 
answer to this question is that at the moment we do not really know. This is primarily 
because such tariffs have only been in the public domain for a very short period of time. In 
addition, as has been noted elsewhere, there is no real consensus regarding what size 
difference between valuations is (or should be) considered meaningful. 
Perhaps the reason for this lack of consensus is that remarkably few of the previous 
valuation studies have been subjected to 'real-world' sensitivity analysis. Exceptions are 
Rosser and Kind [ 1978], who suggest that many decisions at the community level may not 
be sensitive to variations in values and Read et al [ 1984] who, contrariwise, show that, 
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when VAS values are substituted for SG ones in a coronary artery disease decision, the 
recommended course of action changed for 60% of patients. And perhaps part of the 
apparent reluctance to test the sensitivity of valuations in a real-world environment results 
from many of the earlier studies being seen as essentially methodological research, aimed 
at enhancing our understanding of health status measurement rather than at contributing to 
resource allocation decisions. 
However, whilst the studies which culminated in the generation of the TTO-based tariffs 
have addressed (and certainly raised) many methodological questions (see Chapters 2 and 
3), an important objective of the studies was to generate a tariff (or set of tariffs) that 
could be used to inform real-world decision-making. Indeed, many of the decisions taken 
by the MVH Group were taken against this background; for example, considerable time 
and effort was devoted towards ensuring that the sample in the Main Study was as 
representative of the UK general population as possible and it was important that the 
sample was large enough to detect important differences between population sub-groups. 
Achieving both of these objectives in the Main Study, and the subsequent modelling of 
valuations for all EuroQol health states (arguably the most significant contribution of this 
thesis), suggests that potential users of the tariffs might be more willing to consider their 
application than they were with similar technologies in the past. 
Moreover, now that we have good information on the extent to which these tariff values 
differ according to the measure of central tendency that is chosen and according to certain 
respondent characteristics, it should be possible in future cost-utility analyses that use 
EuroQol tariff values to consider the extent to which the cost-utility ratios are affected by 
the choice of tariff and, crucially, to consider the implications for resource allocation 
decisions. 
When carrying out this sensitivity analysis, it is important to remember that the validity of 
the tariff values do not rest on there being a precis e answer to the question of how many 
185 
QALYs a particular programme generates. In many cases, it is likely that the use of 
different tariff values will make no difference to the ordinal conclusions reached about 
what programme generates more QALYs than what. As Lockwood [1988] has argued, 
"only a very radical scepticism, according to which one could not even, with any 
confidence, set numerical limits in such comparisons, would have the effect of rendering 
the QALY approach wholly useless. " This author agrees with Lockwood's assessment 
that "such wholesale scepticism would ... 
be very difficult convincingly to sustain". 
Moreover, real-life resource allocation decisions depend upon a great many considerations 
and the results from a CUA are only likely to play a small part. For example, choices will 
be based upon historical decisions and considerations about the political 'fallout' of 
particular choices. Also, decision-makers must currently make their own judgments about 
the distributional consequences of their choices. Indeed, the identity of the recipient group 
(for example, the poor or the elderly) may be the motivation for a particular programme in 
the first place. Against this background, it may be shown that once the implications of 
using whichever EuroQol tariff have been 'watered down' by these other considerations, 
for practical policy purposes choosing one tariff compared to another actually makes very 
little difference. 
If such a conclusion is reached, although the philosophical questions about the 
appropriateness of different measures of central tendency and about whose values should 
count will remain, much of the heat will be taken out of the debate. On the other hand, if 
real implications for public policy are a function of the choice of tariff, as in some contexts 
they might be (even in the face of these other considerations), then the philosophical 
questions become very real economic ones. 
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Table 2.1.1 Sample characteristics 
TEST 
(n=335) 
RETEST 
(n=1 10) 
GENERAL 
POPULATION 
% n % n (GHS 1989) % 
Female 58.5 196 54.5 60 52.0 
Age: 16-20 2.4 8 2.7 3 7.7* 
21-60 69.5 233 70.9 78 69.2 
61+ 27.8 93 26.4 29 23.1 
(missing) (0.3) (1) 0 - 
Children living with them 33.1 111 32.7 36 47.0 
Main Activity 
paid work 43.9 147 42.7 47 59.5 
looking after home 25.1 84 30.0 33 - 
other 31.1 104 27.3 30 - 
Education 
left school at min. age 48.4 162 46.4 51 - 
training since school 29.6 99 29.1 32 - 
degree or profession 22.1 74 24.5 27 8.0 
Cigarette smoker 34.6 116 30.9 34 30.0 
Health Status 
Problems with Mobility 21.2 71 18.2 20 
Self Care 3.6 12 1.8 2 
Usual Act 15.8 53 14.5 16 
Pain 34.1 114 27.3 30 
Mood 23.0 77 16.3 18 
Experience of Illness 
Job looking after ill 14.6 49 20.9 23 
Serious illness in self 27.2 91 31.8 35 
in family 36.7 123 48.2 53 
in others 32.8 110 34.5 38 
Experience of any 64.5 216 70.9 78 
states used in survey 
from GHS 1990, figures are for ranges 16-19,20-59 and 60+ 
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Table 2.1.2 Experimental groups 
(numbers in brackets refer to incomplete interviews) 
Test Retest 
Group 1st method 2nd method n n 
1 TTO NP SG NP 44 (2) 16 
2 SG NP TTO NP 46 (3) 16 
3 TTO NP SG P 49 (1) 17 
4 SG P TTO NP 44 (2) 12 
5 TTO P SG NP 44 (1) 19 
6 SG NP TTO P 29 (0) 4 
7 TTO P SG P 46 (3) 14 
8 SG P TTO P 33 (2) 12 
TOTAL 335(14) 110 
SG - props 172 55 
SG - no props 163 55 
TTO - props 152 49 
TTO - no props 183 61 
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Table 2.1.3 Variables used in the regression analysis 
Variable Definition 
YOUNG A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the respondent is 
aged 18-29 years, and 0 otherwise. 
OLD A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the respondent 
is aged 60 years or over, and 0 otherwise. 
SEX A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the respondent is 
female, and 0 otherwise. 
SELF The respondent's rating of their own health state on the 
VAS. 
YOUNGVAS The product of the variable YOUNG and the VAS score 
for state x given by this respondent. 
OLDVAS The product of the variable OLD and the VAS score for 
state x given by this respondent. 
SEXVAS The product of the variable SEX and the VAS score for 
state x given by this respondent. 
SELFVAS The product of the variable CROWN and the VAS score 
for state x given by this respondent. 
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Table 2.1.4 Results of the regression models 
Variable TTO TTO SG SG 
With props No props With props No props 
------------------- 
V; X 
------------------ 
-2.86 
---------------- 
0.91 
-------------------- 
-1.51 
--------------- 
1.17 
(-3.81) (3.59) (-2.29) (3.51) 
(V1 )2 7.72 - 4.35 0.28 
(6.02) - ( 4.25) (1.74) 
(V1 )3 -4.30 - -2.50 - 
(-5.58) (-4.46) 
YOUNG -0.18 -0.05 0.15 -0.24 
(-1.52) (-0.64) (-2.14) (-2.87) 
YOUNGVAS 0.17 0.14 0.27 0.32 
(1.01) (1.15) (2.76) (2.80) 
OLD -0.10 0.39 0.13 0.10 
(-0.85) (6.10) (1.74) (1.08) 
OLDVAS 0.01 -0.51 -0.18 -0.17 
(0.04) (-5.95) (-1.85) (-1.48) 
SEX -1.12 0.04 0.07 -0.07 
(-1.27) ( 0.68) ( 1.02) (-0.94) 
SEXVAS 0.18 0.02 -0.03 0.14 
(1.40) (0.29) (-0.31) (1.56) 
SELF 0.15 0.10 -0.06 0.83 
(0.50) (0.49) (-0.32) ( 3.82) 
SELFVAS -0.19 -0.04 0.05 -1.16 
(-0.47) (-0.01) (0.18) (-4.00) 
CONSTANT 0.46 0.01 0.49 -0.23 
(1.56) (0.03) (2.20) (-1.11) 
HET 
V, X 0.18 --- 
(0.97) 
(V1 )2 - 0.06 0.18 - 
(0.83) (1.55) - 
(iºx)2 - 
Functional form (0.82) (-1.38) (-0.17) (-1.54) 
Het. Disturb (-2.55) (-2.11) (0.06) (-3.22) 
Likelihood Ratio 0.18 0.18 0.28 0.37 
Sample 855 982 836 869 
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Table 2.1.5 Average values of variables used in mapping functions 
Variable TTO TTO 
With props No props 
YOUNG 0.29 0.19 
OLD 0.20 0.24 
SEX 0.59 0.55 
SELF 81.05 83.64 
SG 
With props 
0.24 
0.25 
0.56 
84.70 
SG 
No props 
0.20 
0.25 
0.60 
81.06 
The values of the variables YVASA, OVASA, SVASA and OWNVASA 
depend on the VAS score. The values for these variables at which the 
predicted value functions are evaluated are given by the product of the 
values given above and the particular value of the index function for VAS. 
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Table 2.2.1 Completion rates for each method 
METHOD n 
STATES UNVALUED 
TEST RETEST 
%n %n 
SGP 55 5.3 52 2.4 8 
SGNP 54 4.4 41 6.2 20 
TTOP 49 0.8 7 0 0 
TT NP 61 4.2 44 3.0 11 
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Table 2.2.2 Consistency rates for each method 
Medians (and interquartile ranges) 
METHOD 
TEST RE-TEST 
n Consistency n Consistency 
SGP 136 83.3 (66.7-91.7) 45 83.3 (66.7-91.7) 
SGNP 145 87.5 (62.5-95.8) 47 83.3 (58.3-100) 
TTOP 145 91.7 (75.0-91.7) 48 91.7 (77.1-91.7) 
TTONP 163 91.7 (66.7-100) 58 91.7 (66.7-100) 
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Table 2.2.3 Valuations for each state at test 
Medians (and interquartile ranges) 
State SGP SGNP TTOP TTONP 
21111 0.85 0.90 0.95 0.95 
(0.60-0.95) (0.75-0.95) (0.75-0.95) (0.85-0.95) 
0.70 0.85 0.90 0.90 
11122 (0.45-0.90) (0.50-0.90) (0.70-0.95) (0.65-0.95) 
0.60 0.75 0.80 0.85 
21221 (0.25-0.75) (0.50-0.90) (0.60-0.90) (0.65-0.90) 
0.30 0.55 0.45 0.55 
21232 (0.15-0.55) (0.30-0.80) (0.05-0.75) (0.30-0.70) 
0.35 0.50 0.40 0.55 
22323 (0.10-0.55) (0.30-0.80) (0-0.70) (0.30-0.70) 
0.00 0.10 -0.30 0.10 
33333 
L- 
(-0.05-0.10) (-0.10-0.40) (-2-0.05) (-1.5-0.45) 
11 
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Table 2.2.4 Valuations for each state at retest 
Medians (and interquartile ranges) 
State SGP SGNP TTOP TTONP 
21111 0.85 0.90 0.95 0.95 
(0.55-0.95) (0.70-0.95) (0.75-0.95) (0.80-0.95) 
0.70 0.80 0.90 0.80 
11122 (0.50-0.85) (0.35-0.90) (0.55-0.95) (0.60-0.90) 
0.70 0.65 0.80 0.80 
21221 (0.40-0.85) (0.45-0.85) (0.60-0.90) (0.60-0.90) 
0.35 0.50 0.40 0.60 
21232 (0.10-0.60) (0.30-0.70) (0.05-0.75) (0.30-0.80) 
0.30 0.50 0.30 0.55 
22323 (0.05-0.50) (0.25-0.80) (0-0.65) (0.30-0.70) 
0.00 0.05 -0.60 0.05 
33333 (-0.05-0.10) (-2-0.40) (-3-0.05) (-4-0.40) 
195 
Table 2.2.5 Within-respondent comparison of valuations 
State TTONP v 
SGNP 
TTONP v 
SGP 
TTOP v 
SGNP 
TTOP v 
SGP 
21111 TR TR 
11122 T TR 
21221 TR TR 
T 
21232 T 
T 
22323 T 
T 
33333 X 
T= TTO valuation is higher than SG one at test (p <0.05) 
R= TTO valuation is higher than SG one at re-test (p <0.05) 
X= SG valuation is higher than TTO one at test (p <0.05) 
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Table 2.2.7 Correlation between test and retest scores 
METHOD 
Without 
Important 
Event 
With 
Important 
Event 
SPEARMAN PEARSON 
n n With With With With 
out out 
S GP 25 11 0.63* 0.750 0.63* 0.691 
SGNP 31 8 0.71 0.529 0.74 0.498 
TTOP 37 11 0.81 0.727 0.83 0.763 
TTONP 25 14 0.54* 0.643 0.55* 0.622 
significantly lower than TTO Props (p <0.05) 
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Table 2.2.8 Correlation for different time intervals 
(For respondents without an important event) 
Method 
n SPEARMAN PEARSON 
<73 >73 <73 >73 <73 >73 
days days days days days days 
SGP 11 14 0.60 0.64 0.57 0.67 
SGNP 19 12 0.79 0.56 0.83 0.59 
TTOP 18 19 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.83 
TTON 13 12 0.54 0.48 0.64 0.42 
P 
199 
Table 3.1.1 Sample characteristics 
(Figures are percentages) 
Characteristic 
Full 
Sample 
(n=3395) 
After 
Exclusion 
(n=3337) 
GHS 
Sex: Male 43 43 47 
Female 57 57 53 
Age: 18-34 31 32 31 
35-49 25 25 27 
50-59 14 14 15 
60+ 31 30 28 
Education: Degree 9 9 8 
Higher 11 11 10 
A/O levels 40 41 45 
None 37 37 35 
Foreign/Other 3 3 3 
Social Class: I, II 29 30 30 
III Non-manual 24 24 22 
III Manual 20 21 21 
IV, V 25 25 21 
Other 1 1 3 
Marital status: single 17 17 21 
married 60 60 64 
widowed 13 12 9 
divorced 10 11 6 
Those reporting problems on: 
Mobility 18.4 18.1 - 
Self-care 4.2 4.2 - 
Usual activities 16.3 16.2 - 
Pain/discomfort 32.9 32.8 - 
Anxiety/depression 20.9 20.8 - 
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Table 3.1.2 TTO health state valuations 
State N Mean (SD) Median (IQR) 
21111 1306 0.87 (0.24) 0.95 (0.83 - 1.00) 
11211 1335 0.87 (0.23) 0.95 (0.83- 1.00) 
11121 1310 0.85 (0.25) 0.93 (0.80 - 1.00) 
12111 1310 0.83 (0.30) 0.93 (0.80 - 1.00) 
11112 1309 0.82 (0.29) 0.93 (0.75- 1.00) 
12211 828 0.76 (0.33) 0.90 (0.63 - 1.00) 
12121 828 0.74 (0.32) 0.85 (0.60 - 1.00) 
11122 816 0.72 (0.37) 0.83 (0.63 - 1.00) 
22121 830 0.64 (0.42) 0.78 (0.50 - 0.93) 
22112 840 0.66 (0.38) 0.74 (0.50 - 0.95) 
11312 824 0.55 (0.47) 0.68 (0.40 - 0.93) 
21222 823 0.55 (0.46) 0.65 (0.40 - 0.91) 
12222 830 0.54 (0.47) 0.65 (0.38 - 0.93) 
21312 811 0.51 (0.49) 0.65 (0.33 - 0.93) 
22122 809 0.53 (0.47) 0.63 (0.39 - 0.93) 
22222 834 0.50 (0.49) 0.63 (0.35 - 0.88) 
11113 823 0.39 (0.56) 0.50 (0.00 - 0.88) 
13212 820 0.38 (0.54) 0.50 (0.04 - 0.78) 
13311 810 0.33 (0.56) 0.50 (0.00 - 0.75) 
11131 812 0.20 (0.60) 0.38 (-0.33 - 0.72) 
12223 828 0.21 (0.56) 0.35 (-0.28 - 0.63) 
21323 819 0.15 (0.59) 0.30 (-0.38 - 0.60) 
23321 821 0.14 (0.61) 0.30 (-0.41 - 0.63) 
32211 833 0.14 (0.60) 0.25 (-0.38 - 0.63) 
21232 826 0.06 (0.61) 0.13 (-0.48 - 0.55) 
22323 812 0.04 (0.59) 0.03 (-0.48 - 0.53) 
33212 829 -0.02 (0.60) 0.00 (-0.50 - 0.48) 
23313 830 -0.07 (0.58) 0.00 (-0.55 - 0.40) 
22331 814 -0.01 (0.60) 0.00 (-0.53 - 0.50) 
11133 829 -0.05 (0.61) 0.00 (-0.58 - 0.48) 
21133 826 -0.07 (0.59) -0.03 (-0.60 - 0.45) 
23232 827 -0.10 (0.59) -0.08 (-0.63 - 0.43) 
33321 828 -0.14 (0.57) -0.23 (-0.63 - 0.38) 
32313 832 -0.16 (0.57) -0.23 (-0.63 - 0.30) 
22233 829 -0.15 (0.57) -0.28 (-0.63 - 0.34) 
32223 825 -0.19 (0.56) -0.28 (-0.68 - 0.23) 
13332 812 -0.23 (0.55) -0.38 (-0.70 - 0.18) 
32232 818 -0.23 (0.57) -0.38 (-0.73 - 0.20) 
32331 826 -0.27 (0.55) -0.38 (-0.78 - 0.03) 
Uncon 3294 -0.41 (0.39) -0.38 (-0.83 - -0.03) 
33232 824 -0.33 (0.51) -0.43 (-0.75 - 0.00) 
33323 833 -0.39 (0.49) -0.48 (-0.83 - -0.03) 
33333 3289 -0.54 (0.41) -0.65 (-0.93 - -0.28) 
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Table 3.1.3 Variables used in the regression analysis 
Variable Definition 
SEX A dummy taking the value of 1 if respondent is female, 
and 0 otherwise 
AGE A continuous variable for the respondent's age 
AGE2 Age-squared 
EDU I A dummy taking the value of 1 if the respondent has 
intermediate qualifications, and 0 otherwise 
EDU2 A dummy value of 1 if respondent has no qualifications, 
and 0 otherwise 
SOC 1 A dummy value of 1 if respondent is in social class III, 
and 0 otherwise 
SOC2 A dummy value of 1 if respondent is in social class IV or 
V, and 0 otherwise 
MAR I A dummy taking the value of 1 if the respondent is 
separated, divorced or widowed, and 0 otherwise 
MAR2 A dummy taking the value of 1 if the respondent is single, 
and 0 otherwise 
MOB 1 if respondent reports problems on mobiltity, 0 otherwise 
SELF 1 if respondent reports problems on self-care, 0 otherwise 
UACT 1 if respondent reports problems on usual act, 0 otherwise 
PAIN I if the respondent reports pain/discomfort, 0 otherwise 
MOOD 1 if the respondent reports anx/depression, 0 otherwise 
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Table 3.1.4 Results of the regression analysis 
Variable Mild States Moderate States Severe States 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Constant . 511 . 118 -. 262 
(14.495) (2.129) (-6.808) 
Sex -. 029 -0.063 -. 070 
(-3.655) (-5.008) (-7.987) 
Age . 008 . 010 . 008 (5.839) (4.815) (5.400) 
Age 2 -. 00010 -0.00013 -0.00012 
(-7.114) (-6.458) (-8.100) 
Edu 1 . 003 -0.001 -0.004 
(1.804) (-0.377) (-2.432) 
Edu2 . 0004 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.370) (-0.400) (-1.777) 
Soc 1 -. 003 0.002 -0.0003 
(2.146) (1.037) (-0.242) 
Soc2 . 0003 -0.001 -0.003 
(0.305) (-0.544) (-2.992) 
Marl -0.006 -0.007 -0.003 
(-4.347) (-3.855) (-2.320) 
Mar2 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 
(-4.324) (-2.627) (-2.114) 
Mob 0.037 0.064 0.039 
(3.095) (3.401) (3.099) 
Self 0.001 0.008 0.010 
(0.132) (0.469) (0.880) 
Uact 0.007 -0.004 0.013 
(0.675) (-0.251) (1.0.79) 
Pain -0.0003 -0.044 -0.049 
(-0.037) (-3.166) (-5.068) 
Mood -0.011 0.011 0.007 
(-1.142) (0.739) (0.719) 
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Table 3.2.1 Parameter estimates for the whole sample 
(t-statistics are in parentheses) 
Variable Whole Sample Internal Sample 
a . 081 (10.35) . 075 ( 8.64) 
MO . 069 (13.44) . 071 (10.21) 
Sc . 104 (19.23) . 105 (17.45) 
UA . 036 ( 5.85) . 036 ( 4.64) 
PD . 123 (23.92) . 121 (18.26) 
AD . 071 (13.42) . 071 (11.76) 
M2 . 176 (19.40) . 177 (16.03) 
S2 . 006 ( 0.68) . 008 ( 0.66) 
U2 . 022 ( 2.33) . 023 ( 1.76) 
P2 . 140 (14.55) . 141 (12.97) 
A2 . 094( 9.78) . 091( 7.18) 
N3 . 269 (38.12) . 272 (31.19) 
R2 . 046 . 046 
LM Test p<0.0001 p<0.0001 
As an example of how the tariff is generated, consider the state 11223 
estimated for the whole sample: 
Full health = 1.000 
Constant term (for any dysfunctional state) - 0.081 
Mobility: level 1 -0 
Self-care: level 1-0 
Usual activities: level 2 (1 xUA) - 0.036 
Pain or discomfort: level2 (1 xPD) - 0.123 
Anxiety or depression: level 3 (2xAD + 1xA2) - 0.236 
N3 (level 3 occurs within at least one dimension) - 0.269 
Therefore, the estimated value for 11223 = 0.255 
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Table 3.2.2 Comparison of estimated and actual values 
Actual Mean - 
State mean Estimated Estimated 
2 1 1 1 1 0.878 0.850 0.028 
1 1 2 1 1 0.869 0.883 -0.014 
1 2 1 1 1 0.834 0.815 0.019 
1 1 1 2 1 0.850 0.796 0.054 
1 1 1 1 2 0.829 0.848 -0.019 
1 2 2 1 1 0.767 0.779 -0.012 
1 2 1 2 1 0.742 0.692 0.050 
1 1 1 2 2 0.722 0.725 -0.003 
2 2 1 2 1 0.645 0.623 0.022 
2 2 1 1 2 0.662 0.675 -0.013 
1 1 3 1 2 0.552 0.485 0.067 
2 2 1 2 2 0.540 0.552 -0.012 
2 1 3 1 2 0.536 0.416 0.120 
2 1 2 2 2 0.553 0.620 -0.067 
1 2 2 2 2 0.551 0.585 -0.034 
2 2 2 2 2 0.500 0.516 -0.016 
1 3 2 1 2 0.389 0.329 0.060 
1 3 3 1 1 0.346 0.342 0.004 
1 1 1 1 3 0.392 0.414 -0.022 
1 1 1 3 1 0.200 0.264 -0.064 
1 2 2 2 3 0.216 0.151 0.065 
2 1 3 2 3 0.160 0.128 0.032 
2 3 3 2 1 0.147 0.150 -0.003 
3 2 2 1 1 0.152 0.196 -0.044 
2 1 2 3 2 0.064 0.088 -0.024 
2 2 3 2 3 0.042 0.024 0.018 
1 1 1 3 3 -0.049 0.028 -0.077 
2 2 3 3 1 -0.011 -0.003 -0.008 
2 3 3 1 3 -0.070 0.037 -0.107 
3 3 2 1 2 -0.022 0.015 -0.037 
2 3 2 3 2 -0.084 -0.126 0.042 
2 1 1 3 3 -0.063 -0.041 -0.022 
3 3 3 2 1 -0.120 -0.095 -0.025 
3 2 3 1 3 -0.152 -0.098 -0.054 
2 2 2 3 3 -0.142 -0.181 0.039 
3 2 2 2 3 -0.174 -0.163 -0.011 
3 2 2 3 2 -0.223 -0.261 0.038 
1 3 3 3 2 -0.228 -0.115 -0.113 
3 2 3 3 1 -0.276 -0.248 -0.028 
3 3 2 3 2 -0.332 -0.371 0.039 
3 3 3 2 3 -0.386 -0.331 -0.055 
3 3 3 3 3 -0.543 -0.594 0.051 
Mean absolute difference 0.039 
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Table 3.2.3 Predicting the values of an external sample 
Mean of Estimated from Mean - 
State external sample internal sample Estimated 
2 1 1 1 1 0.878 0.854 0.024 
1 1 2 1 1 0.860 0.889 -0.029 
1 2 1 1 1 0.821 0.820 0.001 
1 1 1 2 1 0.850 0.804 0.046 
1 1 1 1 2 0.805 0.854 -0.049 
1 2 2 1 1 0.739 0.784 -0.045 
1 2 1 2 1 0.736 0.699 0.037 
1 1 1 2 2 0.717 0.733 -0.016 
2 2 1 2 1 0.654 0.628 0.026 
2 2 1 1 2 0.650 0.678 -0.028 
1 1 3 1 2 0.527 0.487 0.040 
2 2 1 2 2 0.501 0.557 -0.056 
2 1 3 1 2 0.523 0.416 0.107 
2 1 2 2 2 0.545 0.626 -0.081 
1 2 2 2 2 0.528 0.592 -0.064 
2 2 2 2 2 0.523 0.521 -0.002 
1 3 2 1 2 0.412 0.328 0.084 
1 3 3 1 1 0.404 0.340 0.064 
1 1 1 1 3 0.383 0.420 -0.037 
1 1 1 3 1 0.169 0.270 -0.101 
1 2 2 2 3 0.204 0.158 0.046 
2 1 3 2 3 0.189 0.133 0.056 
2 3 3 2 1 0.133 0.148 -0.015 
3 2 2 1 1 0.135 0.193 -0.058 
2 1 2 3 2 0.086 0.092 -0.006 
2 2 3 2 3 0.073 0.028 0.045 
1 1 1 3 3 -0.106 0.037 -0.143 
2 2 3 3 1 0.010 -0.001 -0.011 
2 3 3 1 3 -0.038 0.036 -0.074 
3 3 2 1 2 -0.005 0.009 -0.014 
2 3 2 3 2 -0.085 -0.126 0.041 
2 1 1 3 3 -0.047 -0.034 -0.013 
3 3 3 2 1 -0.099 -0.100 -0.001 
3 2 3 1 3 -0.149 -0.099 -0.050 
2 2 2 3 3 -0.185 -0.175 -0.010 
3 2 2 2 3 -0.164 -0.161 -0.003 
3 2 2 3 2 -0.129 -0.261 0.132 
1 3 3 3 2 -0.219 -0.114 -0.105 
3 2 3 3 1 -0.235 -0.249 0.014 
3 3 2 3 2 -0.322 -0.374 0.052 
3 3 3 2 3 -0.375 -0.333 -0.042 
3 3 3 3 3 -0.520 -0.595 0.075 
Mean absolute difference 0.046 
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Table 3.3.1 Parameter estimates 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Variable 18-59 year-olds >60 year-olds 
MO . 071 (4.93) . 074 (4.62) 
SC . 075 (4.77) . 126 (7.75) 
UA . 022 (1.54) . 054 (2.79) 
PD . 099 (6.68) . 123 (7.75) 
AD . 076 (2.94) . 044 (2.64) 
M2 . 178 (6.98) . 228 (8.09) 
S2 . 045 (1.51) -. 016 (-0.55) 
U2 . 062 (2.94) -. 048 (-1.59) 
P2 . 158 (6.24) . 127 (4.37) 
A2 . 086 (3.13) . 098 (3.27) 
MOgend -. 009 (-0.41) . 003 (0.13) 
SCgend . 015 (0.58) . 048 (2.18) 
UAgend . 017 (0.61) -. 
011 (-0.43) 
PDgend . 036 (1.05) . 
016 (0.79) 
ADgend -. 008 (-0.36) . 045 (2.08) 
M2gend -. 015 (-0.35) -. 064 (-1.72) 
S2gend -. 022 (-0.74) -. 073 (-1.92) 
U2gend -. 038 (-0.96) . 039 (1.00) 
P2gend -. 002 (-0.06) -. 064 (-1.64) 
A2gend . 032 (0.87) -. 
044 (-1.12) 
N3 . 219 (10.7) . 
328 (14.8) 
N3gend . 034 (1.31) . 
036 (1.25) 
a . 081 (4.66) . 
077 (3.15) 
gend -. 010 (-0.35) . 025 (0.77) 
For men, the value for a particular health state is calculated using the variables 
without the suffix `gend', and for women is calculated using the variables with 
the suffix `gend'. 
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Table 3.3.2 Differences between age groups 
Figures are t-ratios 
Variable 
>60 values 
- men 
>60 values 
- women 
MO -0.66 -1.48 
Sc -4.04 -5.23 
UA -3.91 -1.16 
PD -1.99 -0.56 
AD 2.53 -1.76 
M2 -2.67 -0.09 
S2 1.86 2.41 
U2 5.14 1.35 
P2 1.99 2.76 
A2 -1.12 1.53 
N3 -7.54 -8.07 
Figures are t-ratios, calculated as (B2 - B1) / standard error of B2 
Positive t-ratios indicate that the 18-59 age group has a higher coefficient than 
the 60 or over age group i. e. that they attach a greater disutility to that 
dimension, and vice versa. 
v 
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Table 3.3.3 Coefficients on each dimension for each age group 
Dimension 18-59 18-59 >60 >60 
Men Women Men Women 
Constant 
. 081 . 071 . 077 . 102 
Mobility 
level2 
. 071 . 062 . 074 . 076 level3 
. 320 . 287 . 374 . 316 
Self-care 
level2 
. 075 . 090 . 126 . 174 level3 
. 195 . 203 . 236 . 259 
Usual activities 
level 2 . 022 . 039 . 054 . 043 level3 
. 106 . 102 . 060 . 077 
Pain/discomfort 
level2 
. 099 . 135 . 123 . 139 level3 
. 356 . 426 . 374 . 342 
Anxiety/depression 
level 2 . 076 . 068 . 044 . 088 level3 . 238 . 254 . 186 . 230 
Any level 3 . 219 . 253 . 328 . 364 
Note: Higher numbers correspond to a greater decrement in health state value. 
The value for a particular health state is calculated as 1 (the value for full 
health) minus the constant term minus the relevant coefficients on the 
dysfunctional dimensions minus the `Any level 3' variable, if applicable. 
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Table 3.3.4 Differences between actual and estimated values 
Difference in value 
mean - estimated 
Males 
18-59 
Females 
18-59 
Males 
>60 
Females 
>60 
> -0.10 1 2 2 3 
-0.06 - -0.10 7 5 6 9 
-0.01 - -0.05 8 14 11 11 
0 3 2 5 3 
0.01-0.05 17 13 12 6 
0.06-0.10 5 5 5 5 
>0.10 1 1 1 5 
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Table 3.4.1 Coefficients on variables using medians 
Variable Coefficient 
a -. 038 (-1.03) 
MO 
. 
054 (1.73) 
SC . 129 (3.79) 
UA 
. 044 (1.14) 
PD 
. 114 (3.60) 
AD 
. 100 (3.02) 
M2 
. 350 (6.22) 
S2 -. 004 (-0.06) 
U2 
. 071 (1.23) 
P2 
. 
294 (4.78) 
A2 
. 
123 (1.98) 
N3 
. 163 (3.34) 
Adjusted R2 . 98 
As an example of how the tariff is generated, consider the state 11223 
estimated for the whole sample: 
Full health = 1.000 
Constant term (for any dysfunctional state) - 0.038 
Mobility: level 1 -0 
Self-care: level 1 -0 
Usual activities: level 2 (1 xUA) - 0.088 
Pain or discomfort: level 2 (1 xPD) - 0.228 
Anxiety or depression: level 3 (2xAD +1 xA2) - 0.323 
N3 (level 3 occurs within at least one dimension) - 0.163 
Therefore, the estimated value for 11223 = 0.160 
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Table 3.4.2 Actual and estimated values using medians 
Median Estimated Median- 
State Value Value Estimated 
2 1 1 1 1 0.950 0.984 -0.034 
1 1 2 1 1 0.950 0.994 -0.044 
1 2 1 1 1 0.925 0.909 0.016 
1 1 1 2 1 0.925 0.924 0.001 
1 1 1 1 2 0.925 0.938 -0.013 
1 2 2 1 1 0.900 0.865 0.035 
1 2 1 2 1 0.850 0.795 0.055 
1 1 1 2 2 0.825 0.824 0.001 
2 1 2 1 2 0.775 0.741 0.034 
2 2 1 1 2 0.750 0.756 -0.006 
1 1 3 1 2 0.675 0.616 0.059 
2 2 1 2 2 0.650 0.642 0.008 
2 1 3 1 2 0.650 0.563 0.087 
2 1 2 2 2 0.650 0.727 -0.077 
1 2 2 2 2 0.650 0.652 -0.002 
2 2 2 2 2 0.625 0.598 0.027 
1 3 2 1 2 0.500 0.478 0.022 
1 3 3 1 1 0.500 0.462 0.038 
1 1 1 1 3 0.500 0.552 -0.052 
1 1 3 1 1 0.375 0.353 0.022 
1 2 2 2 3 0.375 0.266 0.109 
2 1 3 2 3 0.325 0.225 0.100 
2 3 3 2 1 0.300 0.295 0.005 
3 2 2 1 1 0.275 0.245 0.030 
2 1 2 3 2 0.138 0.156 -0.018 
2 2 3 2 3 0.025 0.096 -0.071 
1 1 1 3 3 0.000 0.030 -0.030 
2 2 3 3 1 0.000 0.012 -0.012 
2 3 3 1 3 0.000 0.085 -0.085 
3 3 2 1 2 0.000 0.020 -0.020 
2 3 2 3 2 -0.025 -0.097 0.072 
2 1 1 3 3 -0.025 -0.024 -0.001 
3 3 3 2 1 -0.175 -0.110 -0.065 
3 2 3 1 3 -0.225 -0.194 -0.031 
2 2 2 3 3 -0.225 -0.196 -0.029 
3 2 2 2 3 -0.275 -0.192 -0.083 
3 2 2 3 2 -0.375 -0.377 0.002 
1 3 3 3 2 -0.375 -0.159 -0.216 
3 2 3 3 1 -0.375 -0.393 0.018 
3 3 2 3 2 -0.425 -0.501 0.076 
3 3 3 2 3 -0.475 -0.433 -0.042 
3 3 3 3 3 -0.625 -0.841 0.216 
mean absolute difference 0.047 
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Table 3.4.3 Example of differences between mean and median tariffs 
Definition of groups 
Group 1: 5 states with only one dimension at level 2 
Group 2: 26 states with any combination of levels 1 and 2 
Group 3: 80 states with one dimension at level 3 
Group 4: 80 states with two dimensions at level 3 
Group 5: 51 states with three or more dimensions at level 3 
Mean health state values for patients in each group 
Group Individual-based 
tariff 
Medians-based tariff 
1 . 838 . 950 
2 . 695 . 793 
3 . 240 . 355 
4 . 032 . 
056 
5 -. 226 -. 313 
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Table 4.1.1 Adjusted TTO scores for various discount rates 
ti p=1 p=0.95 p=0.91 p=0.87 
1 0.9 0.88 0.85 0.83 
2 0.8 0.76 0.72 0.68 
3 0.7 0.65 0.59 0.54 
4 0.6 0.54 0.48 0.43 
5 0.5 0.44 0.38 0.33 
6 0.4 0.34 0.29 0.25 
7 0.3 0.25 0.21 0.17 
8 0.2 0.16 0.13 0.11 
9 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.05 
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Table 4.2.1 Sample characteristics 
n (=39) % 
Age: 18-39 15 40 
40-59 14 37 
60+ 9 24 
Gender: Male 12 31 
Female 27 69 
Marital Status: Married 24 62 
Separated/divorced 6 15 
widowed 
Single 9 23 
Education: Degree 7 18 
Intermediate 21 54 
None 11 28 
Smoker: Yes 13 33 
No 26 67 
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Table 4.2.2 Transformed VAS scores 
STATE MEDIAN (IQR) 
11111 1.00 
11121 0.81 (0.73-0.89) 
11122 0.57 (0.44-0.67) 
21232 0.38 (0.20-0.50) 
22233 0.19 (0.06-0.28) 
33333 -0.03 (-0.11-0.10) 
Death 0.00 
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Table 4.2.3 Preferences over the timing of one year of poor health 
Figures are numbers of respondents 
State 
Poor health later 
preferred to poor 
health now 
(ie r >0) 
Poor health now 
equivalent to 
poor health later 
(ie r= 0) 
Poor health now 
preferred to poor 
health later 
(ie r<0) 
11121 5 10 11 
11122 8 12 10 
21232 7 9 16 
22233 11 9 13 
33333 8 15 10 
Total 39 (25%) 55 (36%) 60 (39%) 
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Table 4.2.4 Discount rates for health states (%) 
State Mean (S. D. ) Median (IQR) 
11121 -2.94 (5.34) 0.00 (-4.75-0.00) 
11122 -2.58 (8.09) 0.00 (-5.30-0.00) 
21232 -3.50 (10.73) 0.00 (-13.33-0.00) 
22233 -0.46 (15.52) 0.00 (-7.60-7.20) 
33333 +1.35 (13.37) 0.00 (0.80-10.18) 
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Table 4.2.5 Discount rates for respondents 
Discount Rate Number of Respondents 
+ only 2 
- only 2 
0 only 8 
+or0 4 
-or0 8 
+or - 6 
+or-or0 6 
missing 3 
TOTAL 39 
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Table 4.2.6 Implied median TTO scores 
State n 1 Month 1 Year 
Now 
1 Year 
Later 
10 
Years 
11121 37 0.083 0.250 b 0.250 b 0.83 a 
11122 35 0.083 0.250 b 0.125 0.73 a 
21232 35 -. 083 c -. 100 -. 100 0.03 a 
22232 34 -. 067 c -. 200 -. 175 -0.10 a 
33333 33 -. 067 c -. 363 -. 275 -0.33 a 
a significantly higher than all other durations 
b significantly higher than one month valuations 
c significantly higher than one year valuations 
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Table 4.3.1 Variables used in the regression analysis 
Variable Definition 
Month duration Valuations for states lasting one month 
Year duration Valuations for states lasting one year 
Ten year duration Valuations for states lasting ten years 
Health state group 1 `Very mild' health states (11112,11121, 
11211,12111,21111) - forms baseline 
category for other health state group 
dummy variables 
Health state group 2 `Mild' health states. Any state containing 
only 1s and 2s (except those in group 1) 
Health state group 3 `Moderate' health states. Any state 
contining one 3 plus those containing two 
3s if the other three dimensions are all 1s 
Health state group 4 `Severe' health states. Any state containing 
two 3s (except those in group 3) 
Health state group 5 `Very severe' health states. Any state 
containing three or more 3s plus 
`unconscioous' 
Age Age in years 
Education group 2 Intermediate qualifications 
Education group 3 no qualifications 
TYD * group 2 Interaction terms between ten year health 
TYD * group 3 state durations and the respective health 
TYD * group 4 state groups. 
TYD * group 5 
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Table 4.3.2 Sample characteristicse 
(Figures are percentages) 
Sample (n=236) GHS (1992) 
Sex: Male 45 47 
Female 55 53 
Age: 18-34 28 31 
35-49 30 27 
50-59 13 15 
60+ 29 28 
Education: Degree 10 8 
Higher 12 10 
A/O levels 42 45 
None 35 35 
Foreign/other 1 3 
Social Class: I and II 31 30 
III non-manual 21 22 
III manual 23 21 
IVand V 23 21 
Other 2 3 
Marital Status Single 15 21 
Married 66 64 
Widowed 7 9 
Divorced 13 6 
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Table 4.3.3 Mean health state score across durations 
Health state Month Year Ten year 
11111 100 100 100 
32211 46.10 39.87 24.79 
23321 37.78 36.12 28.39 
11211 85.46 83.81 80.37 
11112 85.84 84.88 83.43 
12121 73.70 71.90 70.11 
21232 40.50 36.16 32.10 
13332 23.81 15.31 9.84 
12222 62.66 58.62 53.09 
12211 73.37 72.15 67.93 
33212 37.46 35.03 27.92 
21312 52.41 48.18 47.87 
33323 18.81 10.14 3.54 
33232 20.15 15.33 9.00 
11113 57.23 53.94 48.36 
22323 36.20 29.69 26.05 
32223 29.31 20.74 13.37 
32331 23.76 22.42 16.08 
12223 46.13 35.14 31.95 
11131 51.19 45.07 38.77 
32232 26.31 24.37 17.92 
11133 42.64 36.52 28.68 
33321 26.80 16.47 13.06 
22331 31.30 32.28 28.32 
13311 54.41 43.77 35.01 
21323 41.92 33.28 28.40 
12111 85.40 85.03 82.56 
13212 57.74 50.90 43.62 
22233 28.99 21.29 17.78 
32313 30.65 23.57 17.76 
22222 59.60 51.60 44.85 
22112 70.71 66.93 65.63 
11121 85.11 85.39 81.19 
22121 65.86 64.49 59.59 
22122 63.63 57.38 57.16 
21111 87.32 85.17 83.17 
21222 62.17 60.79 54.34 
23313 31.05 29.28 18.25 
33333 5.72 -1.08 -5.75 
21 133 36.95 27.93 29.87 
23232 29.77 25.33 18.17 
11312 59.13 56.03 53.46 
11122 74.21 72.20 69.26 
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Table 4.3.4 Number of worse than dead VAS valuations 
Total number 
of valuations 
Month Year Ten year 
Very mild states (Health 344 0 0 4 
state group 1) 
Mild states (Health state 507 2 3 8 
group 2 
Moderate states (Health 569 2 13 28 
state group3) 
Severe states (Health 568 7 22 48 
state group 4) 
Very severe states 830 55 100 204 
(Health state group 5) 
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Table 4.3.5 Parameter estimates for different durations 
Variable One month One Year 10 Years 
a . 107 . 113 . 144 
MO . 055 . 052 . 
050 
SC . 064 . 
073 . 078 
UA . 041 . 
045 . 067 
PD . 079 . 
096 . 096 
AD . 056 . 
063 . 047 
M2 . 045 . 
047 . 059 
S2 -. 006 -. 008 . 001 
U2 . 020 . 
005 -. 044 
P2 . 036 -. 
005 -. 021 
A2 . 003 . 
014 . 031 
N3 . 147 . 
183 . 211 
Adjusted R2 . 63 . 
62 . 55 
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Table 4.3.6 Regression of one month on one year scores 
Males' 
sample = 1200 
respondents = 100 
Females 
sample = 1488 
respondents = 124 
Response: 1 month duration 
Fixed: 0.213 (0.218) 0.301 (0.167) 
Constant -0.096 (0.014) -0.074 (0.012) 
Health state group 2 -0.174 (0.016) -0.145 (0.014) 
Health state group 3 -0.281 (0.019) -0.226 (0.016) 
Health state group 4 -0.364 (0.022) -0.307 (0.018) 
Health state group 5 0.016 (0.014) 0.009 (0.011) 
Age -0.0003 (0.0003) -0.0002 (0.0002) 
Age squared 1.37e-6 (1.94e-6) 1.45e-6 (1.44e-6) 
Age cubed -0.044 (0.022) -0.022 (0.025) 
Education group 2 -0.071 (0.024) -0.022 (0.027) 
Education group 3 0.436 (0.024) 0.510 (0.020) 
Year duration 
Random: 
6e: within individuals 0.019 (0.001) 0.018 (0.001) 
62: between individuals 
0.006 (0.001) 0.007 (0.001) 
RESET test, t-ratio (p value) 0.66 (p > 0.05) 1.60 (p > 0.05) 
Predictiontt: 0.171 0.151 
t 12 male respondents had missing age data and were omitted from the 
analysis. 
tt Based on re-estimation of model on 70% of the data, and comparing 
predicted to actual values of remaining 30% of the data.. 
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Table 4.3.7 
Males 
sample = 1200 
Females 
sample = 1488 
respondents = 100 respondents = 124 
Response: 1 year duration 
Fixed: 
Constant 
Health state group 2 
Health state group 3 
Health state group 4 
Health state group 5 
Age 
Age squared 
Age cubed 
Education group 2 
Education group 3 
Ten Year duration (TYD) 
TYD * Health state group 2 
TYD * Health state group 3 
TYD * Health state group 4 
TYD * Health state group 5 
Random: 
6e : within individuals 
62: between individuals 
0.267 (0.323) 
-0.164 (0.046) 
-0.3714 (0.043) 
-0.450 (0.043) 
-0.577 (0.043) 
0.026 (0.021) 
-0.0006 (0.0004) 
3.77e-6 (2.84e-6) 
-0.015 (0.032) 
-0.017 (0.035) 
0.253 (0.051) 
0.050 (0.060) 
0.198 (0.056) 
0.122 (0.057) 
0.322 (0.062) 
0.020 (0.001) 
0.015 (0.002) 
0.591 (0.185) 
-0.318 (0.053) 
-0.337 (0.052) 
-0.435 (0.051) 
-0.516 (0.051) 
0.0006 (0.012) 
-1.76e-7 (0.0002) 
-1.35e-' (1.55e-6) 
0.004 (0.027) 
0.005 (0.030) 
0.288 (0.060) 
0.277* (0.067) 
0.145 (0.066) 
0.170 (0.067) 
0.277 (0.067) 
0.022 (0.001) 
0.008 (0.001) 
RESET test; t-ratio (p value) 1.38 (p > 0.05) 1.86 (p > 0.05) 
Predictiontt: 0.184 0.183 
t 12 male respondents had missing age data and were omitted from the 
analysis. 
tt Based on re-estimation of model on 70% of the data, and comparing 
predicted to actual values of remaining 30% of the data. 
Regression of one year on ten year scores 
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Table 5.2.1 Questions in Section A 
Current health Mean gain Distribution of 
state M gains 
X and Y X: Y 
QA I 
QA2 
QA3 
QA4 
QA5 
QA6 
Potential outcomes 
under current allocation 
XY 
2 60 1: 4 26 98 
2 15 1: 4 8 26 
2 60 1: 2 42 82 
2 15 1: 2 12 22 
40 15 1: 4 46 64 
76 15 1: 4 82 100 
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Table 5.2.2 Results of Section A 
QA1 
QA2 
QA3 
QA4 
QA5 
QA6 
Equally distributed gain 
Mean gain mean 
M 
Atkinson Index 
I 
median mean median 
60 60.32 60 -0.005 0 
15 16.24 15 -0.083 0 
60 60.54 60 -0.009 0 
15 16.03 15 -0.050 0 
15 15.76 15 -0.050 0 
15 14.70 15 0.020 0 
The Atkinson Index is calculated as 1-ý /M. 
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Table 5.2.3 Attitudes to inequality 
Averse 
(I>0) 
QA I 
QA2 
QA3 
QA4 
QA5 
QA6 
Neutral 
(I= 0) 
Seeking 
(I<0) 
9 14 14 
8 11 18 
9 17 11 
6 13 18 
8 13 16 
18 8 11 
Where I= the value of the Atkinson Index. 
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Table 5.2.4 Results from Sections B and C 
Equally distributed gain 
QB I 
QB2 
QB3 
QCl 
QC2 
Mean gain mean median 
M 
Atkinson Index 
I 
mean median 
15 18.46 19 -. 231 -. 267 
15 18.49 19 -. 232 -. 267 
15 16.19 16 -079 -. 067 
15 18.87 20 -. 258 -. 333 
15 17.67 18 -. 175 -. 200 
The Atkinson Index is calculated as 1-ý /M. 
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Table 5.2.5 Section A results after weighing losses and gains 
Equally distributed gain 
QA1 
QA2 
QA3 
QA4 
QA5 
QA6 
Mean gain mean 
M 
Atkinson Index 
I 
median mean median 
60 48.71 48.00 0.188 0.200 
15 13.48 12.00 0.101 0.200 
60 54.25 53.33 0.096 0.111 
15 14.29 13.33 0.047 0.111 
15 12.92 12.00 0.139 0.200 
15 12.06 12.00 0.196 0.200 
The figures in this Table have been calculated on the assumption that 
potential losses are weighted twice as heavily as potential gains. 
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Table 5.2.6 Inequality attitudes after weighing losses and gains 
Averse Neutral Seeking 
(I>0) (I = 0) (1 < 0) 
QA I 
QA2 
QA3 
QA4 
QA5 
QA6 
35 1 1 
26 8 3 
31 4 2 
27 3 7 
30 1 6 
29 4 4 
Where I= the value of the Atkinson Index calculated on the assumption 
that potential losses are weighted twice as heavily as potential gains. 
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Table 5.3.1 Sample characteristics (n=28) 
Sex: Male 15 (53.5%) 
Female 13 (46.5%) 
Age: 18-24 yrs 3 (10.7%) 
25-34 yrs 17 (60.7%) 
35-49 yrs 5 (17.9%) 
50-59 yrs 3 (10.7%) 
Education: Degree 17 (60.7%) 
Intermediate 10 (35.7%) 
None 1 (3.6%) 
Marital Status: Married 10 (35.7%) 
Divorced 1 (3.6%) 
Single 17 (60.7%) 
Interview time: mean: 42 min (range: 30-55 mins) 
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Table 5.3.2 States used and their mean ranks 
11111 1.04 
11121 2.39 
11112 3.00 
11122 4.39 
22112 5.54 
21222 6.46 
22122 6.54 
11131 7.96 
22222 8.39 
12223 9.14 
21323 10.64 
33212 11.64 
22323 11.86 
Death 14.04 
33333 14.21 
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Table 5.3.3 States identified as the outcome from treatment 2 
Resp. No. Interval state BIS WIS Used in PTO 
2 11121 22112 22112 
3 11122 11131 11131 
4 11121 11122 11122 
5 11122 11122 
6 11121 11121 
7 11122 11122 
8 22112 22112 
9 11131 11131 
10 21222 11122 11122 
11 11122 11122 
12 21333 21222 
13 11121 non-response 
14 11121 11122 11122 
15 11122 11122 
16 21222 12223 21222 
17 21222 21222 
18 21222 21222 
19 22122 
20 11121 
21 22112 22112 
22 21222 21222 
23 22112 22112 
24 11112 11112 
25 11111 11121 
26 21222 21222 
27 21222 21222 
28 21222 21222 
29 21222 21222 
Where BIS is the state that makes treatment 2 just preferred to treatment I and 
WIS is the state that makes treatment 1 just preferred to treatment 2. 
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Table 5.3.4 PTO responses (Geometric mean = 0.694) 
Respondent Treatment 1 Treatment 2 T2/T 1 
7 10 10 1.00 
17 10 10 1.00 
18 10 10 1.00 
6 3.5 10 2.86 
14 4 10 2.50 
22 4 10 2.50 
24 4 10 2.50 
28 5 10 2.00 
3 7 10 1.43 
29 9.5 10 1.05 
9 10 0.5 0.05 
12 10 0.5 0.05 
2 10 3 0.30 
19 10 3.5 0.35 
5 10 4 0.40 
8 10 4.5 0.45 
20 10 4.5 0.45 
26 10 4.5 0.45 
10 10 5 0.50 
25 10 5 0.50 
4 10 6 0.60 
21 10 7 0.70 
23 10 7.5 0.75 
27 10 7.5 0.75 
15 10 8 0.80 
11 10 9 0.90 
16 10 9.5 0.95 
13 non-response non-response non-response 
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Table 5.3.5 Interpretation of PTO qualitative data 
Responses to "Could you tell me why you made this choice? " 
7 Ind 
17 Ind 
18 Tnd 
14 1 
9.4 1 
19. 9, 
19 9. 
9,0 9 
26 9 
25 ? 
27 ? 
15 ? 
16 1 ?. 
13 NR 
Key: 
Pref Preference for either Ti or T2, or indifference (ind) 
A Respondent commented that T1 was not a very good treatment 
B Respondent stated preferred treatment gave greater improvement 
C Respondent commented on wanting to help the worse off 
D Respondent mentioned either economic or societal costs 
E Respondent made some reference to the number of people treated 
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Figure 1.2.1 The EuroQol descriptive system 
Mom 
1. No problems walking about 
2. Some problems walking about 
3. Confined to bed 
Self-Care 
1. No problems with self-care 
2. Some problems washing or dressing self 
3. Unable to wash or dress self 
Usual Activities 
1. No problems with performing usual activities (e. g. work, study, 
housework, family or leisure activities) 
2. Some problems with performing usual activities 
3. Unable to perform usual activities 
Pain/Discomfort 
1. No pain or discomfort 
2. Moderate pain or discomfort 
3. Extreme pain or discomfort 
Anxiety/Depression 
1. Not anxious or depressed 
2. Moderately anxious or depressed 
3. Extremely anxious or depressed 
Note: 
For convenience each composite health state has a five digit code number 
relating to the relevant level of each dimension, with the dimensions always 
listed in the order given above. Thus 11223 means: 
1 No problems walking about 
1 No problems with self-care 
2 Some problems with performing usual activities 
2 Moderate pain or discomfort 
3 Extremely anxious or depressed 
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Figure 2.1.1: A hypothetical value function 
VALUE 
LOSSES GAINS 
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Figure 2.1.2: Mapping Function for TTO Props 
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Figure 2.1.3: Mapping Function for TTO No Props 
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Figure 3.1.1 States valued in the MVH main study 
Each respondent valued 11111, Immediate Death, 33333 and unconscious 
plus 
2 from 5 "very mild" states: 
11112 11121 11211 12111 21111 
plus 
3 from 12 "mild" states: 
11122 11131 11113 21133 21222 21312 12211 11133 22121 
12121 22112 11312 
plus 
3 from 12 "moderate" states: 
13212 32331 13311 22122 12222 21323 32211 12223 22331 
21232 32313 22222 
plus 
3 from 12 "severe" states: 
33232 23232 23321 13332 22233 22323 32223 32232 33321 
33323 23313 33212 
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Figure 3.1.2: The effect of age on TTO valuations 
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Figure 3.1.3: Difference between test and retest 
Values are test median minus retest median 
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Figure 3.1.4 
Distribution of ICCs 
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Figure 3.2.1 Variables used in the modelling 
Variable Definition 
a Constant: associated with any move away from full health 
MO 1 if mobility is level 2; 2 if it is level 3; 0 otherwise 
SC 1 if self-care is level 2; 2 if it is level 3; 0 otherwise 
UA I if usual activities is level 2; 2 if it is level 3; 0 otherwise 
PD I if pain/discomfort is level 2; 2 if it is level 3; 0 otherwise 
AD 1 if anxiety/depression is level 2; 2 if it is level 3; 0 otherwise 
M2 1 if mobility is level 3; 0 otherwise 
S2 1 if self-care is level 3; 0 otherwise 
U2 1 if usual activities is level 3; 0 otherwise 
P2 1 if pain/discomfort is level 3; 0 otherwise 
A2 1 if anxiety/depression is level 3; 0 otherwise 
MOSC The product of MO and SC 
MOUA The product of MO and UA 
MOPD The product of MO and PD 
MOAD The product of MO and AD 
SCUA The product of SC and UA 
SCPD The oroduct of SC and PD 
SCAD The Product of SC and AD 
UAPD The product of UA and PD 
UAAD The product of UA and AD 
PDAD The product of PD and AD 
F11 1 if the health state contains 1 dimension at level 1; 0 otherwise 
F21 1 if the health state contains 2 dimensions at level 1; 0 otherwise 
F31 1 if the health state contains 3 dimensions at level 1; 0 otherwise 
F41 1 if the health state contains 4 dimensions at level 1; 0 otherwise 
F13 1 if the health state contains 1 dimension at level 3; 0 otherwise 
F23 1 if the health state contains 2 dimensions at level 3; 0 otherwise 
F33 1 if the health state contains 3 dimensions at level 3; 0 otherwise 
F43 1 if the health state contains 4 dimensions at level 3; 0 otherwise 
F53 1 if the health state contains 5 dimensions at level 3; 0 otherwise 
N3 1 if any dimension is level 3; 0 otherwise 
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Figure 3.4.1: Comparison of mean and median values 
m 
e 
d 
a 
n 
m 
au 
a 
J 
7, 
Y 
JM 
oý 
ýo 
a 
0 
O 
O d 
as 
a 
0 
a 
a 
as 
as 
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0 
-0.2 
-0.4 
-0.6 
-0.8 
0 0.2 0.4 0.0- 0.8 
mean 
250 
Figure 3.4.2: Comparison of mean and median tariffs 
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Figure 4.2.1: Distribution of discount rates in time preference study 
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Figure 4.2.2: Median and profile values from time preference study 
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Figure 4.3.1: Actual and estimated values from the duration study 
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Figure 4.3.2: Estimated values for the three durations 
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Figure 5.2.1: Atkinson's social welfare function format 
I. 
I 
individual X 
ý'A 
individual Y 
Moving from A to C yields the same health benefit as moving from A to B. But, if 
people are averse to inequality, then moving from A to D may yield the same social 
value as moving from A to B. The Atkinson Index in this case is measured as 1-ý /M. 
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APPENDIX - EXAMPLE SHOWCARD FOR SG NO PROPS 
CHOICE "A" 
EXAMPLE CARD 
NO PROBLEMS IN WALKING ABOUT 
NO PROBLEMS WITH SELF-CARE 
EXAMPLE CARD 
IMMEDIATE DEATH 
NO PROBLEMS WITH PERFORMING 
USUAL ACTIVITIES 
NO PAIN OR DISCOMFORT 
NOT ANXIOUS OR DEPRESSED 
CHOICE B 
100% 
CHANCE 
EXAMPLE CARD 
SOME PROBLEMS IN WALKING ABOUT 
SOME PROBLEMS IN WASHING OR 
DRESSING SELF 
SOME PROBLEMS WITH PERFORMING 
USUAL ACTIVITIES (e. g. work, study, 
housework, family or leisure activities) 
MODERATE PAIN OR DISCOMFORT 
MODERATELY ANXIOUS OR 
DEPRESSED 
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APPENDIX - EXAMPLE ANSWER SHEET FOR SG NO PROPS 
THE CHANCES IN CHOICE A: 
Chances of Success Chances of Failure CHO1CF Rh 
100 in 100 0 in 100 100 in 100 
95 in 100 5 in 100 100 in 100 
90 in 100 10 in 100 = 100 in 100 
85 in 100 15 in 100 x 100 in 100 
80 in 100 20 in 100 x 100 in 100 
75 in 100 25 in 100 x 100 in 100 
70 in 100 30 in 100 x 100 in 100 
65 in 100 35 in 100 x 100 in 100 
60 in 100 40 in 100 x 100 in 100 
55 in 100 45 in 100 x 100 in 100 
50 in 100 50 in 100 x 100 in 100 
45 in 100 55 in 100 x 100 in 100 
40 in 100 60 in 100 x 100 in 100 
35 in 100 65 in 100 x 100 in 100 
30 in 100 70 in 100 x 100 in 100 
25 in 100 75 in 100 x 100 in 100 
20 in 100 80 in 100 x 100 in 100 
15 in 100 85 in 100 x 100 in 100 
10 in 100 90 in 100 x 100 in 100 
5 in 100 95 in 100 x 100 in 100 
0 in 100 100 in 100 x 100 in 100 
Please put aJ against all cases where you are CONFIDENT that you would 
choose the risky treatment in Choice A. 
Please put an x against all cases where you are CONFIDENT that you 
would REJECT the treatment and accept the health state in Choice B. 
Please put a= against the case where you think it would be most difficult to 
choose between having the risky treatment (Choice A) and not having the 
treatment (Choice B). 
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APPENDIX - EXAMPLE OF SHOWCARD FOR TTO NO PROPS 
LIFE "A" 
LIFE "B" 
EXAMPLE CARD 
NO PROBLEMS IN WALKING ABOUT 
NO PROBLEMS WITH SELF-CARE 
NO PROBLEMS WITH PERFORMING 
USUAL ACTIVITIES 
NO PAIN OR DISCOMFORT 
NOT ANXIOUS OR DEPRESSED 
EXAMPLE CARD 
SOME PROBLEMS IN WALKING ABOUT 
SOME PROBLEMS WITH WASHING OR 
DRESSING SELF 
SOME PROBLEMS WITH PERFORMING 
USUAL ACTIVITIES (e. g. work, study, 
housework, family or leisure activities) 
MODERATE PAIN OR DISCOMFORT 
MODERATELY ANXIOUS OR DEPRESSED 
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APPENDIX - EXAMPLE ANSWER 
SHEET FOR TTO NO PROPS 
10 YEARS 10 YEARS 
9 YEARS 6 MONTHS 10 YEARS 
9 YEARS = 10 YEARS 
8 YEARS 6 MONTHS x 10 YEARS 
8 YEARS x 10 YEARS 
7 YEARS 6 MONTHS x 10 YEARS 
7 YEARS x 10 YEARS 
6 YEARS 6 MONTHS x 10 YEARS 
6 YEARS x 10 YEARS 
5 YEARS 6 MONTHS x 10 YEARS 
5 YEARS x 10 YEARS 
4 YEARS 6 MONTHS x 10 YEARS 
4 YEARS x 10 YEARS 
3 YEARS 6 MONTHS x 10 YEARS 
3 YEARS x 10 YEARS 
2 YEARS 6 MONTHS x 10 YEARS 
2 YEARS x 10 YEARS 
1 YEARS 6 MONTHS x 10 YEARS 
1 YEAR x 10 YEARS 
0 YEARS 6 MONTHS x 10 YEARS 
0 YEARS x 10 YEARS 
Place a `+` if you prefer Life "A" 
Place a `x' if you prefer Life "B" 
Place a `=` if you cannot choose between Life "A" and Life "B" 
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APPENDIX - PRESENTATION OF ALTERNATIVES IN `TIME 
PREFERENCE' STUDY 
El 
El 
1 YEAR IN THIS STATE: 
No problems in walking about 
No problems with self-care 
No problems with performing usual 
activities 
Moderate pain or discomfort 
Not anxious or depressed 
FOLLOWED BY 9 YEARS IN 
STATE `AP' 
9 YEARS IN STATE `AP' 
FOLLOWED BY 1 YEAR IIf 
THIS STATE: 
0 
No problems in walking about 
No problems with self-care 
LI No problems with performing usual activities 
Q Moderate pain or discomfort 
Not anxious or depressed 
1 MONTH IN THIS STATE: 
0 
No problems in walking about 
Q No problems with self-care 
No problems with performing usual 
activities 
Moderate pain or discomfort 
a Not anxious or depressed 
FOLLOWED BY 9 YEARS AND 
11 MONTHS IN STATE `AP' 
spi 
012345678910 
Number of Years 
SP2 
012345678910 
Number of Years 
SP3 
01234567891.0 
Number of Years 
Where state `AP' refers to EuroQol state 11111. 
Each of these alternatives was presented in `Life B' on the TTO board shown on page 
265 and was compared to `Life A' (i. e.. years in full health) in the standard way. This 
was repeated for each of the five heýaglth states. 
APPENDIX - EXAMPLE FORMAT OF QUESTIONS IN THE 
ATKINSON INDEX STUDY 
Y 
X 
100 --- 
0 
Respondents were asked to place a tick on the scale on the right to indicate 
indifference between this common outcome for X and Y and the different 
outcomes shown on the left. 
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APPENDIX 
- BOARD USED IN THE `PERSON TRADE-OFFSTUDY 
NUMBER OF 
TREATMENT 1 PEOPLE 
A  'º 
NUMBER OF 
PEOPLE TREATMENT 2 
C 0100- 
B 
D 
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